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FOrEwOrD 
This	publication	gives	a	different	take	on	energy	and	energy	transition.	Energy	goes	beyond	
technology.	Energy	systems	are	about	people:	embedded	in	political	orders	and	cultural	
institutions,	 	 shaped	 by	 social	 consumers	 and	 advocacy	 coalitions,	 and	 interconnected	
with	changing	parameters	and	new	local	and	global	markets.		
This	publication	gives	an	overview	and	analysis	of	several	dimensions	of	the	energy	field.	
The	four	chapters	in	this	publication	are	extracted	from	The Big Picture: The future role of gas,	
a	 report	 by	 Energy	Delta	Gas	Research	 (EDGaR)	 published	 in	March	 2015.	 The	 aim	 of	
that	 report	was	 to	provide	 the	gas	market	parties	 and	 stakeholders	with	 a	 view	on	 the	
long-term	‘big	picture’	of	three	potential	end	states	by	2050.	In	end	state	one,	renewable	
energies	would	dominate.	 In	end	state	 two,	 it	would	be	business	as	usual.	 In	end	state	
three,	gas	would	be	dominant.	
An	 overview	 and	 explanation	 of	 the	 three	 end	 states	 have	 been	 extracted	 from	 the	
original	publication	 and	 appear	 in	 the	 first	 chapter.	The	 second	 chapter	 consists	 of	 an	
analysis	exploring	key	drivers	of	change	until	2050,	giving	special	attention	to	the	role	of	
international	politics,	social	dynamics	and	high-impact	ideas.	The	third	chapter	explores	
a	case	study	of	Power	to	Gas	to	illustrate	how	the	development	of	new	technologies	could	
be	shaped	by	regulatory	systems,	advocacy	coalitions	and	other	functions	identified	in	the	
‘technology	innovation	systems’	model.	The	fourth	chapter	explores	the	case	of	Energy	
Valley	to	understand	how	local	or	regional	energy	systems	respond	to	drivers	of	change,	
based	on	their	contextual	factors	and	systems	dynamics.	
The	 current	 publication	 is	 an	 initiative	 to	 serve	 the	 the	 Hanze	 University	 of	 Applied	
Sciences	Groningen,	where	energy	is	a	strategic	theme.	The	authors,	who	conduct	energy-
related	 research	 at	 the	 Hanze	 University,	 present	 new	 perspectives	 on	 energy	 that	 go	
beyond	the	regular	focus	on	technology.	These	perspectives	could	be	used	to	introduce	
energy-related	 themes,	 case	 studies	and	projects	 into	 the	curriculum.	For	example,	 the	
Power	 to	Gas	 case	 could	be	used;	 students	 could	be	 asked	 to	 choose	 a	different	 energy	
technology	in	order	to	explore	the	various	functions	in	technology	innovation	systems.	
Another	 example	would	be	 to	 ask	 students	 to	 select	 a	different	 regional	 system	and	 to	
analyse	 its	 relevant	 contextual	 factors	 and	 systems	 responses,	 based	 on	 desk	 and	 field	
research.	
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Some	of	the	findings	in	the	publication	could	serve	to	support	existing	or	to	trigger	new	
energy-related	 research	 and	 innovation	 activities	 at	 the	 Hanze	 University	 of	 Applied	
Sciences	Groningen.	The	authors	hope	that	these	perspectives	will	also	serve	to	stimulate	
the	ongoing	dialogue	with	business	to	promote	energy	transition.		
Acknowledgements	are	due	to	Bert	de	Kiewiet	and	the	Big	Picture	project	team,	the	Energy	
Delta	Gas	Research	program	and	the	Research	Centre	Energy,	Hanze	University	of	Applied	
Sciences	Groningen.
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1.  ENErGY TrANSITION END 
STATES IN 2050
Authors: Gideon Laugs – Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Maurice Vos – DNV GL,  
Jan Willem Turkstra – DNV GL, Ferry Lounis – DNV GL
An	overview	of	the	three	end	states	is	illustrated	in	the	diagram	below.	Details	of	these	
end	states	have	been	included	in	the	sections	below.	All	illustrations	and	texts	in	the	rest	
of	the	chapter	have	been	extracted	from	the	original	report	with	permission	from	the	‘Big	
Picture	Project’.	
Figure 1: Average energy mixes of the three identified clusters of future energy scenarios.
In	Figure	1	the	upper	graphs	represent	the	average	absolute	contributions	of	the	different	
energy	sources	to	the	energy	mix.	The	lower	graphs	provide	an	impression	of	the	average	
energy	mix	in	relative	terms.
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1.1 Definition of End State
Energy	markets	are	always	changing,	and	therefore	the	end	state	of	the	energy	transition	
should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 point	 in	 the	 future	 when	 all	 developments	 in	 energy	
markets	have	come	to	a	halt.	Synthesizing	from	the	elements	above,	the	end	state	should	
be	interpreted	as	a	time	period	in	the	future	where	humanity	has	altered	the	technologies	
with	which	it	consumes	energy,	the	quantities	of	energy	it	uses	per	region/technology,	the	
energy	sources	it	uses,	a	certain	technological	lock-in	of	vital	parts	of	the	energy	system,	
confidence	that	the	end	state	is	‘sustainable’	for	the	time	being	(be	it	just	a	few	decades	
or	 longer)	 and	a	public	 consensus	 that	we	have	 reached	a	new	status	quo	and	no	 large	
systematic	 changes	 are	 expected	 from	economic	 and	 technological	perspectives	 and	no	
more	large	changes	are	demanded	by	public	opinion	and	politics	(in	their	respective	short	
term	future).	This	definition	of	the	energy	transition	end	state	will	be	used	in	this	study	
as	leading.
1.1.1 End state: renewables
The	end	state	‘Renewables’	(RES)	is	characterized	by	the	following	factors:
•	 Political: Most	effective	policies	and	measures	to	promote	RES,	long	term	perspective,	
stringent	regulations	and	in	increasing	cost	of	CO
2
.
•	 Economic: Global	population	and	GDP	increases,	investment	in	infrastructure	increases.
•	 Social: Climate	change	awareness	shift,	 increasing	tensions	between	rural	and	urban	
communities.
•	 Technological: Significant	 development	 and	 maturity	 of	 the	 existing	 technologies,	
efficiency	 increase,	 modal	 shift	 in	 transport,	 increased	 R&D	 expenditure	 and	
innovation.
•	 Environmental: Significant	emissions	reduction	after	2020.
Figure 2: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C1: Renewables 
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The	energy	mix	of	the	‘Renewables’	end	state	is	described	in	Figure	2	above.	In	this	end	
state	the	world	energy	demand	is	presumed	to	be	significantly	lower	than	in	other	two	
end	states.	Renewables	play	an	increasingly	important	part,	becoming	the	major	source	in	
both	absolute	and	relative	terms	by	2050.
In	 the	 ‘Renewables’	 end	 state	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 level	 of	 political	 and/or	 policy	
intervention	will	be	high.	Governments	take	action	to	steer	the	energy	system	away	from	
fossil	 fuels	 towards	more	 renewables	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 policy	measures.	 Especially	 the	
scenarios	 from	 environmental	NGOs	 assume	 strong	 national	 and	 international	 policy	
actions,	such	as	a	forced	phase-out	of	coal	and	an	international	framework	for	investing	in	
climate	change	mitigation.	It	is	assumed	that	governments	invest	heavily	in	infrastructure	
to	facilitate	renewables	and	in	R&D	to	improve	renewable	technology.	Most	scenarios	in	
this	end	state	assume	either	a	global	or	a	regional	CO
2
	pricing	system.	The	US	loses	 its	
dominant	position	in	the	geopolitical	system:	it	shares	political	dominance	with	China.
Most	scenarios	assume	steady	global	economic	growth,	largely	coming	from	developing	
countries.	GDP	growth	is	exogenous	to	the	scenarios.	More	global	economic	integration	
with	a	decoupling	of	between	economic	growth	and	fossil	fuels	is	assumed.	It	is	expected	
that	 eventually	 economic	 growth	 will	 decouple	 from	 energy	 demand	 growth.	 An	
increasing	price	of	CO
2
	leaves	no	room	for	investments	in	fossil	power	generation.
All	 scenarios	 expect	 an	 increasing	world	 population,	 reaching	 about	 9	 billion	 in	 2050.	
The	growth	in	population	is	mostly	from	the	developing	regions.	Awareness	shift	by	the	
public	pushes	for	more	political	action	to	reduce	emissions.	Fear	of	climate	change	creates	
political	 turbulence	with	tensions	between	rural	and	urban	communities,	especially	 in	
countries	with	poor	 governance.	 Some	 scenarios	 assume	 a	 change	 in	behaviour	by	 the	
public	in	order	to	decrease	energy	consumption:	such	as	reducing	meat	consumption	or	
reducing	mobility	needs.
The	environmental	NGOs	assume,	besides	a	phase-out	of	fossil	fuels,	a	phase-out	of	nuclear	
energy.	Significant	 improvements	 in	the	efficiency	and	costs	of	 renewable	technologies	
are	assumed	due	to	heavy	public	R&D	expenditures.	The	environmental	NGOs	assume	
almost	 a	 complete	 phase-out	 of	 fossil	 power	 generation.	 Other	 scenarios	 assume	 the	
implementation	of	CCS	to	reduce	emissions.	Some	improvements	are	expected	in	utilizing	
hydrogen	 as	 an	 energy	 carrier,	 but	 no	 other	 fundamental	 breakthroughs	 are	 expected	
within	the	scope	of	 the	end	state.	Due	to	the	 increasing	global	 integration,	 innovation	
spreads	quickly	between	countries,	 increasing	the	use	of	more	efficient	technology	and	
renewable	technology.	Information	technologies	stimulate	the	use	of	more	demand	side	
management	solutions.	Biomass	plays	a	big	role	in	most	of	the	scenarios.	Furthermore,	
wind	and	solar	are	mentioned	as	promising	renewables.	
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Global	carbon	emissions	peak	around	2020	and	begin	to	decline	after	that	as	an	effect	of	
international	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 emissions.	One	 scenario	 assumes	 a	growth	 in	 emissions	
because	coal	will	increasingly	be	used	when	oil	and	gas	reserves	become	depleted.
1.1.2 End state: Business as usual
The	end	state	‘Business	as	usual’	(BAU)	is	characterized	by	the	following	factors:
•	 Political: Focus	 on	 short	 term	 national	 security,	 developed	 countries	 assume	 more	
responsibility	for	climate	change,	RES	support	continues,	increased	CO
2
	price.
•	 Economic: Global	population	and	GDP	increase	and	drive	energy	demand	(especially	in	
developing	countries);	energy	efficiency	grows	in	developed	countries.
•	 Social:	 Income	 redistribution	 affects	 energy	 efficiency	 in	 developing	 countries,	
increased	environmental	consciousness.
•	 Technological:	 Increased	 energy	 efficiency,	 progress	 in	 CCS,	 hydrogen,	 and	
unconventional	fossils.
•	 Environmental:	Moderate	emissions	constraints
Figure 3: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C2: Business as Usual 
The	energy	mix	of	the	‘BAU’	end	state	is	described	in	Figure	3	above.	In	this	end	state	the	
world	energy	demand	 is	presumed	to	be	 significantly	higher	 than	 in	 ‘Renewables’	 end	
state,	but	still	lower	than	in	‘Gas’	end	state.	Fossil	fuels	maintain	their	dominant	position,	
regardless	of	both	absolute	and	relative	growth	of	renewables.
This	end	state	is	based	on	an	extrapolation	of	current	trends	without	major	events	that	
change	the	current	path	to	increasing	the	use	of	all	energy	sources.
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Developed	countries	assume	a	higher	responsibility	for	preventing	or	mitigating	climate	
change.	There	are	policies	in	place	to	promote	renewables	(but	on	a	smaller	scale	than	in	
the	renewables	end	state).	In	some	regions	in	the	world	there	is	a	CO
2
	pricing	system	in	
place,	but	it	is	not	assumed	to	be	a	global	system.	The	political	focus	is	more	on	short	term	
national	energy	security.	Major	producers	see	their	power	increasing	on	the	international	
arena.	One	scenario	uses	only	policies	that	are	already	in	place,	another	mentions	a	cautious	
implementation	of	recently	announced	commitments.
Global	GDP	increases	around	3%	per	year,	but	energy	intensity	of	GDP	decreases	gradually	
due	to	efficiency	and	high	energy	prices.	GDP	growth	is	assumed	to	be	the	main	driver	
behind	energy	demand.	Efficiency	improvement	is	identified	as	a	strong	factor	in	reducing	
energy	 demand	 growth.	 The	 increase	 in	 demand	 for	 energy	 is	 due	 to	 the	 developing	
countries.	OECD	has	a	slightly	lower	demand	due	to	efficiency.
World	 population	 is	 expected	 to	 rise	 to	 9	 billion	 in	 2050.	 Income	 redistribution	 in	
developing	countries	could	adversely	affect	energy	efficiency	and	have	a	major	impact	on	
world	markets.
The	technological	outlook	in	this	end	state	varies	between	the	scenarios.	One	scenario	sees	
a	large	role	for	CCS	in	the	future.	Another	explores	the	possibilities	of	hydrogen	as	energy	
carrier.	 Improved	 engine	 efficiency	 reduces	 energy	 demand	 in	 developing	 countries.	
Technologies	in	unconventional	gas	production	help	to	increase	supply.	Due	to	less	global	
economic	integration	as	compared	to	the	renewables	end	state,	innovation	spreads	slower.	
All	 scenarios	 assume	an	 increase	 in	 carbon	emissions.	There	 are	 some	efforts	 to	 reduce	
emissions,	such	as	a	carbon	price	or	CCS	in	some	regions.	However,	these	do	not	off-set	the	
increase	in	use	of	fossil	fuels.	On	a	local	or	regional	level	there	is	attention	for	pollution,	
environmental	damage,	however	there	is	no	international	climate	agreement.
1.1.3 End state: Gas
The	end	state	‘Gas’	is	characterized	by	the	following	factors:
•	 Political:	Focus	on	short	term	national	security,	RES	support	continues,	increased	CO
2
	
price.	
•	 Economic:	 Global	 population	 and	 GDP	 increase,	 developing	 countries	 catch	 up	 in	
economic	growth,	high	commodity	prices.	
•	 Social:	Concerns	about	energy	security.
•	 Technological:	Progress	 in	unconventional	 fossils’	 recovery,	energy	efficiency,	CCS,	no	
dominant	technology.
•	 Environmental:	Global	 emissions	 increase,	 no	 significant	 international	 agreements	 to	
reduce	emissions	in	place.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C3: Gas
The	energy	mix	of	the	‘Gas’	end	state	is	described	in	Figure	4	above.	This	end	state	has	the	
largest	increase	in	energy	demand	up	to	2050	(compared	to	other	end	states).	Comparable	
to	 the	 ‘BAU’	 end	 state,	 fossil	 fuels	maintain	 their	dominant	position,	 regardless	of	 the	
growth	of	renewables.	Notable	for	this	state	is	the	role	played	by	gas:	it	becomes	the	main	
energy	source	in	both	absolute	and	relative	terms	by	2050.
Just	 as	 in	 the	 ‘BAU’	 end	 state	 there	 is	 no	 international	 climate	 agreement	 in	 this	 end	
state.	 Some	 scenarios	 assume	 a	 CO
2
	 pricing	 system	 to	 be	 in	 place	 in	OECD	 countries.	
Environmental	policy	is	focused	on	the	national	or	local	level.	The	scenarios	diverge	on	the	
political	support	for	nuclear	energy:	some	assume	an	extension	of	the	lifetime	of	current	
nuclear	power	generation,	and	other	scenarios	assume	a	gradual	phase-out.
Most	of	the	scenarios	assume	a	global	GDP	growth	of	over	3%	per	year.	Europe	experiences	
the	slowest	economic	growth	of	all	regions.	Non-OECD	countries	have	the	highest	GDP	
growth	rates	and	also	the	highest	increase	in	demand	for	energy.	Due	to	the	increasing	
demand	for	energy,	energy	prices	are	also	gradually	increasing.	Oil	prices	are	expected	to	
increase	faster	than	gas	prices,	therefore	contributing	to	the	competitiveness	of	gas.	Lower	
gas	prices	are	a	result	of	growth	in	unconventional	gas	production.
World	population	increases	to	around	9	billion	in	2050,	with	most	growth	coming	from	
non-OECD	countries.	One	scenario	mentions	the	possibility	of	local	social	unrest	due	to	
resource	scarcity	and/or	environmental	damage.
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Technological	improvements	increase	the	lifetime	of	fossil	fuels.	Oil	and	gas	reserves	and	
their	recovery	rates	are	increased.	Improvements	are	realized	in	shale	gas,	coal	bed	methane,	
tight	gas,	underground	coal	gasification,	CCS	technologies	and	further	developments	of	
LNG	markets.	 Some	scenarios	mention	 the	adoption	of	 electric	vehicles,	while	another	
scenario	assumes	near-zero	advances	in	transport	technology.	Most	scenarios	do	assume	
some	 level	 of	 efficiency	gains	 in	 energy	use.	The	global	 share	of	 gas	 in	 the	 energy	mix	
increases	with	33%	in	2050,	while	the	share	of	coal	and	oil	declines.	Furthermore,	because	
some	 scenarios	 explicitly	 mention	 developments	 in	 gas	 technologies	 this	 end	 state	 is	
labelled	the	‘Gas’	end	state.	
Global	 emissions	 increase	 significantly,	 however	 the	 increase	 is	 not	 equal	 between	 the	
regions.	Emissions	increase	mostly	in	non-OECD	countries.	In	Europe	they	decrease	due	
to	efficiency	and	the	use	of	cleaner	technologies.
1.2 Conclusions
This	 chapter	 identified	 three	 post-energy	 transition	 end	 states	 representing	 dominant	
views	on	energy	futures	in	published	literature.	The	end	states	are	the	result	of	analysis	
and	grouping	of	various	energy	development	scenarios,	and	are	used	as	reference	futures	
in	subsequent	chapters	of	this	report.	The	end	states	are:
•	 Renewables: The	Renewables	 end	 state	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	 share	 of	 renewable	
energy	 sources	 in	 the	 world-wide	 energy	mix	 alongside	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	 energy	
demand	growth	towards	the	future.	
•	 Business As Usual (BAU): In	the	BAU	end	states,	the	future	(relative)	energy	mix	is	roughly	
the	 same	 as	 the	present	 energy	mix.	However,	 a	higher	 absolute	 energy	demand	 is	
envisaged.	
•	 Gas: The	 Gas	 end	 state	 assumes	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 the	 energy	 demand	 to	 be	
fulfilled	 by	 natural	 gas.	 Furthermore,	 energy	 demand	 is	 expected	 to	 rise	 steeply	
towards	the	future.	
Note: Original Report, Kiewiet, Bert, ed. “The big picture: the future role of gas.”Groningen: Gasunie, 
University of Groningen, Hanze University of Applied Sciences, 2015, to be found at http://www.edgar-
program.com/publications/other-publications
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2.  DrIVErS OF ChANGE  
IN ENErGY SYSTEmS 
uNTIL 2050
Author: Dr. H. Matthee – Hanze University of Applied Sciences Groningen
2.1 Introduction
A	plethora	of	drivers	of	change	remain	likely	or	probable	in	shaping	energy	systems	and	
futures.	Drivers	of	change	are	defined	here	as	any	human-	or	nature-induced	factor	that	
cause	 changes.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 drivers	 discussed	 could	 cause	 changes	 that	 would	
shape	 energy	 systems	until	 2050.	Drivers	here	 include	 those	 that	 cause	 change	directly	
or	 by	 altering	 one	 or	more	 direct	 drivers.	 Implicitly,	 some	drivers	 discussed	below	 are	
endogenous,	where	decision-makers	 influence	 some	drivers,	 and	others	are	exogenous,	
where	drivers	influence	decision-makers.	The	drivers	could	have	a	positive	or	a	negative	
effect	at	different	stages	and	during	different	interactions	and	iterations.
The	World	Energy	Council’s	publication	on	global	energy	scenarios	until	2050	is	based	on	
116	drivers,	grouped	in	five	areas.1	This	chapter	is	structured	along	the	WEC	framework,	
using	the	five	interlinked	areas,	but	with	some	changes	in	formulation,	sub-elements	and	
emphasis.	The	five	areas	are:
1.	 Politics - including	 international,	 regional,	 national,	 local	 and	 group	 politics	 and	
security	challenges
2.	 Social factors	-	including	demographics,	consumer	behaviour	and	high-impact	ideas	
and	institutions
3.	 Economies	-	including	roles,	cycles,	finance	and	trade;	
4.	 Resources and the environment
5.	 Energy systems and technology
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2.2 Politics
2.2.1 International politics
International	 politics2	 will	 produce	 several	 important	 drivers	 of	 change,	 which	 could	
impact	on	energy	 futures	until	2050	 in	direct	and	 indirect	ways.	Energy	 is	directly	 tied	
to	 the	 state	 security	 and	 foreign	 policy	 concerns	 of	 governments	 in	 Asia,	 Russia,	 the	
Middle	East,	North	 and	 South	America,	 and	Africa.	The	 same	 is	 the	 case	 for	European	
governments,	 including	 those	 of	 Germany,	 France,	 Britain	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	
global	energy	sector	will	remain	one	of	the	most-politicized	sectors	until	2050.3	
This	means	that	issues	from	outside	the	energy	sector	may	quickly	embroil	the	sector	in	
unforeseen	and	fast-moving	shifts	and	escalations.	This	could	affect	the	security	of	supply,	
but	 also	 change	 the	 nature	 of	 ownership,	 energy	 alliances,	 the	 relative	 importance	 of	
energy	actors	and	the	relative	priority	of	developing	different	forms	of	energy.	
International	politics	could	also	have	a	significant	weakening	or	strengthening	influence,	
in	 seemingly	unrelated	economic	 sectors,	with	a	direct	or	 indirect	 effect	on	 the	energy	
sector.	 For	 example,	 during	 the	 current	 stand-off	 between	 the	 Russian	 government	
of	Pres.	Vladimir	Putin,	 the	USA	and	EU	member	 states	over	 the	Ukraine	 and	Crimea,	
Russia’s	energy	sector	has	become	a	key	target	for	Western	sanctions	and	also	a	key	means	
of	Russian	pressure.	Russian	counter-actions	have	 resulted	 in	Western	agricultural	and	
other	sectors	being	directly	affected.	They	have	also	including	the	pursuit	of	a	potentially	
stronger	 Russia-China	 energy	 alliance,	 efforts	 to	 strengthen	 the	 civilian	 nuclear	 sector	
in	South	Africa,	competing	with	France	in	this	regard,	and	renewed	involvement	in	the	
civilian	nuclear	sector	in	Iran,	against	the	foreign	policy	aims	of	most	EU	member	states.	
The	shift	of	international	power	from	the	West	to	Asia	and	from	an	almost	unipolar	world	
to	a	multipolar	world	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change.4	It	is	expected	that	China	and	
India	specifically	will	become	more	influential	in	regional	and	international	politics	until	
2050.	They	will	 also	experience	a	high	absolute	 increase	 in	energy	demand	during	 this	
period,	which	will	reinforce	the	wider	impact	of	developments	in	the	energy	sector.	
One	 hundred	 years	 ago	 European	 actors	 constituted	 a	much	 larger	 component	 of	 the	
world	population	and	politically	and	economically	dominated	both	the	larger	West	and	
vast	 parts	 of	 the	world	 and	 international	 energy	 sector.	 Today,	 Europe’s	 global	 power	
has	weakened	and	is	weakening.	The	renewed	strength	of	the	USA,	its	focus	on	the	Asia-
Pacific,	and	the	rise	of	Asian	and	other	powers	in	a	multipolar	world	order	will	reinforce	
Europe’s	weakened	position.5	
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In	individual	cases,	this	could	be	reflected	in	the	bargaining	power	of	Europe-based	actors.	
It	could	also	weaken	the	commitment	of	other	actors	to	political	transparency,	rule	of	law,	
protection	of	property	rights,	climate	change,	minority	group	rights	and	human	rights.	
This	could	result	in	more	reputational	and	operational	dilemmas	and	risks	for	Europe-
based	energy	actors	in	their	external	interactions,	projects	and	partnerships.	
The	 importance	 of	 state-linked	 corporations	 or	 privately-owned	 national	 corporate	
champions	outside	Europe	 could	 also	 act	 as	 a	driver	of	 change.	 In	many	 states	of	Asia,	
Africa	and	the	Middle	East,	energy	remains	a	key	source	of	government	income	and/or	a	
key	factor	in	maintaining	domestic	services	and	socio-political	stability.	In	addition,	state	
or	state-linked	corporations	dominate	the	energy	sector,	whether	in	oil,	gas	or	renewable	
energies.	These	companies	often	form	part	of	the	government’s	foreign	policy,	and	operate	
in	accordance	with	both	strategic	and	economic	 imperatives.	This	 is	 the	case	 in	China,	
Russia,	India,	Iran,	Algeria,	the	Gulf	Arab	monarchies,	Nigeria,	and	Brazil,	among	other	
countries.	More	than	80%	of	the	world’s	oil	and	gas	reserves	are	now	controlled	by	national	
energy	companies.6	These	companies	will	be	competing	and	sometimes	cooperating	with	
EU-based	energy	companies.	
National	policies	and	their	impact	on	property	rights	and	protectionism	will	also	be	an	
important	driver	of	change	in	the	international	energy	sector.	Governments,	for	political	
and	economic	reasons,	have	a	long	history	of	interfering	with	private	property.	Since	1990,	
over	75	emerging	economy	governments	have	nationalized	foreign	investments	or	been	
sued	 for	unlawfully	devaluing	 foreign	holdings.7	This	approach	could	 involve	creeping	
expropriation	in	the	form	of	regulations,	taxation	and	local	content	or	 local	ownership	
requirements,	as	in	Iraq,	South	Africa	and	Russia,	or	outright	expropriation,	as	in	Russia,	
Bolivia,	Ecuador	 and	Venezuela.	The	 economic	 failures	due	 to	 such	 an	 approach	 could	
result	in	privatization	projects,	but	privatizations	carried	out	in	those	countries	plagued	
with	 political	 instability	 could	 be	 renegotiated	 once	 a	 new	government	with	 different	
motivations	and	interests	is	installed.8	
New	alliances,	new	 roles	 and	new	actors	 that	 emerge	will	 also	be	 important	drivers	 of	
change.	For	many	years	after	Western	decolonization	 in	 the	1950s,	 Iran	played	 the	 role	
of	 a	 guardian	 of	Western	 interests	 in	 the	Middle	 East.	 This	 changed	 after	 the	 Islamic	
Revolution	of	1979.	Similarly,	Russia’s	role	in	Eastern	Europe	has	changed	with	its	actions	
in	 the	Crimea	and	eastern	Ukraine	 since	 early	2014.	This	 state	of	 affairs	has	had	major	
political	 and	 economic	 repercussions,	 among	 others	 a	 closer	 energy	 alliance	 between	
Russia	and	China.	Similarly,	since	the	Arab	Spring	of	2011,	energy-rich	Arab	monarchies	
in	the	Gulf,	but	also	in	Morocco	and	Jordan,	have	realigned	in	an	effort	to	stave	off	the	
kind	of	revolts	that	appeared	in	Egypt,	Tunisia	and	Yemen.	Meanwhile,	new	actors	like	the	
south	of	Sudan’s	emergence	as	a	state	and	the	rise	of	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	Syria	have	
changed	the	effective	boundaries	of	authority	in	these	three	countries.9
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2.2.2 regional politics
Regional	dynamics	are	likely	to	have	an	increased	impact	on	international	and	national	
politics,	and	will	therefore	be	an	important	driver	of	change.	This	was	especially	visible	
during	the	so-called	Arab	Spring	or	Arab	Rebellion	of	2011,	when	events	in	one	country	
had	considerable	impact	on	other	countries	in	a	region.
The	nature	and	effectiveness	of	regional	governance	arrangements	will	be	an	important	
driver	of	change.	In	principle,	such	regionalism	is	closer	than	international	institutions	
to	the	sources	of	the	problems	to	be	tackled.	Neighbouring	countries	are	directly	affected	
by	threats	stemming	from	respective	regions.	National	leaders	may	be	more	familiar	with	
one	another	in	regional	institutions,	formal	and	informal.	Regional	instruments	may	also	
be	mobilized	faster	than	those	of	larger	organisations.	
Regionalism	will	however	be	weaker	in	some	regions	and	sub-regions	than	others.	ASEAN,	
for	example,	has	developed	over	decades	a	distinctive	style	of	regional	cooperation	based	
on	 a	 low	 level	 of	 institutionalisation,	 a	 non-intrusive	 agenda,	 informality,	 permanent	
consultation,	and	aversion	to	conflict.	The	dynamics	between	China,	the	two	Koreas	and	
Japan	will	be	especially	important	for	East	Asian	regionalism.
Brazil	would	be	the	only	country	with	the	critical	mass	to	strengthen	regional	cooperation.	
However,	 the	 potential	 for	 regional	 fragmentation	 also	 remains	 strong,	 currently	
demonstrated	by	the	Bolivarian	Alliance,	which	only	include	a	selection	of	South	American	
countries.
In	 the	 Middle	 East,	 Turkey	 and	 secondly	 Iran	 will	 be	 the	 states	 with	 most	 potential	
influence	in	the	period	until	2050.	However,	it	is	likely	that	different	sub-regional	alliances	
will	persist,	 of	which	 Israel	would	 also	 form	at	 least	 an	 ad	hoc	part,	 either	 formally	or	
informally.	Similarly,	no	African	country	has	sufficient	 influence	and	resources	to	steer	
regional	cooperation	at	the	continental	level.	Instead,	alignments	around	Nigeria,	South	
Africa,	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo,	 Egypt	 and	 Ethiopia	 among	 others,	 will	 be	
important	for	the	future	of	the	continent.10
Another	driver	of	change	will	be	the	decline	or	re-emergence	of	Russia	as	a	regional	power.	
If	it	declines,	instability	may	give	East	European	alliances	led	by	Poland	the	need	and	the	
opportunity	to	adopt	a	more	assertive	policy	to	the	east.	The	balance	of	power	in	Europe	
may	 in	 time	move	 slightly	 eastwards,	with	Eastern	Europe	 relying	 on	US	 support	 and	
becoming	more	 important	 as	 the	 demographic	 weakness	 of	 Germany	 and	 France	 has	
effect,	while	Turkey	becomes	 stronger	 in	 the	Caucasus,	 and	 areas	 to	 its	northwest	 and	
south.11
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Neighbouring	states	to	the	south	and	the	east	of	EU	are	likely	to	experience	considerable	
internal	and	regional	turbulence	during	the	period	until	2050,	constituting	another	driver	
of	change.	This	applies	to	most	states	in	these	regions,	and	also	to	particular	states	that	are	
important	in	European	energy	supply	and	transit,	including	Russia	and	Algeria.	While	the	
development	of	renewables	will	remain	a	component	of	EU	global	energy	policies,	these	
policies	will	 focus	 on	 institutional,	 regulatory	 and	 investment	predictability	 in	 energy	
producer	and	transit	states	to	its	east	and	south,	rather	than	just	a	free	market.	
An	interesting	exception	in	this	regard	is	Iran.	It	is	quite	possible	that	Iran,	which	already	
experienced	an	early	“Persian	Spring”	of	 internal	upheaval	after	the	2009	elections,	will	
experience	significant	internal	and	regional	political	shifts	in	the	period	until	2050.	The	
outcome	could	lead	to	the	removal	of	Western	sanctions	against	the	country.	Iran	has	the	
second-largest	gas	reserves	in	the	world	and	the	fourth-largest	oil	reserves.12	Thus,	such	
a	shift	could	significantly	influence	the	gas	market,	at	least	in	Asia,	but	possibly	also	in	
Europe.
2.2.3 The Eu as a region
The	alignment	and	integration	of	member	states	in	the	EU	will	be	an	important	driver	
of	 change.	 To	 date,	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 regional	 institution	 has	 been	 shaped	 and	 sometimes	
constrained	by	 several	 factors.	 Some	of	 them	will	be	drivers	of	 change:	 the	 interests	of	
national	governments,	also	in	response	to	political	shifts	among	their	citizens	and	in	the	
relationship	between	different	parties;	the	capabilities	of	the	relatively	small	bureaucracy	
and	executive	arms;	clashing	visions	of	the	EU	as	enhancing	economic	competitiveness	and	
a	free	market	versus	considerations	of	social	cohesion,	or	of	EU	supranational	governance	
versus	responsiveness	to	national	democracies.	
The	EU	also	quickly	expanded	in	the	past	decade,	with	wide	divergencies	and	sometimes	
tensions	between	individual	countries	and	their	institutions	in	the	northwest,	southeast	
and	south	of	Europe.	Some	member	states	could	come	to	diverge	considerably	from	the	
liberal	 multiparty	 models	 dominant	 in	 the	 northwest,	 as	 indicated	 at	 present	 by	 the	
example	of	Hungary.13
Many	of	the	key	national	governments	in	the	EU,	including	those	of	Germany	and	France,	
are	 strongly	engaged	 in	maintaining	or	 re-gaining	national	power	over	 the	EU.	This	 is	
especially	 true	 for	 energy	 policy,	 which	 remains	 closely	 allied	 to	 foreign	 and	 security	
policy.	In	these	policy	areas,	as	Giles	Merritt,	the	head	of	the	Friends	of	Europe	think-tank	
recently	put	it,	the	EU	does	not	speak	with	a	single	voice,	sometimes	not	even	with	a	single	
squeak.14
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Political	decision-makers	are	also	sensitive	to	their	constituencies.	European	Parliamentary	
elections	 in	2014	 reinforced	a	 trend	of	 limited	participation	by	citizens	of	 the	member	
states,	and	saw	the	rise	of	EU-sceptic	or	–critical	opposition	parties.	In	many	other	parties	
in	 the	 Christian	 democratic,	 social	 democratic	 or	 market	 liberal	 traditions,	 national	
considerations	largely	trump	EU	ones.	
Both	 important	 political	 decision-makers	 and	 their	 political	 constituencies	 thus	 do	
not	 seem	primed	 for	considerable	 stronger	EU	 institutions.	Strong	corporations	 in	 the	
diverse	 energy	 sector	of	national	 states	 also	have	diverging	 interests	 and	 ambitions.	As	
a	 result,	national	energy	policies	 in	Europe	are	 likely	 to	pursue	 several	different	 routes	
simultaneously.	
The	relative	resilience,	skills	and	creativity	of	political	elites	in	Europe	will	be	a	driver	of	
change.	For	decades	they	have	enjoined	relative	stability	and	prosperity	in	most	of	the	EU,	
largely	faraway	threats,	the	remnants	of	post-colonial	networks	and	influence	in	Africa,	
Asia	and	the	Middle	East,	and	the	US-led	NATO	security	umbrella	in	a	bipolar	and	later	
unipolar	world.	This	will	change	in	the	period	until	2050,	while	political	elites	in	Asia	and	
other	parts	of	the	world,	will	become	relatively	more	influential.
The	EU’s	overall	policies	reflect	the	differences	between	member	states	and	also	different	
parties	and	stakeholders	in	member	states	between	the	competitiveness	of	markets	and	
corporations,	and	social	cohesion;	and	between	supranational	governance	and	regulation,	
and	national	democracies	responsive	to	their	citizens.	
The	fragmentation	or	alignment	of	EU-wide	energy	policies	will	be	an	important	driver	
of	 change.	 Until	 about	 2007,	 there	 was	 a	 consensus	 driving	 energy	 policy	 primarily	
with	climate	change	in	view,	but	the	consensus	has	become	fragile	since	the	start	of	the	
economic	crisis.15	Internal	energy	policies	in	the	EU,	like	foreign	policies,	could	remain	
relatively	fragmented	until	2050.	The	capacity	of	EU	institutions	is	limited,	and	further	
restrained	by	current	economic	conditions	in	many	EU	member	states.
By	2010,	most	EU	member	states	considered	moving	back	into	nuclear	power.	After	the	
Fukushima	disaster	 in	April	 2011,	 states	 like	Germany,	Belgium	and	 Italy	backtracked.	
However,	 France,	 the	 second-most	 powerful	 EU	member	 state,	 also	 remains	 the	most	
nuclear-dependent	country,	and	countries	like	the	Czech	republic	also	remains	committed	
to	nuclear	energy.	To	reduce	geopolitical	dependence	on	energy	 from	unstable	regions	
to	the	east	and	the	south	of	Europe,	nuclear	energy	could	in	future	again	constitute	an	
attractive	option	 in	 some	European	 countries.	This	 could	 in	 some	ways	 align	with	 the	
expressed	aim	of	several	Middle	Eastern	and	Asian	states	to	 increase	the	role	of	nuclear	
power.
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To	date,	 the	gas	and	electricity	market	 in	the	EU	are	regional	markets	and	also	subject	
to	national	policy	instruments.	Renewable	energies	constitute	a	part	of	local	or	national	
markets.	In	contrast,	oil	and	coal	remain	embedded	in	global	markets.
2.2.4 National politics
The	 European	 Commission’s	 Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050	
suggests	that,	by	2050,	the	EU	should	cut	its	emissions	to	80%	below	1990	levels	through	
domestic	 reductions	 alone.	 It	 sets	 out	 reductions	 of	 the	 order	 of	 40%	by	 2030	 and	 60%	
by	2040.	It	also	shows	how	the	main	sectors	responsible	for	Europe’s	emissions	-	power	
generation,	industry,	transport,	buildings	and	construction,	as	well	as	agriculture	-	can	
make	the	transition	to	a	low-carbon	economy	most	cost-effectively.16	In	the	EU’s	electricity	
system,	the	rate	of	renewable	energies	of	between	13	and	15%	 is	 still	 far	off	 the	current	
political	goals	under	discussion	of	45%	for	2030	or	65-86%	for	2050.17
However,	 national	 politics	 in	 Europe	 are	 likely	 to	 branch	 out	 in	 several	 directions	
simultaneously	 and	 remain	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 change.	 Even	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 shale	
gas	revolution	was	enabled	by	support	from	the	US	Energy	Department,	the	role	of	gas	
authorities,	and	exceptions	to	the	Clean	Water	Act	being	allowed.18
The	stakeholders	and	interest	groups	related	to	different	forms	of	energy	will	also	be	an	
important	driver	of	change.	For	example,	coal	production	remains	an	important	part	of	
the	energy	sector	in	Germany,	Spain,	Poland	and	others,	with	a	reluctance	to	reduce	state	
aid.	While	many	 states	 have	 reduced	 carbon-production	 on	 their	 own	 territories,	 they	
have	also	increased	carbon	consumption	by	importing	goods	from	carbon-rich	producers	
in	China	and	elsewhere.
National	 and	 corporate	 policies	 about	 the	 production	 and	 transmission	 of	 renewable	
energies	will	be	another	important	driver	of	change.	Many	countries	in	the	EU	have	access	
to	 renewable	 energy	 sources,	 but	 some	more	 so	 than	 others,	 and	 with	more	 efficient	
harvesting	 in	 some	 countries	 compared	 to	 others.	Most	 countries	may	 face	 a	 decision	
between	cheaper	electricity	imports	and	the	security	of	supply	of	domestic	production.	
Thus,	renewable	markets	are	more	likely	to	be	buyer’s	markets	and	a	view	of	electricity	
as	 a	 commodity,	not	 a	 strategic	good.	 ‘Concerns	 about	 security	of	demand	and	 supply	
are	not	expressed	in	diversification	policies	and	the	like,	but	in	a	power	struggle	over	the	
ownership	and	decision	rights	with	regard	to	control	and	management	of	the	grid.’19	
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Another	driver	of	change	would	be	the	greater	impact	of	supply	storage	and	disruptions	
where	renewable	energies	are	being	used.	When	renewables	form	an	important	source	of	
countries’	energy,	geopolitical	interdependencies	may	then	shrink	to	the	size	of	the	grid	
that	 connects	producer,	 transit	 and	 consumer	 countries.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	would	
increase	the	reliance	of	participating	countries	in	a	well-functioning	electricity	grid.	On	
the	other	hand,	any	cross-border	 issues	 regarding	energy	supply	would	be	more	acute,	
because	an	interruption	would	directly	 lead	to	black-outs,	and	the	difficulty	 in	storing	
electricity	would	remove	the	option	of	strategic	reserves.
One	 implication	would	 be	 that	 countries	 with	 certain	 capacities	 would	 become	more	
influential,	 changing	 the	 patterns	 of	 influence	 and	 power	 in	 Europe.	 For	 example,	
better-placed	countries	would	be	those	with	considerable	storage	capability,	high	reserve	
capacity,	 the	ability	 to	produce	 renewable	electricity	at	 times	of	high	demand,	or	 large	
interconnector	capacity	that	allows	the	balancing	of	outputs	of	different	areas.
An	important	driver	of	change	would	then	be	the	role	of	large	business	with	the	experience	
in	 building	 and	 operating	 large	 power	 plants,	 and,	 implicitly,	 the	 viability	 or	 not	 of	
smaller	alternatives.	Most	likely,	the	utilities	will	play	a	prominent	role,	and	because	of	
the	strategic	interests,	states	too.	New	roles	for	Distribution	System	Operators	(DOS)	in	
forecasting,	local	allocation	of	distributed	generation	in	the	network,	and	local	balancing	
of	 generation	 and	 load,	 will	 also	 influence	 developments.	 Grid	 support	 services	 will	
become	more	important	to	address	concerns	about	operational	security	and	reliability.20	
Access	 to	components	of	 the	generators	and	transmitters	of	 renewable	energy	will	be	a	
driver	for	change.	Rare	earth	minerals	are	a	crucial	input	for	certain	wind	turbines,	solar	
panels	and	batteries	for	electric	vehicles.	China	has	been	active	in	acquiring	control	over	a	
large	share	of	the	world’s	resources.	If	this	would	become	a	tool	of	geopolitical	pressures,	
European	energy	sectors	would	be	affected.21
2.2.5 Local/group politics
The	 shift	 to	 non-state	 actors	 as	 agents	 or	 spoilers	 of	 cooperation,	 reinforced	 by	 the	
communications	revolution,	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change.	Transnational	non-
governmental	 organisations,	 faith-based	 organisations,	 multinational	 corporations,	
interest	groups	and	civil	society	organisations	will	continue	to	be	effective	in	reframing	
issues	and	mobilising	public	opinion.	Opportunities	will	exist	to	expand	the	interaction	
between	 state	 and	non-state	 actors	 and	public-private	 cooperation.	Those	with	hostile	
political	or	criminal	agendas	will	be	empowered	by	existing	and	new	technologies	and	
pose	serious	security	threats.
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Minority	 group	 politics	 could	 be	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 change	 in	 Europe,	 as	 well	 as	
in	parts	of	Asia,	the	Middle	East	and	Africa.22	In	the	case	of	the	US,	the	strong	Hispanic	
minority,	with	its	territorial	and	family	links	to	Mexico	and	further	south,	will	change	the	
political	 landscape	of	 the	USA.	Friedman	and	Huntington23	 foresee	a	 strong	possibility	
that	the	borderland	between	the	US	and	Mexico,	extending	far	into	the	US	could	become	
predominantly	Mexican,	with	 the	US	becoming	a	bicultural	nation	with	other	 smaller	
minorities.	Different	constituencies	could	eventually	influence	energy	choices	at	a	federal	
state	level.
In	some	cases,	forms	of	class	and	generational	politics	could	also	combine	with	or	oppose	
identity	 politics	 to	 influence	 energy	 policies.	 In	 the	 recent	 case	 of	 the	 referendum	over	
Scotland’s	independence,	for	example,	a	political	dispensation	that	had	been	in	existence	
for	 almost	 400	 years	 was	 almost	 destroyed.	 The	 result	 would	 have	 been	 a	 new	 energy	
dispensation	in	the	United	Kingdom,	due	to	the	location	of	many	of	its	energy	resources	
close	to	Scotland.	Even	though	the	pro-independence	camp	lost,	its	substantial	growth	in	
support,	especially	among	younger	voters,	the	need	felt	by	British	politicians	to	make	big	
concessions	regarding	devolution	indicate	that	the	issue	is	likely	to	re-appear	on	the	agenda	
until	2050.	In	Spain,	Belgium	and	Italy,	among	others,	local	and	group	politics	could	also	
strongly	reshape	the	political	order	and	local	energy	policy	choices	in	the	period	until	2050.
Another	driver	of	change	would	be	the	capacity	of	countries	or	even	local	communities	
to	be	able	to	become	more	self-sufficient	in	the	production,	transit	and	consumption	of	
renewable	energy.	Where	this	does	occur,	 the	geopolitical	considerations	would	reduce	
significantly	compared	to	the	current	system,	with	its	many	dependencies	in	the	supply	
chain.	
A	 linked	driver	of	 change	would	be	 the	 choice	of	 countries	between	using	centralized,	
large-scale	solar	farms	or	wind	parks	to	generate	electricity,	or	using	decentralized,	small-
scale	 individual	 solar	 panels	 and	 turbines.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 geopolitical	 issues	 would	
largely	revolve	around	communities	wanting	such	forms	of	energy	to	generate	revenue	
and	 jobs,	or	 those,	 for	 example	 in	part	of	western	and	 southern	Germany,	who	do	not	
want	it	in	their	backyard.	In	the	second	case,	it	would	be	relevant	whether	the	renewable	
energies	generated	are	 fed	back	 into	the	grid,	or	whether	net	production	would	evolve	
into	local	energy	markets	and	new	regulatory	frameworks.
An	important	driver	of	change	would	be	to	what	degree	the	incentives	of	producers	and	
consumers	to	cooperate	weaken	or	overrule	the	incentives	to	compete.	Producers	compete	
for	markets,	but	they	share	an	 interest	 in	keeping	prices	high.	Consumers	compete	 for	
access	to	resources,	but	they	also	share	an	interest	in	keeping	prices	low.	Producers	and	
consumers	 rely	 on	 each	 other	 for	 revenues	 and	 energy,	 but	 also	 try	 to	minimize	 their	
mutual	dependence.24	
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2.2.6 Security challenges
Conflicts	 in	 regions	 that	 are	major	 producers	 or	 consumers,	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 driver	 of	
change	until	 205025.	This	will	 especially	be	 the	 case	 in	 the	 context	of	 resource-scarcity.	
Such	areas	often	become	rife	with	corruption	and	organized	crime,	also	in	government	
institutions,	 so	 that	 the	 reputational	 risk	 and	 political	 risk	 to	 energy	 companies	 will	
remain	high.	Such	conflicts	will	not	only	create	 short-term	issues	of	 supply,	but	shape	
energy	security	policies	and	preferences,	as	well	as	the	operating	practices	of	international	
and	national	energy	companies.	
Failed	 and	 failing	 cities	 outside	 Europe	 will	 constitute	 a	 key	 driver	 of	 change,	 also	
reinforcing	migrant	streams	to	developed	countries.	There	will	be	an	increase	in	the	size	
and	importance	of	ethnic	minorities	in	many	countries,	also	in	Europe.	A	high	proportion	
of	young	adult	men	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	will	reach	its	peak	in	the	next	
decade,	 also	 in	migrant	 communities	 in	 some	European	 cities.26	 Some	of	 them	will	 be	
well-integrated	and/or	economically	successful,	while	others	may	not	be,	with	resulting	
social	tensions.	
Technological	 developments	 will	 allow	 migrants	 to	 maintain	 close	 links	 with	 their	
home	communities	and	to	transfer	issues	from	the	home	country	into	the	host	country.	
Depending	 on	 the	 interests	 concerned,	 sometimes	 the	 energy	 interests	 concerned,	
governments	of	the	host	countries	will	have	the	impetus	to	intervene	in	the	countries	of	
origin	or	not.27
The	rise	of	private	security	actors	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change.	In	many	locales	outside	
Europe,	 they	 will	 constitute	 an	 important	 provider	 of	 security	 and	 enabler	 of	 robust	
operations	and	resilience	during	instability.	Somewhat	related,	the	interaction	between	
asymmetric	and	symmetric	forces	and	operations	during	conflicts	will	be	an	important	
driver	of	change.28	
The	expansion	of	alternative	currencies	will	be	a	driver	of	change.	It	may	make	it	easier	to	
transfer	and	retain	funds	anonymously,	harder	to	freeze	the	assets	of	criminals	and	rogue	
regimes,	 and	 reinforce	 the	 flexibility	 of	 actors	 and	markets	 linked	 to	 forms	 of	 energy	
smuggling.29
The	growing	use	of	nuclear	energy	raises	the	possibility	of	fissile	material	obtained	by	non-
state	actors	and	countries	hostile	to	the	existing	international	order.30	Unmanned	energy-
using	systems	will	be	a	driver	of	change,	paying	an	increased	role	during	conflict,	perhaps	
transforming	the	way	battles	are	fought.	Dual-use	technologies	and	the	military	application	
of	available	civilian	means	may	also	play	a	role	in	this	regard.	In	addition,	there	will	be	an	
increased	 reliance	 on	 space	 and	 cyber	 technologies,	 creating	 some	 vulnerabilities	 and	 an	
increased	chance	during	conflicts	of	disruptive	attacks	with	an	effect	on	the	energy	sector.31	
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2.3 Social factors
Demographics	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change.	The	global	population	is	expected	to	increase	
considerably,	with	numbers	 including	a	 rise	 from	7bn	 in	2011	to	9bn	 in	2050.	Such	an	
increase	would	result	in	a	huge	increase	in	energy	demand,	according	to	Shell	by	as	much	
as	80%	by	2060.32	
Due	to	the	huge	increase	in	demand,	investment	in	infrastructure	will	also	be	a	key	driver	
of	 change.	An	estimated	 two-thirds	of	demand	will	be	 in	non-OECD	countries,	which	
are	expected	to	outperform	OECD	economies	by	2030.	Increased	access	to	energy	sources	
and	clean	water,	and	affordable,	safe	and	convenient	mobility	choices	will	be	challenges.	
Managing	pollution	and	traffic	will	be	too.	
The	impact	of	demographic	decline	on	Europe’s	working-age	population	is	different.	A	
lower	potential	growth	rate	is	implied,	and	a	lower-investment-to-GDP	ratio	is	needed	to	
keep	the	capital/output	ratio	constant.	In	some	countries	of	Europe,	higher	investment	
may	only	lead	to	higher	captal-output	ratios	and	imply	lower	returns	on	capital.33
Income	 inequality	will	 be	 an	 important	 driver	 at	 regional	 and	 local	 levels	 outside	 the	
OECD	countries,	 and	may	 shape	 the	preferences	of	potential	 consumers.34	The	growth	
of	a	 ‘new	middle	class’	will	put	pressure	on	prices,	as	a	result	of	the	increased	demand.	
The	middle	class	in	many	societies	will	also	increase	in	influence.	Estimates	are	that	an	
additional	2.6bn	people	will	attain	at	least	middle	income	levels	by	2050.	Individuals	also	
tend	to	consume	most	in	their	lifetime	between	the	age	of	16	and	40,	and	before	consumers	
really	begin	saving	for	retirement.35
Government	 incentives	 and	 social	 activism	 to	 stimulate	 consumer	 demand	 for	 green	
goods	 and	 services,	 and	 public	 perception	 and	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 as	
competitive	differentiators	could	also	be	drivers	of	change	in	consumption,	especially	in	
some	European	countries.36	
However,	the	acceptance	of	consumers	or	citizens,	their	willingness	to	tolerate	a	technology	
in	 their	own	environment,	 could	play	 a	major	 role	when	 launching	new	products	 and	
manufacturing	plants	and	services.	The	public	takes	a	critical	view	of	extensions	to	the	
grid	infrastructure	and	the	construction	of	wind	farms	and	pumped-storage	power	plants	
in	their	immediate	vicinity.	People	could	use	consumer	pressure	groups	but	also	political	
and	administrative	opportunities	 to	question	decisions	after	 the	event,	hindering	both	
conventional	 and	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 and	 increasing	 the	 risk	 of	 total	 or	 partial	
failure.37	
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High-impact	ideas	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change.	However,	one	cannot	foresee	all	or	even	
most	ones	in	future,	since	many	of	them	will	result	from	complex	interactions	between	
people,	symbolic	systems,	structures,	and	as	yet-undeveloped	technologies.	However,	at	
present,	there	are	certain	clusters	of	ideas	with	a	probable	high	impact	in	future,	also	on	
the	 environment	of	 energy.	One	 idea	would	be	derived	 from	 individualist	 and	 family-
oriented	traditions,	and	the	formation	and	lifestyles	of	individuals,	nuclear	families	and	
extended	 families.	 For	 example,	 in	 Indonesia,	 as	people	move	upward	 into	 the	middle	
class,	they	initially	focus	their	spending	on	improving	living	conditions	for	their	families	
rather	 than	 themselves.38	 In	 India,	 young	 consumers	 are	 both	 very	 competitive	 and	
motivated	by	the	desire	to	make	their	families	proud,	whereas	older	Indians	also	have	a	
family-oriented	focus.39	However,	even	in	Europe,	locational	and	regional	variations	play	
a	role	in	this	regard.
The	 second	high-impact	 idea,	 related	 to	 individualist	 and	 family	 orientations,	would	
be	the	position	of	women.	Globally,	in	the	labour	market	and	unpaid	household	work,	
gendered	division	 is	 the	 rule.	Women	 are	 also	underrepresented	 in	 the	 energy	 sector.	
In	many	cases,	professional	access	to	the	energy	sector	is	mainly	based	on	a	scientific	or	
engineering	education,	 in	which	women	are	under-represented,	 sometimes	extremely	
so.	The	fields	of	skilled	trade	relevant	to	the	energy	sector	such	as	construction,	electric	
installation,	 plumbing,	 and	 installation	 of	 energy	 control	 or	 heating	 systems	 are	
dominated	by	males.	40	
Women	 as	 consumers	 may	 have	 closer	 knowledge	 about	 the	 energy	 services	 that	 are	
needed	 for	different	members	of	 the	 family,	different	 energy	needs	 and	different	 ideas	
about	 sustainable	 livelihoods.	 Another	 important	 question	 concerns	 the	 influence	 of	
women	on	policy	 concepts,	planning,	decision-making,	 and	 implementation,	which	 is	
limited.	
Gender,	age	and	communitarian	preferences	may	also	shape	the	preferences	and	behavior	
of	 energy	 consumers.	 More	 men	 than	 women	 believe	 it	 is	 important	 that	 programs	
include	the	latest	technologies,	while	more	women	than	men	are	looking	for	programs	
that	simplify	their	lives	and	are	easy	for	the	whole	family	to	use.41	Younger	respondents	
prefer	programs	that	use	the	latest	technologies,	are	fun	to	use	and	are	regarded	as	trendy.	
Consumers	in	emerging	markets	are	also	keen	on	programs	that	enable	them	to	connect	
with	a	community.42
Cultural,	 religious	and	even	political	 ideas	may	also	shape	production	or	consumption	
processes.	
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Islamic	consumerism,	cultural	production	and	lifestyle	choices	may	play	a	role.43	Techno-
nationalism	 or	 techno	 identity	 politics,	 where	 research	 and	 innovation	 are	 driven	 by	
sentiments	and	ambitions	to	service	the	greater	good,	are	already	visible	 in	the	civilian	
nuclear	sector	of	Iran	and	other	countries.	It	will	also	impact	on	the	willingness	to	infringe	
on	intellectual	property	rights	and	turn	to	industrial	espionage	and	protectionism.
Themes	 of	 human	 rights,	 cross-sector	 partnerships,	 corporate	 social	 responsibility,	
sustainability	 and	 inter-generation	 equity	 and	 alternative	 business	 models	 form	 part	
of	 idea	 clusters	 that	 can	 have	 a	 major	 influence	 on	 future	 energy	 business	 models.	
However,	it	would	be	myopic	to	think	that	such	models	need	to	be	compliant	with	the	
current	dominant	models	in	Western	countries.	In	Malaysia,	models	of	Islamic	business	
governance	 have	 emerged.	 In	 China,	 strong	 sentiments	 of	 a	 social	 hierarchy,	 ethical	
structure,	and	a	strong	sense	of	family	as	the	basic	unit	of	production,	with	its	rights	of	
inheritance	 and	 views	 of	 the	 extended	 family,	 still	 pervade	much	 of	 Chinese	 thought.	
Hinduism	and	the	traditional	caste	system	still	influence	power	distance	and	hierarchical	
business	practices,	 the	 concept	of	 time	and	 fatalism,	and	a	 smaller	 concept	of	personal	
space	and	group	orientation.	44
The	empowerment	of	individuals	vis-à-vis the	state	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change.	
Global	literacy	rates	have	improved	from	an	estimated	73%	in	1990	to	about	84%	in	2010	
and	an	estimated	90%	by	2030.	Access	to	independent	media	and	means	of	mobilization	
have	enhanced	the	ability	of	actors.	Greater	interpersonal	transnational	flows	and	many	
networks	connect	more	people.	However,	this	should	not	result	in	assuming	similarities	
in	outlook	or	the	disappearance	of	competing	visions	and	ambitions.	In	many	European	
countries,	this	empowerment	is	reinforcing	dimensions	of	individualism;	in	Asia,	Africa	
and	the	Middle	East,	many	social	institutions	and	norms	of	solidarity	retain	their	influence	
and	shape	the	conduct	of	empowered	individuals.	
Greater	individual	empowerment	without	sufficiently	strong	social	institutions	will	also	
amplify	overload	and	confusion,	an	unusual	intensity	in	volatility	due	to	the	environment,	
sharp	swings	in	confidence	and	demand	and	possibly	herd	behavior.45
In	 several	 ways,	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 has	 been	 slowly	 shifting	 from	 companies	 to	
consumers.	 Tools	 allow	 consumers	 to	 gain	 information	 about	 products,	 services	 and	
purchases.	For	example,	they	see	their	electricity	expenditure,	compare	prices,	and	track	
their	home	 energy	use.	They	 can	make	better	decisions	or	 even	 automate	 the	decision	
process	based	on	certain	preferences.	
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However,	 several	 trends	 have	 also	 converged	 to	 create	 a	 field	 in	 which	 the	 so-called	
hyper-individual	 or	 hyper-consumer	 would	 participate.	 An	 individual	 can	 use	 skills	
and	the	value	of	freely	available	information	to	regain	control	in	the	market-place.	One	
trend	is	maximizing	behaviour	for	high-value	purchases.	Another	is	the	rise	of	websites,	
apps	and	services	that	can	mine	data.	For	example,	a	real-time	online	price-monitoring	
service	could	suggest	the	best	choice.	The	third	trend	is	the	quantified	self,	who	is	able	
to	 track	 and	quantify	many	aspects	of	 their	 lives	now,	whether	 through	 technology	or	
legislative	prescriptions.	People	learn	and	apply	new	methods	of	choice,	self-monitoring,	
and	information-gathering	in	their	everyday	lives.	Modern	lifestyles	also	pressure	people	
to	lead	a	more	streamlined	life.	The	expanding	middle	class	will	also	expand	the	number	
of	such	consumers	in	emerging	markets.46	
A	 significant	 finding	 is	 that	 socio-economically	 and	 demographically,	 a	 person	 in	 the	
middle	class	of	one	country	has	more	 in	common	with	a	person	 in	 the	middle	class	of	
another	country.	However,	in	terms	of	values	and	aspirations,	people	in	the	middle	class	
or	poorer	classes	in	one	country	have	more	in	common	than	people	in	the	middle	class	in	
some	regions.	In	addition,	due	to	its	low	quality,	many	have	opted	out	of	public	health	
and	education	systems,	turning	to	private	options.	This	has	even	been	the	case	regarding	
electricity,	where	purchases	of	electricity	generators	have	risen	with	income.47
2.4 Economics
Due	to	the	extensive	role	of	the	government	in	most	economies	of	Asia,	the	Middle	East,	
Russia,	Africa	and	South	America,	international,	regional	and	national	politics	will	remain	
an	important	driver	of	change	in	economies.	
The	state	of	Asian	economies	in	general	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change	for	Europe.	
However,	 the	 economic	 centre	of	gravity,	 in	 terms	of	 the	 location	of	 economic	 activity	
and	average	GDP,	continues	to	move	to	Asia.	China	and	India	will	be	the	most	important	
countries	to	make	the	biggest	changes	to	the	overall	energy	landscape	up	to	2050.	According	
to	the	World	Energy	Council,	the	total	primary	energy	demand	of	China	is	expected	to	
double	by	2035,	and	that	of	India	to	increase	by	almost	150%	during	the	same	period.
Economic	turmoil	in	emerging	markets	may	also	inhibit	the	projected	growth	in	Asian	
countries	until	 2050.	For	 example,	 inflows	of	 capital	have	 currently	 created	 substantial	
credit	and	real	estate	bubbles	in	China,	Singapore	and	Hong	Kong.	The	quality	of	economic	
growth	and	economic	institutions	has	not	always	been	controlled,	in	the	case	of	China	also	
due	to	ambitious	local	governments.	Foreign	exchange	reserves	are	being	reduced,	often	
an	 indicator	of	worsening	times.	The	IMF	has	warned	of	potentially	prolonged	market	
turmoil	in	emerging	markets.48	
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An	important	driver	of	change	would	be	the	absence	or	presence	of a	second	economic	
slowdown	or	crisis	in	Western	countries,	and	a	concomitant	decline	in	energy	demand.	A	
second	economic	crisis	cannot	be	ruled	out	yet.	While	governments	have	taken	measures	
and	consumer	debt	and	financial	sector	debt	in	the	US	have	since	the	2008	crisis	reduced	
by	about	12%	and	19%	respectively,	Western	banks	still	remain	too	big,	too	interconnected	
and	too	undercapitalized,	according	to	some	experts.	Some	of	the	type	of	products	that	
contributed	to	the	crisis,	like	synthetic	collateralized	debt	obligations,	have	re-merged	in	
Wall	Street,	and	federally	guaranteed	mortgages	requiring	small	deposits	are	back	in	the	
USA.	Meanwhile,	volatility	in	major	emerging	markets	and	in	Russia	are	impacting	on	the	
export-oriented	European	economies.	49	
Market	movers	will	be	a	very	important	driver	of	change.	Market	movers	include	global	
companies	with	international	supply	chains;	banks	who	can	provide	much-needed	capital	
for	increasing	economy	activity,	venture	capitalists	who	fund	breakthrough	technological	
research	in	order	to	gain	larger	shares	in	successful	new	market	entrants,	and	entrepreneurs	
who	offer	new	goods	and	services.	The	institutional	rules	of	the	game	or	incentive	systems	
of	 global	 companies	 and	 entrepreneurs	may	 be	 especially	 important	 for	 innovation	 in	
particular	countries.	
Economically	interlinked	mega-regions	will	be	another	driver	of	change.	These	include	
the	 meta-region	 spanning	 Amsterdam-Rotterdam,	 Ruhr-Cologne,	 Brussels-Antwerp	
and	 Lille,	 the	 English	 mega-region	 spanning	 London,	 Leeds,	 Manchester,	 Liverpool	
and	 Birmingham,	 the	 German	 mega-region	 encompassing	 Stuttgart,	 Frankfurt	 and	
Mannheim,	and	the	Italian	mega-region	from	Milan	through	Rome	to	Turin.50	
An	 important	 driver	 of	 change	 will	 be	 the	 retention	 or	 possible	 substitution	 of	 the	
petrodollar	system	by	a	more	independent	currency	system	not	based	on	the	US	dollar.	
Already,	there	have	been	efforts	by	countries	ranging	from	China	and	Russia	to	India,	Iran	
and	Venezuela	to	do	so.	To	date,	the	US	political	and	military	umbrella	over	Arab	Gulf	
states	combined	with	the	US	dollar-based	investment	fund	holdings	and	bilateral	trade	
agreements	of	these	states,	have	acted	as	a	strong	constraint.	However,	as	China’s	regional	
and	global	influence	grows,	this	may	not	remain	the	case	until	2050.
Investment	to	address	growing	energy	demand	and	gaps	in	the	infrastructure	needed	for	
the	generation,	transmission	and	distribution	of	electricity	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change.	
It	is	notable	that	the	new	European	Commission	since	late	2014	has	expressly	indicated	
its	ambition	to	create	a	more	attractive	environment	for	foreign	and	local	investment	in	
the	 EU.	 In	 this	 regard,	 energy-related	 infrastructure,	 R&D	 and	 renewable	 energies	 are	
specifically	mentioned.51
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Infrastructure	spending	is	most	expected	in	Europe	from	the	target	set	of	achieving	20%	
of	the	energy	production	from	renewable	energy.	Numerous	projects	are	in	the	pipeline	
that	range	from	tidal,	solar,	wind,	bio	fuel,	bio	waste,	geothermal,	and	other	resources.	
Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	systems	will	both	require	and	be	facilitated	by	a	large-scale	
infrastructure.	The	choice	of	public	and	private	 financing	 instruments	depends	on	the	
stage	of	development	of	the	technologies	or	projects,	but	could	also	be	shaped	by	EU	CO
2
	
credits,	spending	priorities	and	regulatory	hurdles.	
Greater	 economic	 volatility	 and	 cyclicality	 and	 more	 uncertainty	 and	 risk	 will	 be	 an	
important	 driver	 of	 change.	 The	 recession	 has	 also	 provided	 governments,	 anxious	 to	
weather	the	downturn,	with	opportunities	to	take	regulatory	measures.	Concerns	about	
employment,	 debt,	 economic	 competitiveness,	 energy	 security	 and	 climate	 change	 are	
now	being	used	to	justify	this.	These	measures	are	accelerating	or	delaying	energy	system	
change,	depending	on	the	political	or	economic	circumstances.	
2.5 resources and environment
Rare	 earth	 elements	will	 be	 a	 driver	 of	 change.	China’s	 policy	 of	 limiting	REE	 exports	
has	 resulted	 in	 high	 prices,	 with	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 cost	 structure	 of	 the	 clean-tech	
industry	which	uses	REE	for	manufacturing	magnets	and	solar	PVs.	Reopened	mines	and	
development	of	resources	will	not	affect	this	state	of	affairs	in	the	short	term.	
Mining	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change	regarding	the	environment.52
Farmland	 will	 become	 a	 scarce	 resource	 and	 a	 driver	 of	 change,	 also	 because	 of	 non-
OECD	economies	increasing	their	consumption	of	meat	and	agricultural	commodities.	
As	populations	continue	 to	grow,	more	pressure	will	be	put	on	 land,	water,	 and	 forest	
resources.	
Agriculture	 is	 still	 of	 major	 importance	 in	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 people	 in	 Asian	 and	
African	 countries,	 and	 more	 energy-intensive	 than	 manufacturing.	 Major	 projects	
of	 industrialization	 are	 also	 expected	 in	 non-OECD	 countries,	 concomitant	 with	 the	
emergence	of	new	middle	classes.	With	an	apparent	emerging	stress	nexus	between	water,	
energy	and	food53,	tightness	of	supply	could	feed	off	each	other.	
By	2050	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 there	will	be	an	extra	2	billion	people	 to	 feed	worldwide.	 If	
they	would	want	 to	consume	as	much	nutrition	as	 today’s	developed	countries,	global	
food	production	will	have	to	rise	by	110%	over	today’s	levels	in	the	next	40	years.	However,	
global	food	demand	has	been	met	by	an	increase	in	productivity	and	not	an	increase	in	the	
amount	of	farmland.	Already,	Middle	Eastern	countries	and	their	sovereign	wealth	funds	
have	begun	to	look	overseas	for	growing	crops	needed	for	domestic	consumption.	Foreign	
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ownership	frameworks	may	be	affected,	with	some	flow-over	potential	to	the	ownership	
of	foreign	energy	companies,	as	currently	in	South	Africa.	Demand	for	fertilisers	will	also	
increase,	influencing	the	price	of	oil.54	
Future	energy	emissions	hinge	on	a	patchwork	of	policy	frameworks	developing,	especially	
in	Asian	economies.	CO
2
	policies	adopted	in	the	OECD	over	the	next	decades	will	be	a	key	
driver	of	change.	This	will	slow	overall	emissions	growth.55	However,	different	countries	
will	develop	different	strategies	for	decarbonising	transport.	Some	countries	will	impose	
carbon	taxes,	others	will	develop	or	join	emission	trading	schemes,	while	others	will	put	in	
place	technology	or	resource	targeted	plans.	More	expensive	renewables	could	be	favoured	
with	technology	developers	chasing	government	subsidies	and	feed-in	tariffs.	There	is	a	
higher	level	of	low-carbon	technology	transfer	into	developing	nations.
Energy	supply	security	could	surpass	environmentally-friendliness	as	a	policy	priority	in	
most	countries	of	 the	world.	According	to	 the	World	Energy	Council,	 this	 is	 the	result	
of	 scandals	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 science	 calling	 for	 climate	 change	 and	 failures	
in	 reducing	 emissions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 policy-makers	 to	 address	
economic	recessions.56
As	 stated	by	 the	Word	Energy	Council,	 global	 energy	until	 2050	will	 be	 influenced	by	
three	aspects,	namely	growing	complexity	in	energy	systems,	the	high	speed	of	change,	
and	institutional	tipping	points	and	the	failure	to	deliver	of	existing	institutions.57	Shell	
already	 indicated	one	of	 the	 implications	 in	2008,	by	 indicating	There are No Ideal Answers	
(TANIA).58
2.6 Energy and technologies
Selective	 government	policies	will	 be	 a	 very	 important	driver	 of	 change,	 regarding	 the	
energy	domain	in	general	but	also	regarding	technologies	specifically.	The	energy	policies	
of	major	powers	like	China	and	India	are	going	to	be	of	interest,	given	the	shift	in	both	
power	and	economic	importance	to	Asia.	
China	is	estimated	to	be	home	to	the	most	technically-accessible	shale	gas	in	the	world.	
59	At	present,	shale	gas	exploration	has	met	with	limited	success.	However,	these	initial	
setbacks	also	were	 the	case	 in	 the	US,	and	shale	extraction	technologies	are	developing	
at	a	high	pace.	As	 in	the	US,	marked	shifts	could	be	possible	 in	future.	As	 indicated	by	
Shell	and	BP	but	also	by	academic	experts,	gas,	rather	than	oil,	will	be	crucial	for	China’s	
push	away	from	coal,	currently	used	for	the	major	part	of	power	generation.	Gas	will	be	
important	not	only	in	reducing	emissions,	but	in	aligning	grids	to	be	more	reliable	when	
supplying	alternative	energies.60	
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In	some	scenarios	 for	China,	moderate	growth	could	mean	a	slight	decrease	 in	coal,	an	
increase	in	the	next	decade	in	the	use	of	gas	from	3%	to	13%,	of	wind	energy	from	4%	to	15%,	
of	nuclear	energy	from	1%	to	7%,	of	solar	energy	to	3%.	Such	a	major	increase	is	not	foreseen	
for	oil	in	the	case	of	China	under	conditions	of	moderate	economic	growth.61
India’s	energy	policy	will	be	important	regarding	the	position	of	coal	in	the	global	energy	
mix.	 Coal	 is	 the	mainstay	 of	 India’s	 energy	 sector	 and	 accounts	 for	more	 than	 50%	 of	
primary	commercial	energy	supply,	69%	of	total	primary	energy	supply	(TPES)	comes	from	
coal-based	thermal	power	stations	and	import	dependency	is	growing.	The	new	activist	
and	 business-oriented	 government	 of	 Narendra	 Modi	 in	 India,	 experiencing	 popular	
frustration	 about	 uneven	 energy	 services,	 are	 focusing	 on	 drastic	 measures	 to	 resolve	
the	situation.	Modi,	after	 successes	with	solar	energy	 in	his	 state	Gujerat,	has	now	also	
envisioned	solar	energy	and	to	a	lesser	degree	wind	energy	as	the	most	important	sectors	
to	address	energy	issues	in	India.	This	could	be	costly,	but	if	so,	in	the	case	of	India,	the	
development	of	the	nuclear	energy	sector	would	be	the	cheapest	alternative	of	all.62	
The	global	position	of	coal	and	nuclear	energy,	especially	 the	 former,	are	 two	variables	
that	could	rend	the	three	end-state	scenarios	less	accurate.	According	to	the	World	Energy	
Council,	China	is	expected	to	overtake	the	US	to	become	the	world’s	largest	economy	by	
2020,	but	China	 itself	 is	 likely	 to	be	overtaken	by	 India	by	2050.	This	 could	 result	 in	a	
resource	 crunch	 between	 domestic	 energy	 resources	 and	 demand,	 especially	 for	 coal.	
Demand	for	coal	in	South	Korea	and	Japan	is	also	likely	to	remain	strong.	The	global	steel	
sector	is	also	expected	to	continue	to	influence	the	demand	for	coal.	
The	exploration	and	production	of	unconventional	gas	 from	shale	 formations	will	also	
be	an	 important	driver	of	change.	Rapid	developments	 in	technology	have	allowed	the	
USA	since	about	2000	to	strongly	increase	the	recovery	and	production	of	natural	gas	from	
shale	formations.	Unconventional	gas	is	relatively	clean	but	will	prolong	the	reliance	on	
fossil	fuels.	It	will	reduce	the	drive	toward	renewable	energy	in	the	USA.	However,	much	
and	expensive	investment	will	be	needed.	Existing	reserves	of	shale	gas	are	often	far	from	
existing	pipeline	infrastructure	and	refineries	designed	to	process	heavier	crude	oil.	Shale	
gas	 is	 also	 produced	 with	 fewer	 additional	 potential	 products	 than	 orthodox	 oil,	 and	
existing	reserves	in	the	US	at	present	also	seem	to	have	a	shorter	lifespan.63
The	 impact	 of	 the	 US	 shale	 gas	 revolution	 on	 European	 energy	 policies	 and	 prices	 is	
another	driver	of	change.	The	success	of	North	America’s	shale	gas	production	may	inspire	
responses	by	other	countries	in	the	northern	and	southern	hemisphere.	Many	European	
countries	 already	have	 a	 high	motive	 to	 redirect	 their	 energy	 security	 away	 from	 their	
current	reliance	on	Russian	gas.	The	current	crisis	over	Ukraine	and	the	Crimea,	which	is	
impacting	on	European	economies	due	to	a	spiral	of	sanctions	and	counter-sanctions,	is	
reinforcing	this	motive.	However,	it	is	likely	that	the	situation	will	differ	per	country	in	
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Europe.	In	some	cases,	like	Austria,	Croatia,	Greece,	Hungary	and	Bulgaria,	the	motive	was	
previously	lower	and	mutual	gas	projects	with	Russia	were	supported,	even	though	they	
could	reinforce	energy	dependence.	64	
The	 aftermath	 of	 the	 shale	 gas	 revolution	 could	 influence	 the	 mix	 between	 gas	 and	
other	energy	elements	in	consumer	countries,	promoting	a	greater	share	for	gas	in	these	
mixtures.	At	present,	gas	contracts	are	often	linked	to	long-term	high-priced	oil	contracts.	
However,	 rising	 gas	 supplies	 and	 the	 option	 of	 several	 suppliers	 may	 result	 in	 many	
consuming	countries	becoming	less	willing	than	at	present	to	contract	large	volumes	of	
gas	over	a	long	period	or	to	link	it	to	oil	supply	contracts.65	
Competition	 and	 sometimes	 cooperation	 between	 and	 International	 and	National	Oil	
Companies	 (IOCs	&	NOCs)	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change.	Trends	that	will	 shape	their	
performance	will	 be	 business	models,	 diversification	 into	 other	 forms	 of	 energy,	 joint	
ventures,	the	stipulations	of	negotiated	contracts,	and	changing	business	practices.	
Oil	supply	and	oil	prices	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change,	the	latter	also	in	decisions	
to	produce	shale	gas.	How	OPEC	responds	to	oil	prices	could	influence	events.	However,	
the	current	geopolitical	divisions	between	Saudi	Arabia	and	other	GCC	states	on	the	one	
hand	 and	 Iran,	 Syria	 and	 Iraq	on	 the	other,	 could	 also	be	 reflected	 in	OPEC	 finding	 it	
difficult	to	respond	to	a	crisis.	Just	after	the	shale	gas	revolution	in	the	US,	Iran,	Venezuela,	
and	some	North	and	Sub-Saharan	African	producers	differed	strongly	from	Saudi	Arabia	
and	 other	GCC	 states	 in	OPEC.66	 Likewise,	OPEC	members’	 different	 interests	may	 be	
difficult	to	reconcile	if	some	of	the	above	drivers	and	enablers	are	active.
Oil	 demand	 will	 be	 another	 important	 driver	 of	 change.67	 Oil	 demand	 projections	
by	 energy	 majors	 often	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 major	 impact	 new	 government	
policies	could	have,	also	in	India	and	China.	Other	factors	could	reinforce	the	effect	of	oil	
demand	destruction.	These	would	include	current	economic	turmoil	in	key	oil	markets,	
political	pressures	that	may	make	alternative	energy	sources	more	attractive,	the	counter-
productive	effect	of	high	oil	prices,	and	the	potential	oil	substitution	impact	of	renewable	
energies	and	policies	related	to	them	in	key	markets.
Oil	 demand	 destruction	 could	 result	 in	 significantly	 falling	 oil	 revenues	 for	 states	 in	
the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	affecting	available	budgets	and	the	ability	to	provide	
sufficient	services	for	often	growing	populations.	The	cost	of	social	stabilization	systems	
and	other	needed	 investment	as	oilfields	decline	may	sharply	reduce	the	actual	benefit	
from	even	high	oil	prices.	This	is	evident	in	Saudi	Arabia,	where	the	estimated	cost	of	the	
social	stabilization	has	increased	from	about	$50	per	barrel	of	oil	in	2002	to	$94	per	barrel	
in	2012	and	$98	today.68	
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This,	 in	 turn,	 could	 trigger	 instability	 in	 one	 or	 more	 countries	 of	 the	 region	 in	 the	
next	 decade,	 reinforcing	 insecurity	 on	 Europe’s	 southern	 border.	Given	 the	 social	 and	
demographic	situation	of	the	region,	the	soft	warning	in	the	IEA’s	World Energy Investment 
Report	in	2014	remains	relevant.	If	the	oil	price	stabilizes	around	current	levels	and	increases	
only	moderately	 to	 2035,	 “governments	 that	 have	 become	 accustomed	 to	 burgeoning	
hydrocarbon	revenues	could	be	in	for	a	difficult	period	of	adjustment.”	69
The	possibility	of	oil	demand	destruction	in	many	ways	challenges	the	accepted	wisdom	
that	oil	demand	will	continue	to	grow,	especially	in	Asian	countries.	However,	this	is	a	
complex	 issue	 involving	 many	 actors,	 possible	 interactions	 and	 less	 visible	 feedback	
loops.	Unintended	 consequences	 and	new	 events	 could	 result	 in	many	quick	 shifts,	 as	
has	happened	in	the	energy	markets	in	the	past	decades	and	also	with	the	shale	energy	
revolution,	which	was	largely	unforeseen	in	the	1990s.	
As	indicated	by	Paul	Stevens,	higher	oil	prices	and/or	oil	price	volatility	could	persuade	
governments	 to	 turn	 to	 alternatives.70	 The	 International	 Energy	Agency	has	 developed	
several	possible	scenarios,	based	on	governments’	choice	for	renewable	energies.	In	the	so-
called	450 Scenario	governments	introduce	policies	until	2035	to	reach	the	globally	accepted	
aim	of	not	more	than	a	2	degree	Celsius	increase	in	global	temperatures.	Oil	demand	in	
such	a	scenario	would	drop	by	13%	compared	to	today.71
However,	 the	majority	 view	 among	 analysts	 still	 is	 a	 tremendous	 rise	 in	 oil	 demand.	
Non-OPEC	conventional	crude	supply	will	 then	also	be	a	driver	of	change.	 It	has	been	
falling,	but	the	fall	could	be	slowed	by	new	discoveries	like	that	in	deep	water	off	Brazil	
and	 reserves	 in	 existing	 fields	 being	 upwardly	 revised	 with	 the	 application	 of	 new	
technologies,	viable	in	higher	oil	price	environments.	This	decline	could	also	be	mitigated	
by	 supplementary	 sources	 like	 unconventional	 oil	 and	 biofuels.	 Interactions	 between	
individual	types	of	energy,	their	markets	and	their	prices	will	reinforce	complexity,	also	
the	virtual	impossibility	of	forecasting	the	future	nature	and	extent	of	global	demand.72
Drivers	 in	 the	 technology	 domain	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 significantly	 change	 the	
energy	 sector	 but	 also	 its	 position	 relative	 to	 other	 sectors,	 like	 electricity,	 transport,	
construction,	and	telecommunications.	 Important	new	developments,	 the	convergence	
or	 re-constitution	of	different	domains	 in	production	or	 consumption,	 and	disruptive	
innovations	and	breakthroughs	are	assumed	until	2050.	This	is	due	to	the	current	state	of	
technologies,	the	time	period	involved,	continuous	challenges	and	the	current	speed	and	
scope	of	new	knowledge	generation.
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Some	 areas	 of	 potential	 technological	 developments	 or	 breakthroughs	 would	 be	
continuing	engine	developments	with	improved	efficient	combustion,	electric	vehicles,	
‘plug-in’	 hybrids	 and	 mass	 market	 fuel	 cell	 hybrid	 vehicles,	 oil	 recovery-	 horizontal	
drilling,	4-D	seismic,	downhole	enhancements	and	shale	gas	technologies.	They	would	
have	strong	implications	for	improved	recovery.	
The	outsourcing	of	R&D	to	Asia	will	be	an	important	driver	of	change.	Already	increasing,	
this	 will	 include	 the	 transfer	 of	 entire	 laboratories,	 subcontracting	 to	 Asian	 research	
organizations,	 and	 through	 collaborative	 R&D	 projects.	 Uncertainties	 over	 human	
resources,	fraud,	and	unclear	property	rights	will	only	have	a	limited	effect	on	this	trend.	
However,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 innovation	 is	 strongly	 guarded	 or	 extensively	 shared	 or	
copied	will	be	important.	Such	an	outsourcing	will	interact	with	the	extensive	focus	on	
R&D	in	the	policies	of	China	and	other	Asian	countries.73
The	 reversal	 of	 an	 Asian	 brain	 drain	 to	 some	Western	 countries	 will	 be	 an	 important	
driver	 of	 change.	 Asian	 knowledge	 elites	 increasingly	 leave	 their	mark	 on	 the	 world’s	
top	multinationals,	high–tech	companies,	and	universities.	Conditions	for	research	and	
innovation	in	Asia	still	leave	much	to	be	desired.	Whether	it	is	solved	by	a	more	open	and	
competitive	approach,	or	a	closed	and	exclusionary	one,	will	shape	change.	
The	 speed,	 lead-time	 and	 direction	 of	 development	 for	 new	 energy	 technologies	 will	
be	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 change.	 New	 energy	 technologies	 must	 be	 demonstrated	
at	 commercial	 scale	 and	 require	 thirty	years	of	 sustained	double-digit	growth	 to	build	
industrial	 capacity	 and	 grow	 sufficiently	 to	 feature	 at	 even	 1-2%	 of	 the	 energy	 system.	
The	policies	in	place	in	the	next	five	years	shape	investment	for	the	next	ten	years,	which	
largely	shape	the	global	energy	picture	out	to	2050.	
Energy	 efficiency	 will	 be	 a	 very	 important	 driver	 of	 change	 in	most	 corporations	 and	
economies.74	 In	several	countries,	 the	potential	gains	 in	this	regard	are	still	substantial.	
The	relevant	technologies	and	learning	curves	could	change	quickly.
2.7 Key findings
This	 chapter	 identified	multiple	 drivers	 of	 change	 in	 energy	 systems	 until	 2050.	 They	
would	cause	change	directly	or	by	altering	one	or	more	direct	drivers	or	recombining	in	
diverse	ways.	Drivers	could	influence	decision-makers,	and	in	some	cases	decision-makers	
could	influence	drivers.	The	drivers	could	have	a	positive	or	a	negative	effect	at	different	
stages	 and	 during	 different	 interactions	 and	 iterations.	 They	 could	 shape	 but	 also	 be	
shaped	by	energy	systems	in	complex	ways.	
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A	key	 finding	 is	 that	 the	 international	political	 and	economic	order	 is	becoming	more	
multipolar	than	three	decades	ago,	and	that	drivers	of	change	can	have	a	different	effect	
in	different	parts	of	the	world.	If	one	looks	at	the	world	as	a	whole,	components	of	end	
state	2	 (Business	as	Usual)	and	end	state	3	 (Gas)	seem	more	plausible	than	those	of	end	
state	1	(Renewables).	
Given	the	policies	and	strategies	in	the	EU,	the	EU	may	differ	from	the	world	as	a	whole	
in	this	regard,	with	components	of	end	state	1	also	being	plausible	there.	Internal	energy	
path	dependencies,	 forces	and	 interactions	 in	the	EU	are	not	aligned,	and	not	 likely	 to	
be	aligned	well	soon.	There	is	a	significant	chance	that	end	state	1	could	at	least	partially	
emerge	in	some	member	states	or	regions	of	the	EU	only,	rather	than	in	the	whole	of	the	
EU.	In	this	regard,	it	is	also	relevant	that	renewable	energies	constitute	a	part	of	local	or	
national	markets,	whereas	oil	and	coal,	for	example,	remain	embedded	in	global	markets.	
It	cannot	be	excluded	that	at	least	parts	of	Europe	would	reach	a	significantly	different	end	
state	compared	to	major	parts	of	the	world	by	2050.
The	role	of	social	and	political	actors	on	energy	systems	is	likely	to	be	more	prominent,	
based	 on	 global	 trends.	 In	 Europe,	 this	 will	 be	 noticeable	 at	 the	 local,	 national	 and	
international	level.	At	the	local	level,	high-impact	social	ideas	like	green	consumerism	and	
limited	acceptance	of	energy	systems	that	result	in	major	trade-offs,	could	be	important	
drivers	of	change.	Nationally,	the	empowerment	of	individuals	and	communities	relative	
to	the	state	and	as	producers	of	some	forms	of	energy	and	the	politicization	of	energy-
related	 issues	will	 be	 key	 drivers	 of	 change.	 Internationally,	 energy	 issues	will	 at	 least	
remain	important	or	become	even	more	so	in	the	foreign	and	security	policies	of	countries	
and	the	geopolitics	of	non-state	actors.	
What	does	this	mean	in	practice	for	European	energy	planners	and	policy-makers?	The	
variable	impact	of	drivers	of	change,	but	also	of	path	dependencies,	diverse	frameworks	of	
global	and	EU-level	actors,	and	the	increased	potential	for	self-organization,	means	that	
the	scope	and	impact	of	known	unknowns,	unknown	knowns	and	unknown	unknowns	
in	energy	systems	until	2050	can	be	potentially	vast.	
The	 identified	drivers	of	 change	and	 the	 complex	ways	 in	which	 they	 can	 interact	 and	
reshape	 futures	 confirm	 that	 lock-in	 effects	 remain	 among	 the	 greatest	 risks.	 In	 EU	
member	states,	flexibility	and	modularity,	rather	than	energy	platforms	only	focused	on	
one	end-state,	would	be	highly	advisable.
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3.1 Introduction
The	three	end	states	presented	in	Chapter	1 show	a	considerable	share	of	renewable	energy	
in	the	energy	mix	as	it	develops.	This	corresponds	with	the	European	energy	policy	and	
plans	as	 they	are	 stated	 in	Energy	20201,	Energy	 trends	20302	 and	 the	Energy	Roadmap	
20503.
The	 growing	 share	 of	 renewable	 energy	 will	 for	 a	 large	 part	 be	 realized	 with	 wind,	
hydroelectric	and	solar	power.	Besides	having	both	low	life	cycle	carbon	emissions,	wind	
and	solar	power	are	also	intermittent	energy	sources.	This	increases	the	need	for	overall	
flexibility	in	the	energy	system	strongly4/5.
The	energy	system	has	to	adapt	to	intermittent	energy	sources,	such	as	wind	power	and	
solar	energy,	which	provide	energy	in	a	fluctuating	manner.	Energy	storage	is	the	solution.	
In	 times	of	 excess	 electricity	production	 the	 energy	has	 to	be	 stored.	Power	 to	Gas	 is	 a	
technology	that	offers	this	storage	option.
The	basic	principle	of	the	power-to-gas	concept	is	the	bidirectional	linking	of	the	existing	
infrastructure	units	(the	electricity	grid	and	the	gas	grid)	with	the	goal	of	establishing	a	
new	way	of	managing	loads	and	generation,	which	enables	high	proportions	of	fluctuating	
electricity	generation	from	renewable	energy	sources	to	be	accommodated	in	the	energy	
system.	To	date,	this	link	only	exists	in	terms	of	generating	electricity	from	natural	gas	
(gas	to	power),	but	not	vice	versa	(power-to-gas)6.	
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The	power-to-gas	principle	is	shown	in	Figure	1:	Power-to-gas	concept	for	bidirectional	
coupling	 of	 the	 electricity	 and	 gas	 grids..	 Excess	 electricity	 is	 converted	 into	hydrogen	
using	electrolysis.	The	hydrogen	can	be	used	in	three	ways7.	In	the	first	place	the	hydrogen	
can	 be	 injected	 in	 the	 gas	 grid	 but	 only	 up	 to	 a	 limited	 amount	 since	 the	 gas	 grid	 is	
designed	to	transport	and	store	natural	gas	and	not	hydrogen8/9.	Secondly	the	hydrogen	
can	be	converted	into	methane.	Methane	can	be	injected	into	the	gas	grid	on	a	large	scale.	
The	CO
2
	that	is	needed	for	methanation	can	be	provided	by	a	bio	gasification	plant10	or	
through	carbon	capture	storage	(CCS).	The	third	option	is	of	course	to	use	the	hydrogen	
in	industry	and	transportation	and	not	inject	it	into	the	gas	grid.
Figure	1	below	shows	that	the	natural	gas	grid	can	store	the	excess	renewable	energy.	It	is	
important	to	notice	that	the	storage	capacity	of	the	gas	grid	is	large	and	that	the	storage	
can	be	used	to	cope	with	seasonal	fluctuations	as	well.	
Figure 1: Power-to-gas concept for bidirectional coupling of the electricity and gas grids.
Three	 end	 states	were	defined.	These	 end	 states	 require	 technological	 innovation.	One	
innovation	that	is	needed	to	accommodate	the	end	states	is	the	storage	of	excess	renewable	
energy.	Power-to-gas	can	provide	this	storage	but	the	technology	is	facing	hurdles.	This	
chapter	 describes	 the	 factors	 that	will	 determine	 if	 power-to-gas	will	 be	 an	 important	
technology	in	the	energy	transition.
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3.2 methodology – a system approach
What	 will	 determine	 if	 power-to-gas	 will	 be	 an	 important	 technology	 in	 the	 energy	
transition	over	the	next	years?	A	technology	does	not	develop	in	one	place	and	it	is	not	
developed	by	one	 actor.	One	 can	 look	at	 the	development	of	 a	 technology	 as	 a	process	
that	 takes	place	 in	 a	 technological	 innovation	 system	 (TIS).	The	TIS	 includes	 all	 actors	
and	 institutions	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 development,	 diffusion	 and	 utilization	 of	 a	
technology.
The	central	idea	of	this	analysis	is	that	the	analysis	of	technological	change	should	focus	
on	systematically	mapping	the	activities	that	take	place	in	innovation	systems	resulting	in	
technological	change.	Since	these	activities	have	the	function	to	contribute	to	the	goal	of	
the	innovation	system,	which	is	the	generation	and	diffusion	of	innovations,	the	activities	
are	often	called	functions	of	innovation	systems11/12.
Many	 actors	 and	 institutions	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 development	 of	 power-to-gas.	 Since	
the	 actors	 and	 institutions	do	not	 act	 alone	 they	 are	 viewed	as	 a	 system	with	multiple	
interdependencies.	
Actors	 are	 numerous,	 ranging	 from	 public	 to	 private	 and	 from	 innovator	 to	 end-user.	
Institutions	 are	 governments,	 agencies,	 law	 and	 others.	 A	 system	 approach	 is	 used	 to	
emphasize	the	dynamics	between	actors,	institutions	and	technological	factors13.	
The	basic	unit	of	the	analysis	is	the	event.	Within	the	context	of	a	TIS	analysis,	an	event	
can	 be	 defined	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 rapid	 change	with	 respect	 to	 actors,	 institutions	 and/
or	 technology,	which	 is	 the	work	of	 one	 or	more	 actors	 and	which	 carries	 some	public	
importance	with	respect	to	in	this	case	the	Power	to	Gas	TIS.	Examples	of	such	events	are	
studies	carried	out,	conferences	organized,	plants	constructed,	policy	measured	issued,	etc.
A	successful	system	should	fulfil	the	following	functions:
1.	 Entrepreneurial	activities
2.	 Knowledge	development
3.	 Knowledge	exchange
4.	 Guidance	of	the	search
5.	 Market	formation
6.	 Resource	mobilisation
7.	 Support	from	advocacy	coalitions
Institutions
Actors Technology
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This	 Technological	 Innovation	 System	 approach	 is	 based	 on	 Motors	 of	 sustainable	
innovation	by	Roald	A.	A.	Suurs.
The	main	research	question	is:	In what way does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation Systems 
affect the energy technology trajectories leading to the end states?
Using	the	Technological	Innovation	System	approach	the	sub	questions	are:
1.	 	How does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation System perform on the defined functions?
	 	The	answer	to	this	question	will	provide	insight	in	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	
Technological	 Innovation	System.	Are	 there	 for	example	 significant	entrepreneurial	
activities,	is	there	meaningful	knowledge	development	and	exchange,	and	so	on.	The	
progress	will	be	recognized	through	so	called	events.	An	event	can	be	a	publication,	
a	commercial	initiative,	a	new	subsidy	or	any	other	signal	that	can	be	considered	as	a	
contribution	to	the	Technological	Innovation	System.
2.	 	What progress does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation System need to make to accommodate the 
different end states?
	 	This	 question	 will	 address	 the	 end	 states.	 The	 focus	 will	 be	 the	 contribution	 that	
power-to-gas	can	have	related	to	the	different	end	states.	It	is	possible	that	power-to-
gas	will	be	more	relevant	for	one	end	state	compared	to	the	other	end	states.
The	TIS	approach	has	a	technology	as	its	starting	point.	The	development	of	a	technology	
is	not	place	based.	At	different	locations	all	over	the	world	entrepreneurial	activities	can	
start	and	research	can	be	initiated.	On	the	other	hand	regulation	and	policies	are	most	of	
the	time	not	worldwide	and	technology	often	develops	in	a	regional	context.	This	study	
looks	at	the	power-to-gas	TIS	from	a	European	perspective	and	will	put	some	emphasize	
on	the	Dutch	situation.
3.3 Entrepreneurial activities
Entrepreneurs	are	at	the	core	of	any	TIS.	The	classic	role	of	the	entrepreneur	is	to	translate	
knowledge	 into	 business	 opportunities,	 and	 eventually	 innovations.	The	 entrepreneur	
does	 this	 by	 performing	 market	 oriented	 experiments	 that	 establish	 change,	 both	 to	
the	emerging	technology	and	to	 the	 institutions	 that	 surround	 it.	The	entrepreneurial	
activities	 involve	 projects	 aimed	 to	 prove	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 emerging	 technology	
in	a	practical	and/or	commercial	environment.	Such	projects	 typically	 take	the	 form	of	
experiments	and	demonstrations14.	Public	actors	can	be	entrepreneurs	as	well,	as	long	as	
their	actions	are	directed	at	conducting	market-oriented	experiments	with	an	emerging	
technology.
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Over	30	power-to-gas	demonstration	plants	are	currently	reported	on	the	internet	and	in	
literature15/16/17.	At	this	moment	most	projects	are	in	the	construction	or	planning	phase.	
The	largest	existing	plants	will	be	discussed.
In	2013	Audi	opened	a	power-to-gas	plant	in	Werlte	(Germany)	with	a	6	MW	capacity.	It	
converts	surplus	renewable	electricity	in	hydrogen	and	methane.	The	renewable	synthetic	
methane,	 called	 Audi	 e-gas,	 is	 provided	 for	 Audi	 customers	 of	 the	 A3-tron	 g,	 an	 Audi	
vehicle.	Customers	can	order	a	quota	of	e-gas	when	they	purchase	the	car.	This	enables	
them	to	take	part	in	an	accounting	process	that	ensures	that	the	amount	of	gas	that	they	
put	in	their	vehicle	at	the	natural	gas	filling	station	is	supplied	to	the	grid	by	the	Audi	
e-gas	plant18.
Also	 in	 2013	 E.ON	 inaugurated	 a	 power-to-gas	 (P2G)	 unit	 in	 Falkenhagen	 in	 eastern	
Germany.	The	unit	uses	wind	power	to	run	electrolysis	equipment	that	transforms	water	
into	hydrogen	which	is	injected	into	the	regional	gas	transmission	system.	The	hydrogen	
becomes	part	of	the	natural	gas	mix	and	can	be	used	in	a	variety	of	applications,	including	
space	heating,	industrial	processes,	mobility,	and	power	generation.	The	unit,	which	has	a	
capacity	of	two	megawatts,	can	produce	360	cubic	meters	of	hydrogen	per	hour19.
In	Grapzow	(Germany)	E.ON	has	installed	in	2012	a	1	MW	power-to-gas	system	connected	
to	a	140	MW	wind	farm.	The	plant’s	owners	have	the	option	to	use	the	hydrogen	in	an	
internal	 combustion	 engine	 to	 produce	 electricity,	 or	 inject	 it	 directly	 into	 the	 local	
natural	gas	grid,	depending	on	operational	needs20.
Enertrag	installed	in	Prenzlau	(Germany)	three	2	MW	wind	turbines	directly	connected	to	
an	electrolyser21.	The	hydrogen	that	is	produced	is	used	in	several	ways.	During	low	wind	
periods,	the	stored	hydrogen,	mixed	with	biogas,	can	be	used	to	fuel	two	combined	heat	
and	power	units,	for	additional	electricity	production.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	grid	
operator,	the	hybrid	power	plant	will	then	be	operating	as	a	base	load	power	station.	The	
hydrogen	can	also	be	used	for	fuelling	cars.	TOTAL	Deutschland	GmbH	is	a	partner	in	
de	project.	Total	operates	service	stations	where	cars	can	be	fuelled	with	wind-hydrogen	
produced	in	Prenzlau.	The	hydrogen	is	transported	in	tankers	from	Prenzlau	to	Berlin22.
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City Project name Operating since Application
Hamburg	 Wasserstofftankstelle	
HafenCity
2012 Production	of	hydrogen
Hydrogen	used	for	transportation	
(busses)
Werlte Audi	e-gas	Project 2013 Production	of	methane
Injection	in	gas	grid
Certificates	for	Audi	vehicles
Frankfurt	Am	
Mein
P2G	demo	Thuga	group 2013 Production	of	hydrogen
Inject	in	gasgrid
Herten H2Herten 2013 Production	of	hydrogen
Hydrogen	used	for	transportation	
and	other	fuel	cells
Niederaussem CO2rrect 2013 Production	of	methane	and	methanol
Bad	Hersfeld Metanisierung	am	Eichhof 2012 Production	of	methane
Inject	in	gasgrid
Stuttgart Verbundproject	Power-
to-Gas
2012 Production	of	methane
Falkenhagen Pilotanlage	Falkenhagen 2013 Production	of	hydrogen
Inject	in	gasgrid
Grapzow Windpark	RH2-WKA 2012 Production	of	hydrogen
Use	hydrogen	to	produce	electricity
Inject	in	grid
Prenzlau Hybridkraftwerk	Prenzlau 2011 Production	of	hydrogen
Use	for	electricity
use	for	transportation
Schwandorf Power	to	Gas	in	Eucolino 2012 Production	of	methane	using	
Microorganisms.
Injection	in	grid	or	storage.
Rozenburg	(NL) P2G	in	Rozenburg 2013 Production	of	methane
Injection	in	local	grid
Table 1: Operating power-to-gas plants in Germany (10) and the Netherlands (1).
Analysing	the	existing	projects	it	is	obvious	that	they	all	use	electrolysis	to	turn	electricity	
into	Hydrogen.	After	all,	that	is	what	makes	them	power-to-gas	projects.	There	are	some	
differences	that	stand	out.	First	of	all	there	is	the	option	of	methanation.	Six	of	the	existing	
projects	produce	methane	and	inject	it	into	the	gas	grid.	The	methanation	is	realized	using	
different	technologies.	The	other	five	projects	do	not	methanise	the	hydrogen.	Three	out	
of	those	five	projects	use	the	hydrogen	in	the	transportation	sector.	The	other	two	projects	
inject	the	hydrogen	in	the	gas	grid	or	convert	it	back	into	electricity.
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All	those	projects	can	count	as	entrepreneurial	activities	as	defined	in	the	TIS	literature.	
They	 are	market	 oriented	 experiments	 trying	 to	 prove	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 emerging	
technology.	It	is	also	important	to	notice	that	all	projects	have	a	recent	date.	Initial	plans	
are	of	course	made	some	years	ago	but	the	operating	projects	have	gone	into	production	
over	the	last	few	years.	For	the	power-to-gas	TIS	this	means	that	entrepreneurial	activities	
have	taken	off	and	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	emerging	technology.
3.4 Knowledge development
The	knowledge	development	function	involves	learning	activities,	mostly	on	the	emerging	
technology	but	also	on	markets,	networks,	users	and	other	factors.	Learning	activities	can	
be	laboratory	experiments	but	also	trial	projects.	Without	knowledge	development	there	
will	be	no	technological	innovation23.	
Power	to	Gas	uses	electrolysis	of	water	to	produce	hydrogen.	The	technology	is	not	new;	
Zenobe	 Gramme	 invented	 the	 Gramme	machine	 in	 1869	 to	 produce	 hydrogen	 using	
electrolysis	 of	water.	 It	 is	 therefore	 arbitrary	 to	 decide	when	 power-to-gas	 started	 as	 a	
technology	to	be	used	to	transform	surplus	electricity	into	gas.	In	this	chapter,	research	
over	the	last	10	years	is	considered	to	be	part	of	the	power-to-gas	TIS.	The	largest	studies	
are	categorized	according	to	their	main	topic	and	will	be	discussed	briefly.
3.4.1 Studies on electrolysis and hydrogen
The	Fuel	Cells	and	Hydrogen	Joint	Undertaking	(FCH	JU)	is	a	public	private	partnership	
founded	 in	 2008	 supporting	 research,	 technological	 development	 and	 demonstration	
activities	in	fuel	cell	and	hydrogen	energy	technologies	in	Europe.	Its	aim	is	to	accelerate	
the	market	introduction	of	these	technologies,	realizing	their	potential	as	an	instrument	
in	 achieving	 a	 carbon-lean	 energy	 system24.	 The	 FCH	 JU	 helps	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 7th	
framework	programme	for	research	and	technological	development	 (FP7).	For	2013	the	
FCH	JU	contributes	€68	million	to	27	projects25.	The	projects	are	categorized	in	five	so-
called	application	areas:
•	 Transportation	and	refuelling	infrastructure;
•	 Hydrogen	production	and	distribution;
•	 Stationary	power	generation	and	CHP;
•	 Early	markets;
•	 Cross	cutting	issues.
Most	FCH	JU	projects	are	relevant	for	the	power-to-gas	TIS.	The	programme	is	therefore	
a	positive	contribution	to	the	TIS.	
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3.4.2 Studies on power-to-gas and the gas network
The	 Naturalhy	 project	 was	 funded	 by	 the	 European	 commission’s	 sixth	 framework	
program	(2002	–	2006)	for	research,	technological	development	and	demonstration26.	The	
project	started	in	2004	and	the	final	report	was	published	in	2010.	The	project	studied	the	
possibility	 to	use	 the	existing	natural	gas	 system	 for	hydrogen.	The	possible	 impact	of	
adding	hydrogen	to	natural	gas	on	the	durability	of	the	network	was	an	important	part	
of	the	project.	Also	measures	to	control	and	monitor	the	condition	of	the	network	were	
analysed.	Safety	aspects	of	adding	hydrogen	to	the	network	were	another	subject.	The	end	
user	aspects	were	studied	as	well.	Research	was	also	done	on	the	possibility	 to	separate	
hydrogen	from	a	hydrogen/natural	gas	mixture	by	the	use	of	membranes.
The	main	goal	of	the	Naturalhy	project	was	to	identify	showstoppers.	This	also	determined	
the	scope	of	the	project.	Materials	that	are	used	in	the	natural	gas	system	which	can	easily	
be	replaced	by	another	–	hydrogen	proof	-	material	were	for	example	not	considered	to	be	
a	potential	threat	to	the	durability	of	the	network.	The	final	report	emphasizes	that	given	
the	size	and	the	complexity	of	the	project	it	is	important	not	to	jump	to	simple	conclusions.	
The	general	outcome	of	the	project	though	was	that	no	showstoppers	were	identified.	For	
the	power-to-gas	TIS	the	Naturalhy	project	therefore	was	a	positive	impulse.	
In	Germany	the	DVGW	carried	out	an	extensive	study	analysing	the	main	power-to-gas	
issues27.	In	the	first	place	the	H2-tolerance	of	the	German	natural	gas	grid	was	researched.	
The	main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 existing	 gas	 infrastructure	 can	 handle	 a	 10%	 volume	
addition	 of	 H
2
	 in	 the	 gas	 grid.	 Furthermore	 four	 possible	 power-to-gas	 applications	
in	 Germany	 were	 studied.	 One	 of	 the	 subjects	 was	 the	 difference	 between	 injecting	
hydrogen	into	the	local	grid	versus	injecting	into	the	interregional	grid.	Injecting	in	the	
local	grid	causes	a	significant	limitation	in	the	H
2
	volume	that	can	be	added.	The	DVGW	
also	examined	the	economics	of	power-to-gas.	The	variables	that	are	most	important	to	
decide	on	the	financial	feasibility	of	power-to-gas	are	the	utilization	of	the	power-to-gas	
installation	(in	hours)	and	the	price	of	electricity.
The	HyUnder	 project	 studies	 the	 possibilities	 for	 large	 scale	 and	 long	 term	 storage	 of	
renewable	electricity	by	hydrogen	underground	storage	in	Europe.	The	project	compares	
hydrogen	underground	 storage	with	other	 storage	options.	Given	de	European	 energy	
policy	goals	the	need	for	storage	is	explored.	The	conclusion	is	that,	although	a	thorough	
quantification	of	 the	energy	 storage	needs	 in	 the	EU	has	not	been	undertaken	yet,	 the	
necessity	 of	 energy	 storage	 to	 compensate	 the	 intermittency	 of	 renewable	 energy	 is	
obvious	 and	 that	 energy	 storage	 will	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 future	 European	 energy	
structure,	as	 it	 is	described	in	the	Energy	2020	program	and	the	Energy	Roadmap	2050	
by	the	EU.	The	project	also	concludes	that	the	only	feasible	option	for	large	scale	energy	
storage	is	to	employ	underground	hydrogen	/	SNG	storage	in	salt	caverns.	SNG	provides	
the	additional	option	to	be	stored	in	all	kind	of	storages	in	the	natural	gas	grid.	Because	
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of	high	investment	costs	systems	with	hydrogen	underground	tube	storage	or	storage	in	
pressure	vessel	bundles	are	not	appropriate	for	long	term	storage	of	large	volumes28.
3.4.3 Studies on power-to-gas in the energy system
In	June	2013	DNV	KEMA	published	“Systems	analyses	Power	to	Gas:	a	technology	review”29.	
The	study	compares	power-to-gas	to	other	energy	storage	technologies.	The	technologies	
should	fulfil	several	functions,	in	the	DNV	KEMA	study	so	called	service	applications:
•	 Frequency	 support:	 stabilizing	 the	 grid	 frequency	 almost	 instantly	 in	 case	 of	 very	
sudden	large	decreases	in	power	generation
•	 Uninterruptable	power	supply:	providing	emergency	power	when	the	 input	power	
source	fails
•	 Community	energy	storage:	store	energy	at	a	local	level
•	 Home	energy	storage:	storage	dedicated	for	household	applications
•	 Forecast	 hedging:	 the	 use	 of	 stored	 energy	 to	 mitigate	 penalties	 when	 real-time	
generation	falls	short
•	 Time	 shifting:	 the	 storage	 of	 energy	 generated	 during	 low	 demand	 periods	 and	
discharged	during	high	demand	periods
•	 Transmission	and	distribution	capacity	management:	possible	avoidance	of	network	
upgrades
The	study	concludes	that	the	value	of	power-to-gas	 is	 in	 its	able	to	deliver	community	
energy	 storage	 services,	 time	 shifting	 and	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 capacity	
management.	This	outcome	contributes	in	a	positive	way	to	the	knowledge	development	
function.
3.4.4 Studies on the financial feasibility of power-to-gas
In	2006	 the	 Institute	 for	Energy	and	Transport	 (IET)	–	part	of	 the	 joint	 research	centre	
(JRC)	 from	the	European	commission-	published	“Bridging	 the	European	wind	energy	
market	and	a	future	renewable	hydrogen-inclusive	economy”.	The	approach	of	this	study	
is	to	determine,	via	life-cycle	cost-benefit	assessment,	the	long-term	competitiveness	and	
economic	implications	of	power-to-gas.	The	study	takes	into	account	that	the	costs	and	
benefits	of	power-to-gas	are	aggregated	at	different	economic	levels.	The	investment	costs	
and	product	 revenues	 for	 example	 are	 assumed	 to	be	 the	project	 owners.	The	benefits	
from	improved	network	management	are	realized	by	the	consumer	of	electricity	in	the	
price	he	pays	for	electricity.	The	benefits	 from	local	environmental	conditions	 (avoided	
particulate	emissions)	are	enjoyed	by	the	local	community	of	consumers.	The	benefits	for	
global	environmental	conditions	(reduced	greenhouse	gas	emissions)	are	enjoyed	by	all	
members	of	society.	
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The	function	of	knowledge	development	was	definitely	met	by	this	study.	 It	 is	hard	to	
categorize	the	contribution	as	positive	or	negative.	Four	scenarios	are	outlined	varying	in	
the	wind	penetration	in	the	energy	mix	and	in	the	strength	of	the	hydrogen	and	climate	
change	push.	The	production	costs	of	Hydrogen	through	power-to-gas	are	much	higher	
than	 the	Hydrogen	market	price.	 In	 other	words,	 power-to-gas	 is	 an	 expensive	way	 to	
produce	Hydrogen.	The	additional	benefits	of	power-to-gas,	avoided	CO
2
	emissions	and	
avoided	balance	costs,	are	not	compensating	the	high	production	costs.	A	scenario	with	
high	wind	penetration,	low	electricity	prices	and	high	CO
2
	and	hydrogen	prices	gives	a	
positive	cost-benefit	outcome	demonstrated	in	lower	electricity	prices.	The	study	assumes	
that	electricity	companies	will	pass	on	benefits	to	the	consumers	through	lower	prices.
In	September	2008	ECN	published	“Conversion	of	excess	wind	energy	into	hydrogen	for	
fuel	cell	applications”30.	The	study	starts	with	estimating	the	excess	wind	energy	in	the	
Netherlands	in	2020.	The	political	ambition	to	have	6	GW	offshore	and	2-4	GW	onshore	
wind	power	 in	2020	 is	 taken	as	a	starting	point.	Using	the	electricity	demand	data	and	
the	wind	speed	data	from	2004	the	result	for	8	GW	installed	wind	power	is	an	excess	wind	
power	 of	 about	 4.5	 TWh.	 The	minimum	 cost	 estimate	 for	 producing	 hydrogen	 using	
the	 excess	 wind	 power	 is	 4.4	€/kg.	 The	 costs	 are	 high	 because	 the	 load	 factor	 for	 the	
electrolysers	is	low.	Using	all	wind	power	to	produce	hydrogen	results	in	production	costs	
of	5	€/kg.	Even	though	the	use	of	the	capacity	of	the	electrolysers	improves,	the	costs	of	
electricity	–	using	a	mean	0f	0.08	€/kWh-	raises	the	costs	of	the	hydrogen.	
DNV	 KEMA	 reports	 using	 different	 sources	 that	 the	 estimates	 of	 excess	 wind	 power	
differ	from	0.5	TWh	per	year	to	10	TWh	per	year	in	2050.	Another	KEMA	study	from	2010	
concludes	that	a	12	GW	wind	capacity	 in	2020	in	the	Netherlands	will	 lead	to	no	more	
than	0.5	TWh	curtailment	per	year31.	Different	scenarios	are	considered.	The	relatively	low	
curtailment	implies	less	need	for	power-to-gas	technology.
The	conclusion	regarding	the	knowledge	development	function	is	that	there	have	been	
many	power-to-gas	research	programs	and	publications	over	the	last	10	years.	The	general	
outcome	for	the	power-to-gas	TIS	is	positive.	The	knowledge	base	is	growing	and	so	far	
no	showstoppers	are	identified.
3.5 Knowledge exchange
The	 function	 of	 knowledge	 exchange	 concerns	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 through	
networks,	publications,	conferences	and	other	means	that	are	used	to	share	information.	
Knowledge	exchange	is	important	in	a	strict	R&D	setting,	but	especially	in	a	heterogeneous	
context	where	R&D	meets	government,	competitors,	and	market.	Here	policy	decisions	
(standards,	long	term	targets)	should	be	consistent	with	the	latest	technological	insights	
and,	at	the	same	time,	R&D	agendas	should	be	affected	by	changing	norms	and	values32/33.	
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For	 the	 Fuel	 Cells	 and	 Hydrogen	 Joint	 Undertaking	 (FCH	 JU),	 cooperation	 between	
government,	businesses	 and	 research	 institutions	 is	 a	main	 target.	The	 three	members	
of	 the	 FCH	 JU	 are	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 NEW	 Industry	 Grouping	 and	 the	
N.ERGHY	Research	Grouping.	The	NEW	Industry	grouping	has	68	companies	working	
in	 the	 field	 of	 fuel	 cells	 and	hydrogen	 and	 they	 represent	 a	major	 part	 of	 the	 sector34.	
The	 N.ERGHY	 Research	 Grouping	 represents	 the	 interests	 of	 European	 universities	
and	 research	 institutes	 in	 the	FCH	JU.	Currently	58	 international	 research	 institutions	
are	 a	part	 of	N.ERGHY35.	As	mentioned	before	 the	FCH	 JU	has	 27	projects	 carried	out	
and	they	are	all	Hydrogen	related.	The	projects	themselves	all	have	several	organizations	
participating.
The	 International	Energy	Agency	 (IEA)	 is	an	autonomous	organization	which	works	 to	
ensure	reliable,	affordable	and	clean	energy	for	its	28	member	countries	and	beyond.	The	
IEA’s	four	main	areas	of	focus	are:	energy	security,	economic	development,	environmental	
awareness,	and	engagement	worldwide.	The	IEA	has	developed	a	Hydrogen	Implementing	
Agreement.	The	strategy	of	the	IEA’s	Hydrogen	Program	is	to	facilitate,	coordinate,	and	
maintain	innovative	R&D	activities	through	international	cooperation	and	information	
exchange.	Knowledge	exchange	is	stimulated	by	the	IEA	because	of	its	focus	on	international	
cooperation.	Task	24	from	the	Hydrogen	Implementing	agreement	provides	an	overview	
for	 technologies	 which	 have	 direct	 influence	 on	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	
systems	integrating	wind	energy	with	hydrogen	production.
The	Joint	Research	Centre	Institute	for	Energy	and	Transport	(JRC	IET)	provides	support	
to	European	Union	policies	and	technology	innovation	to	ensure	sustainable,	safe,	secure	
and	 efficient	 energy	 production,	 distribution	 and	 use	 and	 to	 foster	 sustainable	 and	
efficient	transport	in	Europe.	The	SETIS	program	belongs	to	the	key	scientific	activities	of	
the	JRC	IET	and	provides	information	on	37	fuel	cells	and	hydrogen	projects	and	45	wind	
energy	projects36.	
The	entrepreneurial	activities	that	are	a	part	of	the	power-to-gas	TIS	are	also	a	clear	example	
of	the	knowledge	exchange	function.	Appendix	B	shows	the	partners	per	project.	Almost	all	
projects	have	multiple	partners	with	different	backgrounds	such	as	research	institutions,	
gas	companies,	electricity	companies	and	suppliers	of	power-to-gas	technology.
The	North	Sea	Power	to	Gas	Platform	is	an	example	of	a	network	of	stakeholders	that	come	
together	 to	 share	 information	and	experiences.	The	platform	was	 initiated	 in	2012	and	
has	had	five	meetings	since	the	start.	14	member	organizations	have	joined	the	platform.	
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The	research	that	is	seen	as	a	part	of	the	knowledge	development	function	contributes	to	
the	knowledge	exchange	function	in	two	ways.	First	of	all,	the	research	programs	in	general	
result	 in	publications,	presentations	and	conferences.	 In	 the	 second	place,	 just	 like	 the	
entrepreneurial	activities,	most	research	programs	have	multiple	partners	participating	in	
the	projects.	Appendix	C	shows	the	participating	partners	in	the	largest	recent	power-to-
gas	research	programs.	Since	almost	all	research	programs	and	entrepreneurial	activities	
involve	several	participants	the	conclusion	is	that	the	knowledge	exchange	function	in	the	
power-to-gas	TIS	is	fulfilled	in	a	positive	way.
3.6 Guidance of the search
The	guidance	of	the	search	function	refers	to	the	activities	within	the	TIS	that	shape	the	
needs,	requirements	and	expectations	of	actors	with	respect	to	their	further	support	of	the	
emerging	 technology.	Usually,	 various	 technological	 options	 exist	within	 an	 emerging	
technological	field.	The	guidance	of	the	search	function	represents	the	selection	process	
that	is	needed	to	direct	scarce	resources	to	the	most	promising	options37/38.
For	 power-to-gas	 the	 growth	 of	 intermittent	 renewable	 energy	 is	 crucial.	 Only	 when	
there	 is	 significant	 excess	 renewable	 electricity	 it	 becomes	 urgent	 to	 have	 power-to-
gas	 technology.	 The	 European	 Commission	 states	 in	 its	 Energy	 2020	 strategy	 that	 it	
will	 implement	the	SET	plan	without	delay39.	One	of	the	six	 initiatives	in	the	SET	plan	
is	 the	 European	 wind	 initiative.	 The	 key	 objective	 of	 this	 initiative	 is	 to	 double	 the	
power	generation	capacity	of	the	largest	wind	turbines,	with	off-shore	wind	as	the	lead	
application40.	The	European	wind	initiative	is	now	being	implemented	by	EU	institutions,	
member	states,	TPWind	and	the	European	Energy	Research	Alliance	(EERA).	The	budget	
of	the	European	wind	initiative	is	€6	billion	(public	and	private	resources)41.	
In	March	 2013	 the	Dutch	 government	 published	 “Rijksstructuurvisie	Windenergie	 op	
land”.	It	was	decided	that	for	onshore	wind	energy	a	number	of	areas	were	considered	to	
be	fit	for	wind	projects	of	100	MW	and	more.	These	projects	will	have	to	answer	to	national	
regulation	whereas	smaller	projects	have	to	meet	local	(provincial)	regulation.	This	way	
the	Dutch	 government	wishes	 to	 realize	 6000	MW	onshore	wind	 energy	 by	 2020.	 The	
vision	includes	subsidies	for	2013	for	a	total	of	€3	billion	for	the	production	of	renewable	
energy	(not	just	wind).	For	offshore	projects	the	new	national	policy	will	appear	in	2014.	
The	 guidance	 of	 the	 search	 function	 at	 a	 high	 level	 compares	 power-to-gas	 to	 other	
technologies	 to	 store	 intermittent	 renewable	 energy.	 Those	 other	 relevant	 large	 scale	
energy	 storage	 technologies	 are	 pumped	 hydro	 energy	 storage,	 compressed	 air	 energy	
storage	 and	 stationary	 batteries.	 Research	 shows	 that	 the	 strengths	 of	 power-to-gas	
technology	are	the	possibility	to	offer	storage	on	a	large	scale	and	to	store	energy	in	the	
range	of	hours	to	several	weeks.	On	the	other	hand	the	power-to-gas	energy	efficiency	is	
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low	compared	to	other	storage	options42,43,44,45.	As	far	as	guidance	of	the	search	is	concerned	
the	comparison	with	other	storage	technologies	seems	to	encourage	further	power-to-gas	
development	based	on	its	strengths.	Improving	the	energy	efficiency	is	a	priority.
Within	 the	 power-to-gas	 TIS	 the	 guidance	 of	 the	 search	 function	 has	 several	 subjects.	
They	can	be	analysed	in	a	structured	way	using	the	power-to-gas	process.	The	first	step	is	
the	conversion	of	excess	electricity	into	hydrogen	using	electrolysis.	The	electrolyser	uses	
either	Alkaline,	Polymer	Electrolyte	Membrane	 (PEM)	or	Solid	Oxide	Electrolysis	 (SOE)	
technology.	Alkaline	electrolysis	is	a	well-established	technology	but	the	efficiency	of	the	
process,	 the	purity	of	 the	hydrogen	and	the	performance	at	 low	 loads	 should	 improve.	
PEM	technology	is	more	efficient	but	has	higher	costs.	SOEC	electrolysis	is	in	a	laboratory	
stage46/47.	Currently	 several	projects	 study	Alkaline	 and/or	PEM	electrolysis48/49.	On	 this	
subject	the	guidance	of	the	search	is	ongoing.	There	are	no	recent	breakthroughs	that	are	
decisive	for	the	choice	of	electrolysis	technology.
After	the	conversion	of	excess	electricity	into	hydrogen	there	are	different	ways	to	use	the	
hydrogen.	First	of	all	the	hydrogen	can	be	used	in	transportation	or	in	industry.	The	FCH	
JU	reports	20	projects	concerning	transportation	and	refuelling	infrastructure50.	Some	of	
the	entrepreneurial	activities	also	involve	transportation.	In	more	than	10	European	cities	
hydrogen	fuelling	stations	can	be	found51.	
The	hydrogen	can	also	be	added	to	the	gas	grid.	This	option	has	three	main	advantages.	
The	storage	capacity	of	the	gas	grid	is	large,	the	existing	infrastructure	can	be	used	and	the	
transportation	of	gas	is	cost-effective.	Two	large	studies	suggest	that	adding	hydrogen	to	
the	gas	grid	is	probably	feasible	under	certain	conditions52/53.	One	of	the	conditions	is	the	
percentage	of	hydrogen	that	 is	added	to	the	natural	gas.	Converting	the	hydrogen	into	
methane	is	an	alternative	route.	Methane	behaves	like	natural	gas	and	can	be	added	to	the	
gas	grid	without	restrictions.	On	the	other	hand	methanation	makes	the	power-to-gas	
process	 less	energy	efficient	and	CO
2
	 is	needed	to	produce	the	methane.	Both	methods	
are	 currently	used	 in	 the	 entrepreneurial	 activities	 that	 are	discussed54/55/56	 and	 there	 is	
ongoing	research	on	the	injection	of	hydrogen	and	methane	into	the	gas	grid57.	Again	it	
is	too	early	to	say	if	hydrogen	is	going	to	be	added	to	the	gas	grid	on	a	large	scale	and	if	
methanation	is	going	to	be	used	while	doing	this.
If	hydrogen	is	added	to	the	gas	grid	it	might	be	desirable	to	be	able	to	separate	the	hydrogen	
from	 the	 gas	 mixture	 for	 other	 applications	 later	 on.	 Using	 a	 membrane	 system	 this	
separation	is	possible	but	has	high	capital	costs58.	The	FCH	JU	has	one	project	concerning	
separation59.	It	seems	that	the	separation	technology	does	not	have	the	centre	of	attention	
in	the	power-to-gas	TIS.
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In	 the	power-to-gas	TIS	 the	guidance	of	 the	 search	 function	 involves	 two	main	 issues.	
In	the	first	place	power-to-gas	has	to	become	more	energy	efficient.	Several	electrolysis	
technologies	 are	 being	 studied	 but	 there	 is	 no	 best	 technology	 identified	 yet.	 In	 the	
second	place	it	is	not	clear	in	what	way	the	produced	hydrogen	should	be	used	to	get	the	
highest	benefits	out	of	power-to-gas	technology.	If	hydrogen	transportation	is	going	to	
be	applied	on	a	large	scale	it	may	not	be	necessary	to	inject	hydrogen	into	the	gas	grid.	
On	this	subject	the	guidance	of	the	search	function	is	in	progress	and	has	not	identified	a	
preferred	solution	yet.
3.7 market formation
The	market	 formation	 function	 involves	 activities	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	
demand	for	the	emerging	technology,	for	example	by	financially	supporting	the	use	of	the	
emerging	technology.	In	case	of	sustainable	innovations,	there	is	usually	no	commercial	
product	 unless	 the	 institutional	 framework	 is	 adjusted	 to	 account	 for	 external	 costs.	
Therefore,	in	this	case,	the	system	function	is	typically	fulfilled	by	governments,	through	
the	setting	up	of	formal	institutions60.	
3.7.1 regulation
For	power-to-gas	 the	market	 formation	 is	 in	 the	 first	place	 facing	a	 lack	of	 regulation.	
At	 this	moment	the	responsibility	concerning	power-to-gas	 is	unclear.	 Is	power-to-gas	
the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 electricity	 producer,	 electricity	 distributor,	 gas	 producer,	 gas	
distributor	 or	 some	 other	 party?	 Despite	 all	 the	 power-to-gas	 demonstration	 projects	
it	 is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	 large	scale	power-to-gas	plants	before	the	regulator	has	
set	up	the	regulatory	framework.	In	the	Energy	agreement61	power-to-gas	is	mentioned	
when	adaptations	in	the	energy	infrastructure	are	discussed.	The	Energy	agreement	states	
that	 energy	 storage	 is	 needed	 and	 that	 power-to-gas	 technology	 has	 to	 be	 examined.	
Responsibilities	or	the	need	for	regulation	are	not	discussed.	Recent	changes	in	the	Gas	
law	and	the	Electricity	law	have	not	provided	a	regulatory	framework	for	power-to-gas.	
Still	such	a	framework	is	necessary	for	market	formation	to	develop.
Regulation	 is	 also	 important	 to	 achieve	 economically	 viable	 P2G	 implementation.	 At	
present,	the	only	value	that	can	be	gained	from	P2G	technology	is	in	the	production	of	
a	gas	with	re-sale	value	–	hydrogen	or	SNG.	Much	of	the	real	value	to	the	energy	system	
comes	from	elsewhere	-	in	the	avoided	capital	cost	of	extra	infrastructure,	in	the	enabling	
of	maximum	utilization	of	renewable	electricity,	and	in	the	increase	in	renewable	content	
of	the	gas	networks.	All	these	need	to	be	given	value	through	appropriate	regulation	to	
give	P2G	developers	the	confidence	that	they	can	implement	a	market	ready	solution62.
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3.7.2 regulatory risk
There	 is	a	direct	relation	between	market	 formation	and	the	perceived	risks.	When	the	
businesses	consider	the	project	risks	too	high	then	there	will	be	no	market.	What	risks	do	
businesses	face	when	they	invest	in	power-to-gas	technology?	Two	risk	categories	that	can	
be	identified	(among	others)	are	regulatory	risk	and	market	risk63.
Regulatory	or	institutional	risk	concerns	the	risk	of	adverse	changes	in	the	policy	context.	
Policies	and	measures	might	change	during	the	project	cycle	which	may	have	significant	
impacts	on	the	profitability	of	a	project.	Examples	are	changes	to	or	even	ending	of	policy	
support	 schemes	or	 changes	 to	 the	market	design.	As	most	markets	 for	 renewables	are	
being	regulated	under	policy	schemes,	this	risk	is	of	particular	importance	to	renewable	
energy	 technologies64.	Once	 installed	 the	 regulation	has	 to	be	 reliable	 in	 the	 long	 run.	
Regulatory	risk	is	caused	by	unexpected	changes	in	the	rules65.	
The	policy	context	for	power-to-gas	includes	the	Energy	2020	strategy,	the	European	wind	
initiatives	and	in	the	Netherlands	the	national	plans	for	wind	on	land	and	wind	at	sea.	It	
is	important	that	the	plans	of	the	government	are	perceived	as	convincing.	In	response	to	
the	plans	of	the	government	Energie-Nederland,	a	Dutch	organization	for	the	assembled	
Dutch	energy	producers,	transporters	and	other	parties,	signals	some	problems.	Some	of	the	
assigned	areas	are	not	chosen	from	a	technical	feasible	point	of	view.	In	reality	there	might	
be	not	enough	sufficient	space	for	6,000	MW	in	the	plans.	Another	concern	that	Energie-
Nederland	 has	 is	 the	 availability	 from	 the	 subsidies	 for	 wind	 projects.	 The	 regulation	
provides	incentives	to	apply	for	subsidies	with	low	cost	projects.	In	the	end	those	projects	
don’t	turn	out	to	be	financial	feasible.	Bigger	and	more	expensive	wind	projects	miss	out	on	
the	subsidies	and	will	not	be	realized	according	to	Energie-Nederland66.
The	CPB	(the	Dutch	agency	for	economic	policy	analysis)	adviced	negative	on	the	Dutch	
onshore	wind	plans.	A	cost	benefit	analyses	shows	that	the	economic	crisis	and	the	large	
availability	of	 coal	due	 to	 the	 shale	gas	growth	 in	 the	USA	has	caused	excess	electricity	
producing	capacity.	Expanding	the	capacity	–	with	wind	energy	or	otherwise	–	will	not	be	
profitable.	The	CPB	advises	to	postpone	the	new	wind	projects	for	five	years67.
3.7.3 Gas quality and regulatory risk
To	store	hydrogen	in	the	gas	grid	is	not	only	a	matter	of	technological	feasibility.	It	is	also	
necessary	that	adding	hydrogen	is	confirmed	by	the	relevant	regulation.	In	2011	KEMA	and	
Arcadis	published	“Gaskwaliteit	voor	de	toekomst”,	a	study	on	the	possible	composition	
of	 gases	 in	 the	 system68/69.	 The	 study	 was	 ordered	 by	 the	ministry	 of	 economic	 affairs,	
agriculture	and	innovation.	First	the	study	mentions	the	requirements	that	the	policy	on	
gas	quality	has	to	meet.	For	power-to-gas	the	most	important	requirement	is	that	there	is	
a	need	for	a	policy	that	offers	certainty	for	investments.	If	power-to-gas	eventually	means	
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a	gas	grid	containing	10%	hydrogen	then	this	has	to	be	according	to	the	future	gas	quality	
standards.	As	long	as	these	standards	are	not	clear	investors	will	hesitate	to	invest	in	power-
to-gas.	The	most	important	conclusions	of	the	report	is	that	the	gas	quality	for	the	future	
needs	further	specification	to	give	investors	in	appliances	and	producers	of	gas	the	right	
information	 that	 they	 need	 for	 their	 decisions.	 This	 is	 also	 recognized	 by	 the	 topteam	
energy,	a	platform	that	is	a	part	of	the	Dutch	topsector	policy.	The	need	for	(international)	
regulation	is	one	of	the	problems	that	the	team	would	like	to	solve70.
3.7.4 Economic risk
Important	 economic	 risks	 are	demand	 risk	 (uncompetitive	pricing	policy	of	 renewable	
projects)	and	price	risk	(changes	in	market	prices	of	energy	carriers	and/or	certificates	for	
climate	change	abatement	of	renewable	production)71.
If	 the	 hydrogen	 or	 methane	 is	 too	 expensive	 due	 to	 the	 high	 costs	 of	 power-to-gas	
technology	there	will	be	a	lack	of	demand.	Power-to-gas	installations	are	expensive	and	
since	 they	 are	only	used	when	excess	 electricity	 is	 available	 the	 installation	will	not	be	
operating	all	the	time.	This	means	that	the	high	fixed	costs	have	to	be	compensated	in	
limited	time.	The	revenue	of	power-to-gas	will	probably	not	cover	the	costs	if	the	revenue	
is	restricted	to	the	price	that	 is	received	for	the	gas.	An	additional	benefit	of	power-to-
gas	 is	 the	 contribution	 to	 the	 balancing	 of	 the	 electricity	 network.	 The	 value	 of	 this	
contribution	could	be	considered	to	be	revenue	as	well.	
Because	power-to-gas	does	not	seem	to	be	financially	feasible	different	models	are	looked	
upon.	In	Germany	there	is	a	proposal	to	obligate	the	regional	energy	producers	to	buy	the	
green	gas	at	a	price	that	covers	the	costs	for	the	investor.	The	extra	costs	will	be	passed	on	
to	the	consumers.	Since	the	green	gas	is	a	small	part	of	the	total	energy	use	the	extra	costs	
will	be	limited72.	
Compared	 to	 other	 options	 (batteries,	 pumped	 hydro	 systems	 and	 others)	 the	 large	
scale	and	long-time	storage	of	excess	electricity	through	power-to-gas	looks	promising.	
Large	scale	stationary	storage	of	hydrogen	enables	synergies	with	both	e-mobility	by	the	
application	of	hydrogen	powered	 fuel	 cell	 electric	 vehicles	 and	 the	direct	utilisation	of	
hydrogen	in	industry.	Given	the	achievable	prices	for	hydrogen	in	different	applications,	
based	on	the	assumption	that	hydrogen	in	the	transport	sector	can	be	sold	in	a	bandwidth	
between	 6	 €/kgH
2
	 (hydrogen	 delivered	 to	 refuelling	 station)	 and	 8	 €/kgH
2
	 (accepted	
hydrogen	sales	price	at	the	refuelling	station	for	end	users),	it	is	revealed	that	hydrogen	
as	a	fuel	provides	the	most	valuable	sales	pathway.	The	other	utilisation	pathways	may,	in	
fact,	offer	a	larger	potential	in	light	of	volume,	but	their	potential	with	regard	to	economic	
opportunities	is	clearly	below	that	of	the	transportation	sector.	Also	a	major	disadvantage	
of	the	methane	systems	is	their	comparatively	low	overall	efficiency73.
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Another	approach	is	taken	by	the	CENER	Centre74.	Their	model	provides	an	economical	
assessment	 of	 a	 wind-hydrogen	 energy	 system.	 They	 emphasize	 the	 possibility	 to	 sell	
wind	 electricity	 at	 the	 best	 possible	 price.	When	 prices	 are	 low,	 the	 energy	 should	 be	
stored	as	hydrogen.	Selling	at	 the	best	possible	price	might	 improve	the	overall	 rate	of	
return.	For	a	42	MW	wind	farm	using	historical	data	it	turns	out	that	adding	power-to-
gas	to	the	system	results	in	a	better	price	(€/kWh)	but	not	in	a	higher	rate	of	return.	The	
investments	needed	for	the	power-to-gas	equipment	bring	along	higher	costs	that	are	not	
made	up	for	by	the	extra	revenues	due	to	better	trading.
SEO	Economic	Research	studied	the	costs	and	benefits	of	different	measures	to	reduce	CO
2
	
emissions75.	They	qualify	power-to-gas	as	a	costly	but	necessary	technology	to	meet	the	
2050	target	of	80%	reduction	of	emission.	The	most	cost	efficient	technologies	are	energy	
savings,	wind	on	land,	CO
2
	capture	and	nuclear	energy.	ECN	and	the	Planbureau	voor	de	
leefomgeving	published	a	roadmap	for	205076	where	they	also	find	that	given	the	reduction	
of	 emission	 target	 a	 growth	 in	 renewable	 energy	production	 should	be	 expected.	This	
growth	creates	a	need	for	storage	that	power-to-gas	can	fulfil.	
3.7.5 market formation
The	market	formation	function	in	the	power-to-gas	TIS	identifies	a	number	of	barriers.	In	
the	first	place	there	is	a	lack	of	regulation	and	it	is	therefore	unclear	who	has	the	responsibility	
to	balance	 the	electricity	network	applying	power-to-gas.	Secondly	 it	 is	unsure	whether	
current	 regulations	will	 result	 in	 a	 sufficient	 growth	 of	 intermittent	 renewable	 energy.	
There	are	European	and	national	programs	and	plans	to	support	this	growth	but	they	may	
not	be	sufficient	and	they	are	criticized	for	being	unrealistic.	A	third	barrier	is	the	lack	of	
long	 term	 regulation	on	 the	 subject	 of	 gas	quality.	 Finally	power-to-gas	does	not	 seem	
financially	feasible.	The	contribution	of	power-to-gas	in	balancing	the	network	has	to	be	
taken	into	account	because	other	costs	may	be	avoided.	The	conclusion	is	that	the	market	
formation	function	identifies	a	number	of	problems	for	the	power-to-gas	TIS.
3.8 resource mobilization
Resource	mobilization	refers	to	the	allocation	of	financial,	material	and	human	capital.	The	
access	to	such	capital	factors	is	necessary	for	the	development	of	the	power-to-gas	TIS.	Typical	
activities	involved	in	this	system	function	are	investments	and	subsidies77.	As	discussed	above,	
there	is	only	a	need	for	power-to-gas	if	there	is	a	large	amount	of	intermittent	renewable	
energy.	This	means	that	the	funds	directed	at	stimulating	renewable	energy	in	an	indirect	
way	 increase	 the	 need	 for	 power-to-gas.	 Therefore	 looking	 at	 the	 function	 of	 resource	
mobilization	 requires	 a	 broad	 perspective.	 Investments	 and	 subsidies	 for	 power-to-gas	
technology	represent	direct	resource	mobilization	for	the	TIS	but	resources	for	intermittent	
renewable	energy	sources	are	relevant	as	well	since	they	contribute	to	market	formation.
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3.8.1 Subsidies
Subsidies	 can	 be	 found	 at	 both	 European	 and	 national	 level.	 The	 Seventh	 Framework	
Programme	from	the	European	Union	wants	to	make	Europe	the	leading	world	forum	
for	 science	 and	 technology.	 The	 specific	 program	Cooperation	 –	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Seventh	
Framework	-	aims	to	support	cooperation	between	industries,	research	centres	and	public	
authorities.	Energy	is	one	of	the	nine	themes	of	the	Cooperation	program.	The	budget	
allocated	 to	 the	Energy	 theme	 is	€	 2,350	million	 for	 the	period	2008	–	2013.	A	 share	of	
€467	million	of	this	budget	is	earmarked	for	research	on	fuel	cells	and	hydrogen	and	is	
implemented	 by	 the	 fuel	 cells	 and	 hydrogen	 joint	 undertaking	 (FCH-JU).	 The	 €467	
million	from	the	FCH-JU	is	matched	by	€470	million	from	the	industry78/79.
Only	a	part	of	the	Seventh	framework	programme	budget	for	the	Energy	theme	is	spent	on	
research	related	to	hydrogen.	The	Energy	Policy	for	Europe	introduces	a	set	of	European	
energy	measures	 that	 should	 realize	 the	goals	 of	 the	Energy	 theme.	The	measures	 and	
goals	concern	among	others	the	internal	energy	market,	energy	efficiency	and	renewable	
energy.	The	budget	for	the	Energy	theme	is	therefore	not	at	all	earmarked	for	power-to-
gas	technology.	The	funds	directed	at	stimulating	renewable	energy	 in	an	 indirect	way	
increase	the	need	for	power-to-gas.	An	example	is	the	more	than	€110	million	that	has	
been	provided	by	the	European	Union	since	2002	for	wind	energy	research80/,81.
The	Dutch	government’s	industrial	policy	is	based	on	nine	so	called	top	sectors.	Energy	is	
one	of	the	top	sectors	and	is	divided	in	seven	Top	consortia	for	Knowledge	and	Innovation	
(TKI).	One	of	the	TKI’s	has	gas	as	its	subject.	The	TKI	Gas	has	a	€50	million	budget	in	2012	
but	only	a	small	part	is	invested	in	power-to-gas	related	topics82/83.
3.8.2 Investments
It	is	important	to	realize	that	the	European	and	national	subsidies	do	not	finance	research	
and	pilot	projects	by	themselves.	They	are	always	matched	by	other	funds	that	are	also	
needed	to	have	 sufficient	 resources.	Whether	 research	or	projects	are	 financed	 through	
subsidies	or	private	investments	depends	on	the	life	cycle	stage	that	the	technology	is	in84.
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Figure 2: Global capital market for sustainable projects 2007. (Biemans, 2009)
Figure	2	shows	that	a	technology	in	its	early	stage	–technology	research	and	technology	
development	 -	 is	 financed	 through	 subsidies,	 businesses	 and	 venture	 capital.	 The	
entrepreneurial	activities	in	the	power-to-gas	TIS	(Table	1:	Operating	power-to-gas	plants	
in	Germany	 (10)	 and	 the	Netherlands	 (1).)	 confirm	 this.	 All	 activities	 have	 private	 and	
public	parties	involved.	
Using	 the	 broad	 perspective	 where	 the	 growth	 of	 intermittent	 renewable	 energy	 is	 a	
positive	contribution	for	the	power-to-gas	TIS	Figure	3	shows	the	installed	capacity	for	
electricity	generation	from	renewables	in	the	European	Union.	It	is	clear	that	there	is	a	
large	growth	of	installed	wind	capacity	that	implicates	a	growth	in	mobilized	resources	
as	well.	The	solar	energy	is	among	the	other	sources	of	renewable	energy	and	has	grown	
as	well.	
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Figure 3: Installed capacity for electricity generation from renewables, EU-2885
Bloomberg86	reports	rising	new	investments	in	renewable	energy	in	Europe	between	2004	
and	2011.	 In	2012	and	2013	new	investments	 fall	 to	a	 lower	 level.	For	the	power-to-gas	
TIS	the	fall	 in	new	investments	 is	negative.	Looking	at	the	need	for	a	strong	growth	in	
intermittent	energy	sources	a	rise	in	new	investments	in	renewable	energy	is	needed.
The	 conclusion	 concerning	 resource	 mobilization	 is	 that	 the	 large	 amount	 of	
entrepreneurial	activities	in	recent	years	shows	that	resources	have	been	available.	On	a	
European	level	subsidies	exist	and	are	matched	by	private	capital.	The	growing	installed	
capacity	for	electricity	generation	from	renewables	also	contributes	to	the	power-to-gas	
TIS	in	a	positive	way.
3.9 Support from advocacy coalitions
The	rise	of	an	emerging	technology	often	leads	to	resistance	from	actors	with	interests	in	
the	incumbent	energy	system.	In	order	for	a	TIS	to	develop,	it	is	necessary	to	overcome	
this	 resistance.	 Lobbies	 and	 advice	 activities	 are	 used	 to	 create	 support	 from	 advocacy	
coalitions87/88.	To	analyse	the	support	from	advocacy	function,	the	lobby	groups	that	are	
related	to	power-to-gas	have	to	be	found.	In	the	European	transparency	register	15	lobby	
groups	 are	 registered	 with	 hydrogen	mentioned	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 the	
organization.	Over	50	lobby	groups	have	wind	in	the	description	of	their	goal89.	Some	of	
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the	lobby	groups	have	hydrogen	or	wind	energy	as	their	core	business	other	lobby	groups	
have	other	 goals	 that	 come	 in	 the	 first	place.	 For	 them	 the	promotion	of	hydrogen	or	
wind	energy	is	a	secondary	goal.	The	largest	lobby	groups	that	focus	on	hydrogen	or	wind	
energy	will	be	described	briefly.
The	European	gas	research	group	(GERG)	was	founded	in	1961	and	promotes	innovation	
in	gas	technology.	GERG	wants	to	strengthen	the	safe	transport,	distribution	and	use	of	
natural	and	renewable	gases.	It	is	a	major	objective	of	GERG	to	maintain	strong	links	with	
the	European	Union	and	to	contribute	to	the	discussion	of	policy	on	activities	concerning	
natural	gas	R&D	in	Europe	by	making	available	its	expertise,	advice	and	support90.	GERG	
is	 therefore	 an	 important	 advocacy	 coalition	 with	 28	 gas	 industry	 members	 from	 14	
countries.
The	European	Hydrogen	Association	(EHA)	represents	21	national	hydrogen	and	fuel	cell	
organisations	and	 the	main	European	companies	active	 in	 the	hydrogen	 infrastructure	
development.	 The	 EHA	 communicates	 on	 important	 issues	 regarding	 industrial	 and	
regulatory	needs	to	key	decision	makers	at	EU	level91.	
The	NEW	industry	grouping	(NEW-IG)	has	68	companies	working	in	the	field	of	fuel	cells	
and	hydrogen	and	they	represent	a	major	part	of	the	sector.	Their	objective	is	to	promote	
the	interests	of	the	fuel	cells	and	hydrogen	industry	at	a	European	level	by	engaging	with	
European	decision-makers92.
The	N.ERGHY	Research	Grouping	represents	the	interests	of	European	universities	and	
research	institutes	in	the	FCH	JU.	Currently	58	international	research	institutions	are	a	
part	of	E.NERGHY
The	European	Wind	Energy	Association	(EWEA)	promotes	the	utilization	of	wind	power	
in	 Europe	 and	 worldwide.	 It	 represents	 700	 members	 from	 almost	 60	 countries.	 The	
EWEA	develops	and	communicates	effective	strategic	policies	and	initiatives	to	influence	
the	political	process	in	a	direction	that	maintains	and	creates	stable	markets	and	overcome	
barriers	to	the	deployment	of	wind	energy93.
The	support	from	advocacy	coalitions	function	is	met	by	the	power-to-gas	TIS	as	far	as	the	
existence	and	presence	of	lobby	groups	is	concerned.	Whether	the	lobby	activities	result	in	
the	desired	actions	is	another	matter.	The	entrepreneurial	activities,	the	existing	research	
programs	and	the	available	funds	all	suggest	that	the	lobby	activities	do	have	the	desired	
results.	Examples	of	issues	that	are	not	realized	so	far	are	gas	quality	standards	that	allow	
hydrogen	in	the	gas	grid	and	the	legal	framework	for	power-to-gas.
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3.10 System dynamics
So	far	the	different	functions	from	the	power-to-gas	TIS	have	been	discussed	separately.	
This	has	given	a	valuable	insight	in	the	progress	that	has	been	made	in	each	function.	It	
also	has	been	a	static	approach.	In	this	section	the	system	dynamics	will	be	discussed.	
The	power-to-gas	TIS	seems	to	start	with	entrepreneurial	activities.	The	expected	growth	
of	renewable	energy	will	cause	more	intermittent	electricity	and	a	balancing	problem	on	
the	electricity	grid.	The	guidance	of	the	search	function	starts	the	entrepreneurial	activities.	
Innovative	 research,	 including	demonstration	projects,	 is	 initiated.	The	businesses	and	
research	institutions	then	require	resources	to	cover	part	of	their	costs	and	to	compensate	
the	 financial	 risks	 they	 take.	 In	 the	 power-to-gas	 TIS	 funds	 have	 come	 available	 and	
projects	have	 started.	The	outcome	of	 the	projects	 feeds	back	 into	 the	dynamic	 system	
and	is	an	impulse	for	new	projects.	The	entrepreneurial	activities	interact	with	knowledge	
development	and	knowledge	exchange.	This	too	has	been	observed	in	the	power-to-gas	
TIS.
Figure	4	shows	an	illustration	of	the	dynamics	between	functions.	It	is	possible	to	place	
the	events	 that	have	been	discussed	 in	 this	chapter	 in	 this	dynamic	 system.	The	policy	
context	for	power-to-gas	includes	the	Energy	2020	strategy,	the	European	wind	initiative	
and	in	the	Netherlands	the	national	plans	for	wind	on	land	and	wind	at	sea.	The	energy	
policy	activates	the	guidance	of	the	search.	The	expected	growth	in	wind	and	solar	energy	
causes	 a	 (potential)	balancing	problem	on	 the	 electricity	networks	 so	 a	 solution	has	 to	
be	 found.	 Business	 and	 research	 institutions	 start	 projects	 and	 claim	 resources.	 The	
most	 important	 events	 concerning	 knowledge	 development	 are	 the	 FCH	 JU	 projects,	
the	Naturalhy	 project,	DVGW	 research	 and	 the	HyUnder	 project.	 The	 entrepreneurial	
activities	are	a	response	to	the	guidance	of	the	search	impulse	as	well.	Research	centres	
and	businesses	build	advocacy	coalitions	to	lobby	for	resources	to	support	research	and	
entrepreneurial	projects.	
Figure 4: The power-to-gas TIS as a dynamic system.
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So	far	the	general	outcomes	of	the	projects	have	resulted	in	positive	feedback	loops.	Most	
research	and	demonstration	projects	support	the	feasibility	of	power-to-gas.	The	guidance	
of	the	search	is	continued	at	the	same	path	and	new	projects	are	initiated.	The	seventh	
framework	programme	is	followed	by	Horizon	2020	supporting	new	power-to-gas	related	
projects.	The	fuel	cells	and	hydrogen	joint	technology	initiative	(FCH	JTI)	resulted	in	the	
foundation	of	the	fuel	cells	and	hydrogen	joint	undertaking	(FCH	JU).	The	entrepreneurial	
activities	have	also	 resulted	 in	new	and	more	projects.	 In	Stuttgart	a	ZSW	pilot	project	
from	2009	has	been	followed	by	a	 larger	project	 in	2012.	 In	Eichhof	a	Fraunhofer	IWES	
power-to-gas	pilot	has	resulted	in	a	second	phase	including	methanation.
Negative	feedback	loops	are	found	looking	at	the	market	formation	function.	Appropriate	
regulation	to	achieve	economically	viable	P2G	implementation	is	missing94.	The	Energy	
2020	strategy	has	to	be	carried	out	but	are	not	perceived	by	all	as	convincing95/96.	There	is	
also	a	need	for	new	regulation	on	gas	quality	standards97/98.	So	far	the	identified	problems	
have	not	resulted	in	a	drastic	change	in	the	guidance	of	the	search.	New	research	and	pilot	
projects	are	still	carried	out	even	though	the	market	formation	is	lagging	behind.
3.11 Conclusions
The	power-to-gas	TIS	 shows	 a	 lot	 of	 progress	 on	most	 functions.	Over	 the	 last	 years	 a	
growing	number	of	research	projects	and	entrepreneurial	activities	have	been	developed.	
This	has	led	to	knowledge	development	and	knowledge	exchange.	Funds	to	finance	the	
projects	have	become	available.	An	important	matter	now	is	if	the	need	for	power-to-gas	
solutions	is	urgent	enough	to	keep	the	power-to-gas	TIS	in	an	upward	spiral.	This	urgency	
is	in	TIS	terminology	part	of	the	guidance	of	the	search	function.
The	 first	 conclusion	 has	 to	 be	 that	 a	 convincing	 European	 and	 national	 energy	 policy	
aimed	at	a	substantial	growth	of	wind	and	solar	energy	is	the	most	important	condition	
for	 power-to-gas	 to	 become	 a	 needed	 and	 applied	 technology.	 The	 European	 energy	
policy	and	plans	as	they	are	stated	in	Energy	202099,	Energy	trends	2030100	and	the	Energy	
Roadmap	2050101	do	show	this	commitment.	The	European	wind	initiative	–	part	of	the	
SET	plan	-	wants	to	enable	wind	energy	to	supply	20%	of	Europe’s	electricity	in	2020,	33%	
in	2030	and	50%	in	2050.	It	is	clear	that	the	European	ambition	is	large	enough	to	cause	
a	 need	 for	 power-to-gas	 technology.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	 ambition	 has	 to	 be	 a	
driving	 force	 for	power-to-gas	 to	become	widely	applied.	 If	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
European	plans	gets	delayed	or	if	the	ambition	is	scaled	down,	this	will	obviously	reduce	
the	need	for	power-to-gas	solutions.
The	need	for	a	substantial	growth	of	wind	en	solar	energy	asks	for	support	from	advocacy	
coalitions.	The	growth	of	wind	and	solar	energy	cannot	be	 taken	 for	granted	based	on	
the	presence	of	an	ambitious	formulated	European	energy	policy.	The	large	investments	
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cause	criticism	and	this	could	result	in	a	turning	point	for	renewable	energy.	A	significant	
and	continues	effort	to	organize	support	for	growth	of	wind	and	solar	energy	are	a	second	
condition	for	power-to-gas	to	play	a	part	in	the	future	energy	system.
Power-to-gas	technology	has	to	be	improved	to	eliminate	a	number	of	technological	and	
economic	barriers.	To	add	10%	hydrogen	to	the	natural	gas	network	measures	have	to	be	
taken	to	ensure	that	the	existing	gas	turbines,	appliances,	steel	tanks	and	underground	
storages	 are	 ready	 for	 a	 changed	 gas	mixture.	 Another	 pathway	 is	methanation.	Using	
hydrogen	to	produce	methane	offers	the	advantage	that	methane	can	be	injected	into	the	
natural	gas	network	without	 restrictions.	 In	both	cases	an	 increase	 in	energy	efficiency	
of	 power-to-gas	 technology	 is	 needed	 to	 improve	 the	 power-to-gas	 business	 case.	
Entrepreneurial	activities,	knowledge	development	and	knowledge	exchange	are	needed	
to	realize	the	requested	progress.
The	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 power-to-gas	 at	 the	 moment	 shows	 some	 deficiencies.	
Power-to-gas	is	the	linking	pin	between	the	electricity	grid	and	the	natural	gas	network.	
Regulation	is	needed	to	determine	if	power-to-gas	is	the	responsibility	of	the	electricity	
producer,	 electricity	 distributor,	 gas	 producer,	 gas	 distributor	 or	 some	 other	 party.	
Despite	all	the	power-to-gas	demonstration	projects	it	is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	large	
scale	power-to-gas	plants	before	the	regulator	has	set	up	the	regulatory	framework.
Another	regulatory	issue	are	the	gas	quality	standards.	To	store	hydrogen	in	the	gas	grid	
is	not	only	a	matter	of	technological	feasibility.	It	is	also	necessary	that	adding	hydrogen	
is	conform	the	relevant	regulation.	The	gas	quality	standards	for	the	future	need	further	
specification	to	give	 investors	 in	appliances	and	producers	of	gas	the	right	information	
that	they	need	for	their	decisions.	
Power-to-gas	 installations	 are	 expensive	 and	 since	 they	 are	 only	 used	 when	 excess	
electricity	is	available	the	installation	will	not	be	operating	all	the	time.	This	means	that	
the	high	fixed	costs	have	to	be	compensated	in	limited	time.	The	revenue	of	power-to-gas	
will	probably	not	cover	the	costs	if	the	revenue	is	restricted	to	the	price	that	is	received	for	
the	gas.	Additional	benefits	of	power-to-gas	are	the	contribution	to	the	balancing	of	the	
electricity	network,	the	avoiding	of	capital	costs	of	expanding	the	electricity	network	and	
the	utilization	of	renewable	electricity.	The	value	of	this	contribution	could	be	considered	
to	be	revenue	as	well.	Regulation	is	needed	so	that	the	power-to-gas	investor	does	not	only	
carry	the	costs	but	also	gets	rewarded	for	the	realized	benefits.
The	legal	framework,	the	gas	quality	standards	and	the	regulation	to	support	investments	
are	all	part	of	the	market	 formation	function.	The	power-to-gas	advocacy	coalition	can	
contribute	to	the	market	formation	function	by	lobbying	for	the	needed	regulation.
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Using	a	TIS	approach	to	analyse	power-to-gas	development	has	been	useful.	The	position	
that	power-to-gas	will	have	in	the	future	energy	system	will	depend	on	the	realization	of	
wind	and	solar	ambitions,	the	technological	progress	on	power-to-gas	energy	efficiency	
and	 the	 making	 of	 a	 regulatory	 framework	 both	 for	 gas	 quality	 standards	 and	 for	
investment	conditions.	All	TIS	functions	need	to	make	progress	but	this	is	especially	true	
for	the	market	formation	function.
What	 will	 determine	 if	 power-to-gas	 will	 be	 an	 important	 technology	 in	 the	 energy	
transition	 over	 the	 next	 years?	One	 can	 look	 at	 the	 development	 of	 a	 technology	 as	 a	
process	that	takes	place	in	a	technological	innovation	system	(TIS).	The	TIS	includes	all	
actors	and	institutions	that	are	involved	in	the	development,	diffusion	and	utilization	of	a	
technology.	For	a	technology	to	develop	successfully	the	TIS	should	fulfil	several	functions.	
For	 power-to-gas	 technology	 pilot	 projects	 are	 realized,	 studies	 are	 carried	 out	 and	
funds	are	available	both	for	projects	as	for	research.	The	functions	called	entrepreneurial	
activities,	knowledge	development,	knowledge	exchange	and	resource	mobilization	are	
all	met.	The	function	that	faces	the	most	problems	is	called	market	formation.	There	is	
not	yet	a	regulatory	framework	for	power-to-gas.	Investors	in	power-to-gas	also	need	to	be	
rewarded	for	the	benefits	that	they	realize	such	as	the	contribution	to	the	balancing	of	the	
electricity	network,	the	avoiding	of	capital	costs	of	expanding	the	electricity	network	and	
the	utilization	of	renewable	electricity.	Policy	directed	at	market	formation	is	therefore	
recommended.
Key Findings:
•	 Power-to-gas	technology	needs	a	substantial	growth	of	wind	and	solar	energy.
•	 Research	and	entrepreneurial	activities	are	contributing	to	power-to-gas	technology.
•	 A	legal	framework	is	needed	to	enable	potential	investors	to	take	long	term	decisions.
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4.1 Introduction
This	chapter	describes	how	contextual	 factors	and	system	reactions	 influence	end	state	
developments	based	on	a	 systems	approach.	The	chapter	uses	 the	 case	 study	of	Energy	
Valley	of	the	Netherlands	to	illustrate	the	influence	of	contextual	factors	on	the	regional	
energy	 system	 and	 how	 the	 system	 responded	 and	 developed.	 The	 illustration	 below	
captures	system	interactions	with	its	context	and	eventually	the	resulting	end	state.
Contextual	
Factors
System
Reactions
Energy
Developments
(End	States)
Figure 1: Systems approach
The	illustration	above	shows	that	energy	systems	respond	to	contextual	factors	and	this	in	
turn	affect	contextual	factors.	Decisions	and	behaviour	in	this	energy	system	are	influenced	
by	contextual	factors,	which	in	turn	result	in	energy	developments.	This	continued	loop	
of	interactions	would	finally	result	in	a	particular	‘end	state’	for	such	a	system.	The	term	
‘end	states’	has	been	described	in	the	introductory	chapter	and	this	chapter	shows	how	
such	end	states	could	be	influenced	by	various	contextual	factors	and	systemic	responses.	
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When	talking	about	‘energy	systems’	this	analysis	takes	a	broader	perspective	and	looks	
at	‘energy’	as	being	embedded	in	social,	economic,	and	political	systems	and	that	such	a	
system	could	be	a	district,	region,	country,	or	a	regional	block	such	as	the	EU.	The	analysis	
looks	at	‘energy’	as	being	located	in	a	specific	location	with	a	defined	boundary	and	it	can	
be	of	different	 scales.	 In	 the	 research,	Energy	Valley	was	examined	as	an	energy	 system	
embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 energy	 system,	which	 is	 the	 national	 energy	 system	 and	 this	 in	
turn,	is	embedded	in	a	European	energy	system.	Each	of	these	systems	can	be	examined	
separately,	but	each	of	these	next	level	systems	is	interconnected	and	contributed	to	other	
levels.	EU	decisions	and	developments	influenced	Dutch	decisions	and	developments	and	
therefore	that	of	Energy	Valley.	At	the	same	time,	Energy	Valley	developments	reflected	
national	and	EU	developments.	This	analysis	compares	Energy	Valley	and	national	energy	
developments	to	that	of	EU	developments	for	similarities	and	differences	in	their	systems	
patterns	and	behaviour	later	in	the	chapter.
Finally,	 it	must	 be	noted	 that	 this	 chapter	 builds	 on	 a	 previous	 chapter	 on	 ‘drivers	 of	
change’,	which	focuses	on	the	macro	level	contexts	in	which	energy	developments	take	
place,	whilst	this	chapter	looks	at	contextual	factors	influencing	energy	developments	at	
the	micro	level,	specifically	from	a	systems	perspective.	
The	rest	of	the	chapter	has	5	sections.	Section	4.2	describes	salient	aspects	of	Energy	Valley	
and	 the	 research	 to	be	 able	 to	 frame	 the	 analysis	presented	 in	 this	 chapter.	 Section	4.3	
4.3	 describes	 ‘contextual	 factors’	 and	 how	 these	 framed	 Energy	 Valley’s	 energy	 system	
developments	initially	and	then	in	Section	4.4,	the	‘system	responses’	are	described	and	
again,	Energy	Valley’s	energy	system	responses	are	illustrated	to	show	what	this	means.	In	
Section	4.5,	a	comparison	of	Energy	Valley’s	energy	system	development	and	that	of	the	EU	
is	discussed	to	understand	how	energy	systems	are	embedded	in	larger	regional	systems	
and	how	these	systems	interact.	In	the	final	section	4.6,	implications	of	the	analysis	[and	of	
a	systems	approach]	are	discussed	in	the	light	of	‘end	states’.	
4.2 research on Energy Valley case study
Energy	Valley	 is	 an	 energy	 cluster	 covering	 the	Northern	 part	 of	 the	Netherlands	 and	
was	 established	 in	 2003	 by	 stakeholders	 including	 local	 policymakers	 in	 response	 to	
EU	 and	 national	 energy	 liberalization	 policies.	 Energy	 Valley	 faced	 two	major	 strands	
of	 development.	 The	 first,	 a	 gas	 driven	 national	 energy	 sector	 facing	 the	 transition	 to	
more	 sustainable,	 liberalised	 European	 energy	 market	 and	 the	 second,	 the	 economic	
development	of	a	periphery	region.	Energy	Valley	cluster	as	a	case	study	offered	exploration	
into	these	two	interconnected	developments	driven	by	changing	EU	and	global	contexts.
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Energy	Valley	was	 established	 in	 2003	 and	has	 seen	 changes	 in	 its	 scope,	 visibility	 and	
developments	 as	 a	 result	of	 changes	 in	 its	 context.	 In	order	 to	understand	how	energy	
systems	develop,	the	research	chose	a	complex	adaptive	systems	approach,	which	offered	
a	systems	perspective	on	how	systems	change	due	to	responses	of	its	agents	to	changes	in	
its	environment.	This	approach	offered	both	micro	and	macro	level	systems	perspectives	
which	meant	that	local	micro	interactions	and	behaviours	of	agents	could	be	understood	
within	 broader	 macro	 level	 energy	 and	 contextual	 developments.	 The	 study	 looked	
at	system	developments	at	the	 local,	national	and	EU	levels	and	these	examples	will	be	
used	to	 illustrate	how	energy	systems	develop	 in	their	 (local)	contexts.	The	research	on	
Energy	Valley	was	a	qualitative	study	based	on	stakeholder	and	expert	inputs	supported	
by	secondary	sources	of	information.
4.3 Contextual factors
Contextual	factors	in	this	analysis	include	drivers	of	change,	history	and	geography	of	the	
system,	stakeholders	and	collective	definition	and	boundaries	of	the	energy	system.	
Figure 2: Contextual Factors in Energy Systems
To	illustrate,	discovery	of	gas	in	the	North	NL	and	the	development	of	the	gas	industry	
for	NL	and	EU	determined	the	key	stakeholders,	namely,	gas	corporations,	the	national	
government	 and	 regional	 governments.	 This	 led	 to	 an	 energy	 system	 built	 on	 gas	 as	
the	key	resource.	This	initial	energy	system	dominated	by	gas	with	its	stakeholders	and	
definitions	of	the	system	responded	to	specific	drivers	of	change.
Contextual	
Factors
System
Reactions
Energy
Developments
(End	States)
Drivers	of	change
History	&	geography
Stakeholders
Identity	&	scope
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4.3.1 Drivers of change
Drivers	of	change	in	this	analysis	are	understood	to	be	drivers	that	change	the	system	as	
a	whole.	It	has	been	found	in	this	study	that	drivers	in	energy	systems	can	be	external	or	
internal	drivers.	The	case	study	of	Energy	Valley	illustrates	which	drivers	of	change	were	
relevant	 to	 its	 system	 changes.	 There	 were	 nine	 significant	 external	 drivers	 and	 seven	
internal	drivers.	Below	are	some	highlights	of	these	drivers	of	change	and	their	relevance	
to	a	gas	dominated	system	of	Energy	Valley.
External drivers of change in Energy Valley
•	 Geo-political shifts
	 	Major	geo-political	shifts	such	as	the	emerging	power	shifts	towards	Asian	economies	
and	 the	 renewed	 Russian	 political	 threats	 to	 Europe	 are	 examples	 of	 drivers	 that	
required	strategic	responses	in	Energy	Valley.	
•	 Energy security threats
	 	Dependence	on	external	energy	 sources	 (EU	 imports	53%	of	 its	energy	needs	and	of	
this,	imports	for	crude	oil	is	90%,	natural	gas	is	66%	and	solid	fuels	42%)	and	incidents	
such	as	the	recent	Russian	threats	to	European	gas	supply	(Russian	gas	contributes	39%	
of	its	gas	imports)	needed	to	be	addressed.
•	 Large scale power outage and blackouts in Europe
	 	The	 need	 for	 improved	 grid	 infrastructure	 across	 Europe	 to	 increase	 reliability	 is	
directly	linked	to	energy	security	issues.	Major	outages	and	blackouts	in	Europe	that	
had	cascading	effects	in	other	parts	were	present	in	the	recent	past	and	therefore	all	
regions	had	to	comply	with	new	EU	directives	and	legislations	to	mitigate	such	effects,	
including	major	grid	investments.	
•	 EU market liberalization
	 	EU	liberalization	of	electricity	and	gas	markets	was	introduced	to	support	consumer	
choice	and	increased	competition.	Energy	systems	are	directly	affected.
•	 EU legislations
	 	The	 legislations	 supported	 EU’s	 goal	 towards	 a	 more	 reliable	 and	 sustainable	 use	
of	 energy	and	more	 flexible	markets	 led	by	demand-side	 focus.	 Specific	 legislations	
governed	 grid	 interconnections	 and	 efficiency	 of	 energy	 systems	 to	 support	
development	of	a	European	internal	energy	market.	Energy	Valley	needed	to	comply.
•	 Sustainability and climate change
	 	Long-term	 energy	 sustainability	 agendas	 that	 included	 climate	 change	 resulted	 in	
compliance	of	Member	States	to	meet	CO
2
	and	renewable	energy	targets.	The	EU	saw	
gas	as	a	fossil	fuel	and	this	had	implications	for	Energy	Valley	and	the	Netherlands.
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•	 New energy resources and balancing
	 	EU	targets	for	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	(Policies:	2020,	2030,	2050	Energy	
Roadmaps)	were	 directly	 relevant	 to	 developments	 in	 Energy	 Valley.	 The	 increased	
need	for	balancing	as	a	result	of	large-scale	introduction	of	renewable	energies	offered	
new	opportunities	for	the	gas	sector	in	Energy	Valley.
•	 US cheap coal and shale
	 	The	US	 shale	 revolution	 and	 its	move	 towards	 increased	 renewable	 energy	 in	 their	
energy	mix	 resulted	 in	 excess	 and	 cheap	 coal	 being	 dumped	 in	 European	markets,	
including	 the	 Netherlands.	 This	 had	 a	 strong	 impact	 on	 energy	 demands	 by	
power	 plants	 and	 therefore	 affected	 climate	 change	 and	 sustainability	 agendas	 and	
developments	locally.	
•	 Technology developments
	 	The	shale	revolution,	cheaper	solar	and	wind	energy,	viable	smart	grid	technologies,	
bio-fuels,	 fuel	 cells	 and	hydrogen	 fuels	 are	examples	of	 the	 impact	of	 technological	
developments	on	market	developments.	Unpredictability	was	a	major	concern.	
Internal drivers of change in Energy Valley
•	 Depletion of gas resources
	 	Depletion	of	the	Groningen	gas	reserves	has	been	estimated	around	2030	at	the	current	
rate	 of	 extraction.	 Energy	 Valley’s	 gas	 contributes	 almost	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 energy	
needs	of	the	Netherlands.	Earnings	in	2013	were	more	than	15	billion	euros	from	gas	
revenues.	The	gas	industry	has	direct	implications	for	local	and	national	economies.	
•	 New gas reserves and biogas
	 	Biomass	gasification,	production	of	syngas,	creation	of	green	gas	hubs	are	examples	of	
new	developments	in	Energy	Valley	changing	the	local	gas	and	energy	sectors.
•	 Increased earthquake risks
	 	Increased	 earthquakes	 and	 damage	 to	 property	 directly	 related	 to	 gas	 exploitation	
in	 the	 Energy	 Valley	 region	were	 creating	 tensions	 between	 local	 population,	 local	
politicians	and	gas	corporations	and	national	government	where	conflicts	in	interests,	
roles	and	power	relations	played	a	role.	
•	 National policies 
	 	As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 government	 economic	 interests	 in	 the	 gas	 revenues	 were	
conflicting	with	 citizen	 safety	 and	 electoral	 pressures.	 Long-term	gas	 contracts	 and	
legal	obligations	to	trading	partners	outside	of	the	country	versus	citizen	and	green	
movements	were	tensions	in	the	system.	National	policies	were	leading	and	therefore	
relevant	to	Energy	Valley’s	energy	system.
•	 North Netherlands as economic lag region
	 	Energy	Valley	is	a	periphery	region	of	the	Netherlands	that	has	lower	economic	growth	
than	the	national	average	(-3%	vs.	0.75%	in	2014).	Regional	development	agendas	were	
competing	with	energy	transition	developments	and	national	economic	priorities.
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•	 Citizen movements and developments
	 	As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 a	 growing	 distrust	 in	 energy	 corporations	 and	 government	
related	to	conflict	of	interests	regarding	gas	exploration	and	earthquake	risks,	the	rising	
energy	prices	and	need	for	autonomy	and	self-sufficiency	were	some	of	the	key	motives	
of	 citizens	 and	 grassroots	 movements	 to	 initiate	 decentralized	 energy	 solutions.	
Parallel	to	this	was	also	the	‘green’	sustainable	movement.	Citizens	producing	energy	
were	dubbed	‘prosumer’,	producing	consumers.	
•	 Role of local governments
	 	The	 urgency	 of	 local	 governments	 in	 the	 economic	 lag	 region	 of	 Energy	 Valley	 to	
create	 jobs	and	economic	growth	was	prevalent.	The	depletion	of	gas	resources	was	
a	major	threat	to	further	economic	depression	coupled	with	youth	urban	migration	
pulls.	Earthquakes	risked	aggravating	the	attractiveness	of	the	location.	The	regional	
development	 agenda	 was	 a	 strong	 driver	 in	 the	 region	 that	 included	 job	 creation,	
innovation	boost	and	mitigating	earthquake	issues.	
4.3.2 history and geography
Discovery	of	gas	in	the	1950s	has	and	continued	to	have	a	major	impact	on	the	local	energy	
system	of	Energy	Valley.	The	region	has	built	its	infrastructure,	energy	mix	and	economic	
development	policies	based	on	the	gas industry and revenues.	The	Dutch	government	has	a	
dominant	stake	in	the	gas	resources	(50%	state	ownership)	and	are	directly	connected	to	
national	strategic	interests.	The	local	energy	system	of	Energy	Valley	is	therefore	tightly	
connected	 to	 the	 national	 energy	 system.	The	 trading history	 of	 the	Netherlands	 and	 its	
current	‘BV	NL’	(‘Netherlands	Incorporated’)	strategy	framed	economic	interests	as	being	
leading.	Gas	is	traded	internationally	and	has	larger	implications	beyond	Energy	Valley.
The	periphery and lag region	positions	of	the	region	meant	that	economic	and	social	structures	
needed	to	be	addressed.	The	region	is	dominated	by	agriculture and rural economies	on	the	one	
hand,	and,	large chemical and energy intensive manufacturing industries	related	to	national	policies	of	
the	past	related	to	availability	of	cheap	energy.	Energy expertise	and	energy	related	industries	
were	 dominant.	However,	 there	were	 other	 economic	 sectors	 dominant	 in	 the	 Energy	
Valley	region	and	regional differences	were	present,	for	example,	water	and	recreation,	food	
and	agro-based	 industries	 (Friesland),	horticulture	 (North	Holland	North),	 agriculture	
and	dairy	farming	(all	provinces),	forestry	and	tourism	(Drenthe)	and	heavy	industry	and	
harbour	facilities	(Groningen),	etc.
Lack of strong R&D investments and knowledge centres,	public	and	private	centres	were	also	key	
feature	of	the	system.	The	limited	knowledge	base	was	a	key	concern	for	Energy	Valley.
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4.3.3 Stakeholders
Energy	 Valley	was	 initiated	 to	 address	 a	 serious	 threat	 of	 losing	 the	 local	 gas	 industry	
and	 expertise	 built	 up	 in	 50	 years	 as	 a	 result	 of	 EU	 liberalization	 policies	 and	 future	
gas	depletion.	The	need	 to	preserve	 existing	gas	 expertise	 in	 the	 local	 economy	was	 an	
important	driver	to	Energy	Valley.	The	key	stakeholders	developing	Energy	Valley	were	
therefore	 regional governments, gas corporations	 and	 local educational institutes.	 However,	 gas	
dominance	in	Energy	Valley’s	energy	landscape	meant	that	gas industry	 stakeholders	and	
the	national government	had	strong	positions	in	the	current	system.
4.3.4 System definition - identity and scope
Identity	and	scope	of	an	energy	system	is	directly	related	to	its	key	stakeholders.	In	Energy	
Valley,	stakeholders	from	policy,	business,	academics,	and	regional	development	agencies	
were	present	and	‘policy’	included	local	and	national	policy	makers	and	decision-makers.	
Dominant stakeholders	 in	 the	 energy	 system	 were	 identified	 as	 the	 national	 government,	
gas	 related	 stakeholders	 and	provincial	 governments	due	 to	historical	 and	geographical	
factors.	This	meant	that	the	differences	in	stakeholders	resulted	in	different	definitions	and	
boundaries	for	the	system.	Given	the	dominance	of	 its	particular	stakeholders,	 three main 
frames, ‘economic’, ‘energy transition’ and ‘regional development’, were	evident	in	Energy	Valley.	This	
in	part	led	to	complex	and	conflicting	agendas	as	already	mentioned	in	earlier	sections.
The	regional	development	focus	of	local	policy	makers	meant	that	initially	a	regional and 
internal focused	 strategy	was	present	although	the	national	and	trading	aspects	of	 the	gas	
business	had	strong	national	and	international	scopes.	The	activities	supported	by	Energy	
Valley’s	strategic	focus	in	the	initial	working	programmes	were	very	much	on	energy	and	
regional	developments.
4.3.5 Interconnectedness of contextual factors
Drivers	 of	 change,	 history	 and	 geography,	 stakeholders	 and	 system	 definition	 are	 all	
interconnected	as	captured	in	the	previous	sections.	The	illustration	below	captures	this	
interconnectedness.
Figure 3: Interconnected Contextual Factors
Drivers	of	change
System	definition
History	and	geography Stakeholders
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Energy	 Valley’s	 gas	 dominated	 system	 determined	 its	 stakeholders,	 and	 therefore	 their	
conceived	identity	and	scope	of	the	energy	system	and	both	these	factors	were	shaped	to	a	
large	extent	by	its	(perceived)	history	and	geography	of	gas	and	socio-economic	factors	related	
to	national	and	regional	 interests.	Drivers	of	 change	are	connected	 to	an	energy	system’s	
definition,	its	identity	and	scope,	as	certain	drivers	influence	decisions	of	scope,	need	new	
strategic	focus,	etc.	In	Energy	Valley,	the	need	to	redefine	gas	dominance	in	its	initial	energy	
system	was	due	to	drivers	of	sustainability,	pending	depletion	of	local	gas	sources,	etc.	
4.4 System reactions
According	to	complexity	approaches,	systems	change	when	agents	in	the	system	respond	
to	changes	in	their	environment.	The	total	system	change	can	be	understood	by	exploring	
different	 aspects	 of	 a	 system	 that	 contribute	 to	 such	 a	 change.	 In	 this	 analysis,	 aspects	
contributing	to	system	reactions	include:	‘pulls’ of the system	which	is	the	direction	in	which	
a	system	tends	to	move;	coping strategies	of	agents	that	include	developing	and	gathering	
new	knowledge,	resources	and	skills;	differences that matter	for	future	strategies;	transforming 
interactions	and	collaborations.	Finally,	these	aspects	add	up	to	a	macro	level	system	change	
visible	in	emerging system patterns.
Contextual	
Factors
System
Reactions
Energy
Developments
(End	States)
“Pull”	of	system
Coping	strategies
Differences	
that	matter
Transforming	
interactions
Emerging	system	
patterns
Figure 4: Contextual Factors and System Reactions in Energy Systems
To	illustrate	system	reactions	in	Energy	Valley,	there	was	a	pull	towards	more	sustainable	
and	 decentralized	 energy	 solutions,	 connections	 between	 gas,	 oil	 and	 renewables.	 In	
addition,	 a	key	 coping	 strategy	was	 the	 creation	of	Energy	Academy	Europe	 that	would	
bring	fragmented	knowledge,	research,	education	and	stakeholders	together.	An	example	of	
transforming	interactions	and	collaborations	was	found	in	EnTranCe,	a	multi-stakeholder	
open	 innovation	 environment	 close	 to	market.	 Examples	 of	 emerging	 system	 patterns	
were	the	increased	presence	of	bottom-up	initiatives	next	to	top-down	policy	directives,	
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interplay	of	gas	and	electricity,	cross-sector	collaborators	such	as	bio-based	economy.	The	
following	sections	give	more	details	on	the	system	reactions	of	Energy	Valley.	
4.4.1 ‘Pull’ of the system
A	system	responds	to	changes	in	its	environment	and	there	is	often	an	underlying	direction	
towards	which	 the	 system	 tends	 to	move.	 In	 Energy	 Valley,	 the	 drivers	 of	 change	 and	
responses	by	individual	agents	in	the	system	resulted	in	more	complexity	and	increased	
unpredictability	and	a	general	movement	towards	the	‘outside’.	
The	energy	system	was	initially	an	internal	and	regional	oriented	system.	But	the	changes	
in	the	context	saw	various	shifts	in	this	system.	One	example	was	the	position	of	‘gas’	in	the	
energy	mix.	It	was	no	longer	secure	due	to	the	increase	in	new	sustainable	energy	solutions.	
This	meant	that	a	pull	to	redefine	and	reposition	gas	in	the	new	energy	system.	Related	to	
this	was	the	decentralization	movement	of	citizens	and	grassroots	organizations.	This	also	
meant	a	tendency	towards	more	demand-side	focus	instead	of	the	traditional	supply-side	
dominance.	
The	 lack	 of	 R&D,	 innovation	 resources	 and	 facilities,	 talent,	 policy	 constraints,	 etc.	
resulted	in	a	tendency	to	explore	possibilities	outside	the	local	system.	Pilots	in	the	UK	
were	carried	out	where	regulations	were	less	stringent	for	new	innovations.	The	strong	
‘pull’	to	seek	solutions	outside	Energy	Valley	was	a	serious	threat	of	further	depletion	of	
capacities	and	attractiveness	of	the	region	if	this	resulted	in	a	‘cluster	drain’.	Programmes	
and	mandates	from	the	European	Union	supported	internationalization	tendencies,	and	
provided	 additional	 resources	 to	 regional	 systems,	 enhancing	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 ‘the	
outside’.	Being	connected	internationally	was	not	in	itself	negative,	but	the	‘pull’	of	the	
outside	could	be	a	threat	if	it	did	not	contribute	to	strengthening	the	system’s	capabilities.	
4.4.2 Coping strategies
There	was	a	need	to	deal	with	the	changing	landscape	of	Energy	Valley’s	energy	system.	
Stakeholders	identified	different	strategies	for	its	future	and	these	included	creating	new	
and	different	infrastructure	to	deal	with	the	emerging	(complex)	energy	system;	including	
new	stakeholders	such	as	local	intermediaries,	citizen	and	grassroots	organizations,	Small	
and	Medium-sized	Enterprises	(SME),	etc.	in	the	search	for	broader	system-wide	changes;	
creating	new	cross-sector	 value	 chain	 collaborations;	 creating	educational	programmes	
with	multi-disciplinary	 competences;	 creating	new	 institutions	 and	 innovation	 spaces,	
etc.	All	stakeholder	groups	underlined	the	urgency	for	different	approaches	and	changes	
in	 the	 existing	 policy,	 business,	 education	 and	 innovation	 practice.	 There	was	 also	 an	
acknowledgement	 of	 the	 need	 for	 both	 large-scale	 and	 decentralized	 solutions,	 and	 a	
more	inclusive	strategy.
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4.4.3 Differences that matter
In	order	to	meet	the	new	challenges	due	to	the	changes	in	Energy	Valley,	the	innovation	
potential	of	the	system	had	to	be	analysed.	Exploring	‘differences	that	matter’	in	a	system	
with	new	combinations	of	potential	differences	 in	a	system	could	result	 in	 innovation.	
In	Energy	Valley,	new	and	different	 competences	 and	 capacities	needed	 to	be	 explored	
to	resolve	the	increasing	complexity	in	the	system	through	new	combinations	(German	
notion	 of	 ‘neue	 Kombination’).	 For	 example,	 innovative SME collaborating with large 
corporations and industry	with	 their	 resources	and	market	 reach	could	result	 in	accelerated	
commercialization	of	 innovations,	 including	 access	 to	 international	markets.	Combining 
fragmented research and knowledge disciplines present	 in	 the	 different	 universities	 in	 Energy	
Valley	 could	 accelerate	more	 focussed	 and	 collective	 solutions	 for	 energy	 development	
challenges.	 Regional differences	 in	 Energy	 Valley	 with	 differences	 in	 goals,	 ambitions,	
resources,	market	 structures,	networks,	 etc.	 could	be	used	 to	 forge	new	networks,	new	
cross-sector	 solutions,	 new	 business	model	 testing,	 etc.	 The	 regional and national interests	
were	also	significant	and	could	offer	different	solutions	 to	both	systems.	Energy	Valley	
had	physical	space	and	large	agricultural	land	and	farms	that	offered	biomass	solutions	as	
a	sustainable	energy	source	whilst	national	government	needed	to	deal	with	CO
2
	targets	
and	 these	 two	 different	 goals	 could	 be	 achieved	 through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 differences	 of	
each	system.	Potential	or	‘missing’	stakeholders	in	Energy	Valley	such	as	environmental	
groups,	civil	organizations,	and	‘prosumers’	had	different	values,	goals	and	motives	from	
the	 established	 stakeholder	groups.	Combining	 these	differences	 could	offer	 a	broader	
reach	to	the	energy	sustainability	agenda.	
4.4.4 Transforming interactions
When	 interactions	 take	place	 that	 come	 from	new	 combinations,	 a	 change	 takes	 place	
that	transforms	the	original	interactions.	An	example	in	Energy	Valley	was	the	creation	of	
EnTranCe	which	began	in	the	skybox	of	the	local	football	club	where	informal	discussions	
of	different	local	energy	businesses	and	the	energy	research	centre	led	to	the	creation	of	an	
open	innovation	multi-disciplinary	centre	where	businesses,	students	and	research	could	
come	together	to	solve	energy	transition	challenges.	The	‘gas’	stakeholders	had	a	strong	
systems	approach	and	this	has	been	adopted	in	EnTranCe	as	a	key	competence.	Energy	
Academy	 Europe	 is	 another	 example	 of	 a	 collective	 initiative	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 special	
institution	for	energy	to	overcome	fragmentation	and	lack	of	‘energy’	in	curricula.	
A	different	example	of	transforming	interactions	was	the	integration	of	energy	–	between	
electricity	 and	 gas,	 renewables	 and	 existing	 energy	 systems,	micro-level	 energy	 system	
management	 for	 homes	 and	 neighbourhoods,	 meso-level	 energy	 hubs	 connecting	
businesses	 in	 transition	 parks,	 green	 gas	 hubs,	 and	macro-level	 energy	 collaborations	
across	 regional	 boundaries	 such	 as	 in	Hansa	 Energy	 Corridor	 and	 ENSEA	 (North	 Sea)	
projects.	
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Another	 example	 of	 transforming	 interactions	 in	 Energy	Valley	were	 the	 development	
of	 integrated	 energy	 vision	 clustering	 strengths	 of	 the	 different	 Provinces	 in	 ‘De	 Plus	
van	Noord	Nederland’,	of	different	sectors	in	the	‘Bio-based	Economy’,	and	aligning	to	
national	agendas	in	the	‘Green	Deal’	and	‘Switch’	agreement	and	programmes.	
A	more	inclusive	strategy	of	extending	dialogues	to	consumer	and	grassroots	movements	
on	energy	developments	in	Energy	Valley	region	meant	that	the	system	was	changing	in	
terms	of	its	relationship	to	these	groups,	from	end	users	to	participants	and	increasingly	
strategic	partners.
4.4.5 Emerging system patterns
The	transforming	interactions	of	Energy	Valley	were	visible	indications	of	changes	in	the	
system.	These	changes	were	coming	together	due	 in	part	by	 the	responses	of	agents	 in	
the	system	and	their	coping	strategies,	building	on	innovation	potential	of	‘differences’,	
and	the	underlying	‘pulls’	of	the	systems.	On	a	systems	level,	new	or	emerging	patterns	
could	be	discerned	in	Energy	Valley.	These	patterns	indicated	that	the	energy	system	was	
becoming	more	complex,	which	is	partly	due	to	the	system	becoming	more ‘open’	as	seen	by	
the	inclusion	of	new	players,	new	sources	of	energy,	more	international	orientation,	new	
business	models,	etc.	
The	scope	of	the	system	was	changing	to	become	both	more local	and	more international and	
there	 was	 evidence	 for	 a	more systemic approach	 that	 went	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 notion	
of	 energy	 systems.	 Following	 the	 systemic	 approach,	 a	 more	 emergent	 and	 organic	
development	 of	 the	 energy	 system	 was	 visible	 even	 as	 more	 policy	 and	 top-down	
coordination	was	taking	place	in	Energy	Valley.	Included	in	this	shift	were	more flexible and 
varying	 strategies	 that	 embraced	both	 local	 and	 international	developments,	 traditional	
and	renewable	energy	solutions	on	small	and	large-scale	as	necessary,	thematic	and	on-
line	 community	 developments	 that	 were	 self-organizing	 as	 well	 as	 strategic	 projects	
focused	on	‘gas	and	energy	roundabout’	policies	in	line	with	national,	trans-regional	and	
EU	developments.	Collaborations	on	international	and	EU	levels	across	Energy	Valley’s	
system	were	another	emergent	pattern	that	reflected	major	shifts	of	the	system	from	the	
once	regional	and	locally	oriented	system.
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4.4.6 Interconnectedness of system developments
Emerging
System
Patterns
Differences	that	matter
Transforming	interactions
‘Pull’	of	system Coping	strategies
Figure 5: Interconnectedness of System Reactions
The	 system	 reactions	 are	 interconnected	 as	 shown	 above	 in	 the	 diagram	 and	 together	
these	 result	 in	macro	 level	 system	 patterns	 as	 already	 described	 in	 the	 section	 above.	
When	gas	is	re-positioned	as	a	balancing	power	source	in	Energy	Valley	(‘pull’	of	system),	
then	 realizing	 an	 integrated	 fossil,	 renewable	 and	 gas	 energy	 system	 (‘differences’)	 is	
more	feasible.	This	allows	other	energy	carriers	to	be	seen	as	complementary	rather	than	
competitors	 (transforming	 interactions),	which	 in	 turn	 facilitates	open	 innovation	and	
collective	initiatives	as	‘coping	strategies’.	More	collaborative	and	integrated	approaches	
become	part	of	new	system	patterns.
4.5 System patterns in Energy Valley/NL and Eu
Energy
Developments
(End	States)
Contextual	
Factors
System
Reactions
Figure 6: System in System interconnections of Energy Developments
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The	analysis	explored	how	Energy	Valley	and	the	Dutch	national	systems	reflected	system	
patterns	at	the	EU	level.	Complex	Adaptive	Systems	(CAS)	approach	explains	how	systems	
are	embedded	in	larger	systems	and	how	systems	interact	and	feed	into	each	other.	The	
diagram	above	captured	the	embedded	nature	of	energy	systems	as	understood	by	CAS.
In	 the	 comparison	of	 the	 three	 levels,	 Energy	Valley,	 the	Netherlands	 and	 the	EU,	 the	
shifts	 in	 the	 contexts	 were	 similar,	 namely,	 the	 growing complexity and unpredictability	 of	
energy	system	developments	as	were	the	external drivers of change	(geo-politics,	financial	and	
euro	crises,	new	technological	advances,	energy	market	developments,	etc.).	Similarly,	in	
all	three	levels,	energy systems were embedded in larger socio-, political, economic and ecological systems.	
In	all	three	levels,	economics was leading	and	this	 framed	energy	developments	 in	terms	of	
enabling	competitiveness.	Common	themes	related	to	this	are	energy	security,	sustainable	
energy	solutions,	CO
2	
mitigations,	innovation,	and	smarter	grid	connections.	Regional social 
cohesion	and	job	creation	was	a	key	issue	to	Energy	Valley	and	the	EU.	
On	the	other	hand,	whilst	Energy	Valley	and	the	NL	had	a	gas-dominated	history	similar	
to	the	UK,	the	EU	had	a	wider	diversity	of	energy	sources	and	systems.	The	‘pull’	of	Energy	
Valley’s	system	was	to	keep gas in the energy mix	whilst	the	EU	was	focussed	on	independence of 
external sources of fossil fuels	plus	its	commitment	to	climate change	resulted	in	a	strong	‘pull’	
towards	renewables.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU	had	a	diverse ‘energy system’ with	27	different	
Member	 States	 (MS)	 with	 their	 different	 infrastructures,	 energy	 sources	 and	 socio-
economic	 structures	 stemming	 from	 their	 different	 history	 and	 geography.	 In	 Energy	
Valley	on	the	other	hand,	whilst	regional	differences	were	present,	national economic frame 
and policies were dominant.	
A	common	system	development	in	all	three	levels	was	the	acknowledgement	of	a	need for 
collective commitments	to	build	multi-disciplinary	competences,	cross-sector	and	new	value	
chain	 innovations,	new	business	 and	governance	models,	 and	more	 trans-regional	 and	
international	 collaborations	 to	meet	 the	new	and	 complex	 challenges	of	 energy.	There	
were	more	 visible	 coordination	 and	 connections	 in	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	markets	
in	all	levels,	more	and	different	alliances	and	collaborations,	new	governance	structures,	
more	 decentralization	 of	 energy	 movements,	 more	 trust	 and	 engagement	 to	 realize	
collective	goals,	more	sustainability,	technology	and	consumer	push,	etc.	The	system	level	
patterns	at	all	three	levels	had	some	differences	but	in	general,	there	were	many	parallels	
in	their	system	developments.
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4.6 Implications for end states and energy futures
The	 system	of	Energy	Valley	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 analysis	 showed	how	gas	was	 the	
dominant	factor	 in	the	system	and	how	the	stakeholders,	strategies	and	solutions	were	
all	 related	 to	 the	 traditional	 gas	 sector.	 In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 analysis,	 the	 system	
reactions,	the	role	and	definition	of	gas	in	the	new	Energy	Valley	system	had	changed.	Gas	
was	also	bio-gas,	sync	gas,	gas	from	different	sources	and	players,	gas	was	also	connected	
to	smart	grids	and	had	re-positioned	itself	as	a	balancing	and	storage	carrier	within	a	more	
diverse	energy	 system.	This	meant	new	and	different	 ‘coping	strategies’	 including	new	
competences	and	expertise	beyond	gas.	A	different	aspect	of	the	system	change	was	the	
earthquake	risks	brought	about	by	gas	exploitation.	The	position	of	gas	in	the	larger	socio-
economic	system	was	weakened	by	such	developments.	The	future	of	gas	in	the	energy	mix	
in	Energy	Valley	has	become	polarized	between	the	local	and	national	economic	interests	
and	therefore	new	‘coping	strategies’	needed	to	be	considered	where	citizen	acceptance	
and	national	interests	needed	to	be	balanced.
4.6.1 Contextual factors, system behaviour and end states
In	 this	 analysis,	 the	 role	of	 contextual	 factors	has	been	explored	 in	 the	 light	of	Energy	
Valley’s	energy	system	and	the	resulting	system	reactions.	The	analysis	also	included	an	
exploration	of	how	Energy	Valley	was	embedded	in	the	national	and	EU	systems.	Based	on	
this	analysis,	a	number	of	conclusions	can	be	drawn	that	have	implications	for	end	state	
developmental	pathways.	The	following	considerations	play	a	role	in	these	developments	
and	 can	 contribute	 or	 limit	 end	 state	 developments.	 The	 considerations	 have	 been	
categorized	under	 their	 respective	headings	of	 contextual	 factors,	 system	reactions	and	
system	in	systems.
Contextual factors and end states
role of contextual factors
Energy	systems	are	more	than	technological	systems
Each	energy	system	is	subject	to	local	and	global	contextual	factors	and	it	is	more	than	only	drivers	
of	change,	it	includes	history	and	geography,	stakeholders	and	system	definition
Interconnectedness	and	unpredictability	of	system	interactions	as	a	result	of	contextual	factors
Box 1: Elaboration on role of contextual factors
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Energy	 transition	 is	 not	 only	 a	 technical	 challenge	 but	 economic,	 (geo)	 political,	
environmental,	behavioural	and	(civil)	societal	aspects	play	an	important	role.	Moreover,	
these	aspects	are	interconnected	and	unpredictable	and	are	therefore	difficult	to	anticipate	
and	know	what	impact	they	could	have	on	chosen	pathways.
The	future	is	not	predictable	(gas	prices,	earthquakes,	technological	advances)	and	therefore	
more	attention	is	needed	to	‘fitness’	of	strategy	to	drivers	of	change	where	alertness	and	
responsiveness	 to	current	 trends	and	developments	are	 important.	Too	much	 focus	on	
long-term	planning	may	miss	current	trends	and	opportunities	elsewhere.
Focus	on	one	dominant	energy	system	(e.g.	gas	dominance)	could	lead	to	lock-in	effects	
inherent	in	contextual	factors.	External	drivers	of	change,	e.g.	a	major	earthquake,	could	
have	major	impacts	on	such	future	end	states.	A	diverse	energy	mix	offers	flexibility	and	
resilience.
System reactions and end states
System reactions
Due	to	unpredictability	of	energy	future,	planning	strategies	are	limited	in	their	value	and	therefore,	
more	resilient	strategies	are	needed.	These	could	include
•	 being	open	to	broader	developments
•	 creating	trust	amongst	a	larger	group	of	stakeholders	and	engaging	with	‘new’	stakeholder
•	 engaging	in	interdisciplinary	solutions,	innovations	and	knowledge	sharing
•	 supporting	new	businesses	to	reach	critical	mass,	and	to	be	part	of	the	energy	system
•	 creating	broader	system	definitions	and	approaches,	e.g.	energy	as	eco-system	
•	 acknowledging	self-organizing	processes	next	to	coordinated	policy
Box 2: Elaboration on system reactions
Interconnectedness	and	unpredictability	of	‘other’	factors	increases	the	urgency	to	engage	
and	 include	 stakeholders	outside	of	 energy	 in	developments	 to	expand	 the	perspective	
and	scope	of	strategy	frameworks	of	energy	clusters.	
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•	 Connections	(especially	to	outside	the	‘normal’)	as	opposed	to	fragmentation	and	‘silos’	
are	vital	to	break	down	‘lock-in’	risks	and	to	make	an	energy	system	more	resilient:	
	- Including	 other	 stakeholders,	 for	 example,	 engaging	 politicians	 at	 all	 levels,	
connecting	to	consumers	and	consumer	intermediaries	especially	since	consumer	
and	demand-side	focus	is	becoming	more	influential
	- Connections	to	other	disciplines	instead	of	mono-disciplinary	approaches	
	- Connections	in	an	enlarged	scope,	examples	being	gas	to	renewables,	international	
connections,	other	sectors,	value	chain	approach	instead	of	product	development	
in	isolation
•	 Building	ecosystems	to	accelerate	innovation	and	knowledge	sharing:
	- Includes	 open	 innovation,	 international,	 interdisciplinary,	 inter-sectorial,	
consumer	involvement,	focus	on	variety,	etc.
	- Government’s	 role	 in	 facilitating	 ecosystems	 including	 capacity	 building	 and	
knowledge	development	to	support	knowledge	acceleration	and	excellence.
	- Major	 push	 needed	 to	 boost	 start-ups,	 large	 corporations	 and	 R&D	 centres	 to	
create	critical	mass	to	attract	and	keep	expertise	and	talent	in	the	region.	
	- Attractiveness	of	the	region	is	a	major	challenge	that	would	influence	future	of	the	
cluster.	Energy	Valley	needs	to	deal	with	this	to	avoid	‘cluster	drain’.
•	 Centre	and	periphery	issues	where	relevant	such	as	a	shift	to	include	stakeholders	in	the	
margins	(environmentalists,	 ‘prosumers’,	consumers,	innovators,	funding	partners),	
or	a	shift	in	system	position	from	peripheral	regions	to	more	strategic	positions	as	was	
the	case	in	Energy	Valley.
•	 Better	alignment	and	connections	between	future	scenarios	and	frames	of	key	players	
need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 Balancing	 ‘frames’	 of	 climate	 change,	 competiveness	 and	
economics,	regional	cohesion	agendas	and	other	local	frames	needed	since	this	could	
result	in	affecting	end	state	developments.	Particularly,	where
	- energy	as	a	theme	served	different	goals	and	agendas
	- major	differences	and	misalignments	in	urgency	and	priorities	were	present
•	 Systems,	and	particularly	complex	systems,	are	 subject	 to	self-organizing	processes.	
Acknowledgement	of	such	processes	and	facilitating	decentralized	initiatives	as	part	
of	good	governance	is	needed	in	addition	to	coordination	through	top-down	policies	
and	guidance
•	 Building	trust	as	a	key	aspect	of	energy	system	developments	is	important	since	this	is	
strongly	connected	to	how	local	energy	systems	react	to	new	and	planned	development	
pathways.	This	includes
	- trust	between	different	types	of	businesses,	between	government	and	businesses,	
citizens	and	governments	and	businesses	
	- trust	 in	 large	 scale	 investments	and	projects	 especially	when	new	technology	 is	
involved
	- trust	in	the	‘care-taker’s	role’	of	the	government	and	the	long	term	sustainability	
of	societies
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System in system and end states
System in systems
Local	and	EU	energy	systems	are	interconnected
•	 	Lower	level	systems	feed	into	higher-level	systems	and	therefore	various	local	energy	systems’	
developments	and	their	respective	energy	end	developments	will	contribute	to	a	higher	order	
system	of	end	states
Box 3: Elaboration of system in system
•	 Local	 energy	 systems	 are	 connected	 to	 EU	 systems	 and	 this	 offers	 opportunities	 to	
connect	and	tap	into	competences,	resources,	energy	sources,	to	increase	scope,	scale	
and	 capabilities	 to	 accelerate	 energy	 system	developments	 locally	but	 it	 also	works	
both	ways	and	offers	national	and	EU	level	 systems	opportunities	 to	accelerate	and	
influence	their	preferred	energy	developments.
•	 On	a	systemic	 level,	being	aware	and	connecting	to	other	systems’	developments	 is	
an	opportunity	for	growth,	visibility	and	influence	and	at	the	same	time,	it	increases	
complexity	and	unpredictability	of	end	state	pathways.
•	 Local	 energy	 systems	 tend	 to	 be	 ‘locked	 in’	 to	 their	 contextual	 factors	 and	 system	
reactions	as	described	in	this	analysis.	Connecting	to	other	local	energy	systems	and	
to	the	EU	could	help	temper	lock-in	pulls.	At	the	same	time,	at	the	higher	EU	level,	
the	diversity	of	the	different	 local	energy	systems	and	their	end	state	pathways	and	
goals	make	the	EU	system	more	resilient.	Diversity	of	the	higher	level	system	could	
act	as	a	buffer	for	any	lack	of	resilience	of	energy	systems	to	external	shocks	(drivers	of	
change)	and	therefore	an	issue	to	be	considered	for	the	‘big	picture’	is	that	there	could	
be	different	end	states	in	a	larger	EU	system	but	that	the	higher	level	system	of	the	EU	
needs	to	be	diverse	and	resilient	to	future	drivers	of	change.
89 CONTExTuAL AND SYSTEmIC FOrCES IN ENErGY VALLEY,  ThE NEThErLANDS
4.6.2 Complex energy systems
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Figure 7: Complex Systemic Energy Developments
Based	on	the	systems	analysis	as	described	in	this	chapter	end	states	are	determined	by	
contextual	factors	of	the	(local)	energy	system	and	the	energy	system’s	reactions	to	such	
changes.	The	configurations	for	a	specific	energy	system	are	continuously	being	shaped	
by	 the	 interaction	 of	 contextual	 factors	 and	 system	 reactions.	 And	 end	 states	 of	 local	
systems	feed	into	higher-level	end	states,	which	in	turn	are	affected	by	contextual	factors	
and	 system	 reactions	 that	 then	 determine	 energy	 end	 states	 of	 the	 whole	 system-in-
system.	For	Europe,	local	and	regional	energy	end	states	feed	into	the	European	end	state	
developments	and	therefore	a	systemic	analysis	of	local	and	European	end	state	contextual	
factors	and	possible	system	reactions	could	provide	a	more	specific	picture	of	constraining	
and	 supporting	 factors	 towards	 end	 states.	 In	 addition,	 as	mentioned	 in	 the	 system	 in	
system	analysis,	 the	notion	of	different	end	states	 in	 local	energy	systems	is	a	plausible	
scenario,	which	in	turn	could	support	a	more	diverse	and	resilient	energy	system	at	the	
EU	level.	This	last	consideration,	of	systemic	interconnectedness,	could	become	a	relevant	
agenda	in	the	EU’s	development	of	its	Internal	Energy	Union	and	its	end	state	pathways.	
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4.6.3 Implications for Big Picture - 3 End states
Potential	 limiting	 factors	 as	 ‘risks’	 have	 been	 identified	 below	 for	 the	 end	 states,	
particularly	from	the	EU	perspective,	to	illustrate	key	contextual	and	systemic	factors	that	
could	affect	pathways	to	energy	end	state	scenarios.
•	 Risk of underestimation of ‘system reactions’	as	energy	systems	are	not	technology	
systems	but	social	systems
	- System	reactions	on	unexpected	incidents	such	as	nuclear	disasters,	shale	gas	risks,	
offshore	 oil	 disasters,	 earthquakes,	 political	 crises	 have	 shown	 their	 impact	 on	
energy	policies	and	practice.
	- System	reactions	on	slow	trends	(boiled	frogs),	for	example,	climate	change,	and	
on	sudden	breakthroughs	(game	changers),	for	example,	fracking	technology.
	- Micro	 level	 system	 reactions	 on	 price	 developments,	 ecological	 damage,	 push	
for	 autonomy	 and	 self-sufficiency,	 etc.,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 ‘prosumer’	 and	 green	
movements,	 decentralized	 energy	 systems	 and	 emergence	 of	 small	 innovative	
firms.
 End States:	Larger	risk	in	BAU,	less	risk	in	GAS,	and	least	in	RES.
•	 Risk of miscalculation of role of governments	and	regulations	at	European,	national	
and	regional	levels
	- European	Union’s	drive	to	be	independent	from	foreign	supplies	(energy	security	
focus)	and	its	transition	to	low	carbon	society.	Captured	in	new	‘Resilient	Energy	
Union’	 vision	 of	 secure,	 sustainable,	 competitive,	 affordable	 energy	 for	 every	
European.
	- EU’s	 ambitions	 translate	 to	 national	 and	 regional	 regulations,	 for	 example,	
renewed	focus	on	North	Sea	Grid	to	reduce	Russian	gas	supply	dependence.	
	- European	 Union’s	 innovation	 policy	 and	 funding	 programmes	 focus	 on	
strengthening	 regions	 and	 clusters	 to	 increase	 competitiveness	 of	 small	 and	
medium	businesses,	particularly	 in	new	emerging	 industries.	Energy	efficiency,	
smart	 grid	 and	 decentralized	 innovations	 are	 energy	 related	 examples.	 This	
includes	shifts	to	regional	vs.	national	levels,	strengthening	the	regional	and	local	
energy	systems	primacy.
End States:	BAU	and	GAS	scenarios	more	vulnerable	than	RES.	
•	 Lock-in risk due to current dominance of fossil fuels
	- Assumption	 of	 abundant	 fossil	 fuels	 (gas	 in	GAS	 scenario),	 power	 of	 fossil	 fuel	
corporations,	 short-term	 thinking	 and	growth	of	 energy	needs	 results	 in	more	
exploration,	 more	 infrastructure	 for	 fossil	 and	 non-fossil,	 more	 expertise,	 etc.	
(more	of	same	=	lock-in).
	- Underutilization	 of	 ‘other	 solutions’	 (as	 in	 RES	 scenario),	 cross-sectoral,	 cross-
disciplinary	open	innovation	developments.	
End States:	BAU	and	GAS	have	largest	risk,	RES	least.
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The	table	below	captures	the	risks	with	a	brief	explanation	for	EU	end	states.
Key risks risk for BAu risk for GAS risk for rES
underestimation of 
‘system reactions’
++ + - -
Short-term thinking particularly in BAU scenario makes it more 
vulnerable
In RES, variety of stakeholders including demand-side innovative firms, 
NGOs and consumers reduce tunnel vision and increase flexibility of 
system.
miscalculation of 
role of governments 
and regulations
++ + - -
Current dominance, lobby and short-term thinking of fossil fuel industry 
feeds into optimism of continued influence and lack of alternatives for 
current scenarios on the short-run
National sovereignty still dominant in EU and fossil fuel industry have 
powerful positions
EU ambition to be low carbon and energy independent is a push for 
RES 
Lock-in risk
++ + -
Similar to ‘role of government’ risk
Current dominance and power of fossil industry and a lack of 
alternatives strengthen search of solutions in ‘known’ RES are 
dependent on new innovation and therefore less risk of lock-in
Table 1: Implications of Risks for End States shift
4.7 Key findings 
General
•	 EU’s	 end	 states	 are	 unpredictable	 due	 to	 contextual	 factors	 and	 energy	 systems	
reactions
•	 Local	energy	systems	influence	EU	end	states	and	v.v.
•	 Local	energy	mix	variations	in	end	states	(e.g.	gas	dominance	in	NL)	contribute	to	EU’s	
diversity	and	less	lock-in	risk,	and	this	increases	EU	energy	system’s	resilience.
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risks
•	 Underestimation	of	‘system	reactions’	
•	 Risk	of	miscalculation	of	influence	of	governments	and	regulations	especially	BAU
•	 Risk	of	lock-in	especially	in	BAU	and	GAS
Opportunities
EU’s	combined	drive	for	energy	independence	and	low	carbon	economy	ambitions	create	
opportunities	for	leadership	in	innovation	(push	for	RES)
Note: The ‘Contextual and Systemic Forces in Energy Valley’ analysis was based on a PhD research project 
focussing on energy cluster dynamics that overlapped the study of ‘end states’ in the context of Energy Valley. 
Drs. Karel van Berkel was part of the research team contributing to the study. (Expected completion of PhD 
thesis, 2015).
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